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Foreword
Strobe Talbott
Governance is the greatest challenge facing the international commu
nity. In fact, only if the nations of the world cooperate in establishing
institutions and rules in support of the global common good will the
phrase “international community” have practical meaning. Otherwise,
sovereign nations will live, and very likely die, not in a community at
all but in a Hobbesian jungle.
The overarching common goal can best be deﬁned in the negative:
avoiding catastrophe for the planet. Because of humankind’s mastery
of technology, we now have the capacity to destroy ourselves. We can
do so today and quickly, in a thermonuclear war; or we can do so
tomorrow, more slowly but no less completely, through the ruination
of our environment. This book addresses that danger and what it will
take to avert it.
In their thoughtful, rigorous, comprehensive, and readable chap
ters, the scholars and practitioners assembled here discuss options and
opportunities for better management of our ecological interdepend
ence. The authors, all in the forefront of their ﬁelds, draw on several
areas of scientiﬁc expertise, including international law, economics,
biological sciences, and environmental policy; they also represent a
variety of national perspectives spanning ﬁve continents. Yet they
share a conviction that traditional national policy and international
diplomacy are no longer sufﬁcient, either in pace, scope or substance.
Retarding and reversing the damage that we are already inﬂicting on
our environment requires an unprecedented, coordinated, long-term
effort involving ambitious, innovative, and ﬂexible coalitions of state
and non-state actors, especially non-governmental organizations that
tap into the resources, knowledge, and activism of citizens.
Making the case for environmental governance is an intellectual
challenge as well as a political one. Hence the opportunity — and the
obligation — of leading institutions like the Yale School of Forestry &
Environmental Studies to contribute to the debate.
The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization is proud to have sup
ported this venture. Those of us involved in the founding of the
Center in 2001 have stressed that globalization is not a policy or an





  

option. It’s not good or bad. It’s not something to be for or against. It’s
a fact of life — something to be understood and managed. Yet global
ization is, for better or worse, subject to human behavior. We can max
imize the positive aspects of globalization, diminish the risks, and
counter the threats. In that sense, we’ve often said, globalization is like
the weather, which not only manifests the forces of nature but shows
the effects of human proﬂigacy and short-sightedness.
This book tackles head on that aspect of globalization — including
what it has to say about the weather, how it’s changing, and how we,
the international community, can change the way it’s changing.
Readers will have a chance to join the authors in better under
standing the problem of global environmental degradation and there
by being part of the solution, which is global governance.

  

A Note from the Editors
Daniel C. Esty and Maria H. Ivanova

This book grew out of the Global Environmental Governance Project
sponsored by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. The
project began in 1998 as a dialogue among environmental profession
als, government ofﬁcials, business people, non-governmental organi
zation leaders, and scholars from around the world keenly aware of
the magnitude of modern environmental challenges, the inability of
existing institutions to respond effectively, and the need for funda
mental reforms in the way we manage our global ecological interde
pendence. A diverse group has continued to gather over the years to
push the boundaries of the current debate and to delineate options
and opportunities for strengthened global environmental governance.
The World Summit on Sustainable Development to be held in
Johannesburg in August 2002 provided the impetus for assembling the
accumulated collective knowledge into a concise volume aiming to
contribute to the policy dialogue with a thoughtful yet rigorous
reform agenda. What seemed like an impossible timeframe for a pub
lication became a feasible project with editorial and publicity support
from the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (F&ES).
Dean James Gustave Speth contributed visionary leadership, policy
guidance, and ﬁnancial support. Jane Coppock, Assistant Dean and
Editor of the Yale F&ES Book Series, ingeniously pulled all the pieces
together and made this volume a vibrant part of the School’s book
series on environmental subjects of current interest.
We owe a great debt of gratitude to the extraordinary group of
authors that gave life to this book. The ﬁfteen contributors brought to
the project a depth and breadth of expertise, invaluable experience
from all social sectors, and a range of national perspectives from
Africa, Asia, Latin America, Western and Eastern Europe, and North
America. Above all, they offered energy, enthusiasm, and commit
ment. The authors submitted drafts and revisions under pressing
deadlines, quickly and thoughtfully responded to comments, and
traveled great distances to enliven the dialogue that this volume
reﬂects.





  

The truly collaborative nature of this project was manifested in a
two-day workshop in New Haven in April 2002 that allowed us to dis
cuss the draft chapters, elaborate the overall analytical framework of
the volume, and test preliminary ﬁndings. A grant from the Yale
Center for the Study of Globalization made this event possible. The
broad support, active engagement, and insightful advice of its Director
Strobe Talbott helped immeasurably. We are also grateful for the
encouragement and assistance of Associate Director Haynie Wheeler.
The commentaries and critiques of two reviewers, Peter Haas of the
University of Massachusetts and David Driesen of University of
Syracuse Law School, strengthened the book considerably. The valu
able comments of Mehjabeen Habidi-Abib of UNDP in Pakistan also
helped to bolster several of the chapters.
The analytical framework for this book has greatly beneﬁted from
our extensive discussions over a number of years with the participants
in the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy’s Global
Environmental Governance Project (and the recently constituted
Global Environmental Mechanism Policy Action Group that grew out
of that project). We wish to thank all those who have been part of this
process: Mehjabeen Abidi-Habib (Pakistan), Adnan Amin (Kenya), Ali
Azimi (Afghanistan), Abimbola Bamidele-Izu (Nigeria), Alicia
Bàrcena (Mexico), Johannah Bernstein (Canada), Frank Biermann
(Germany), Al Binger (Jamaica), Zbigniew Bochniarz (Poland),
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (Switzerland), Delphine Borione
(France), Tom Burke (United Kingdom), James Cameron (United
Kingdom), Paulo Henrique Cardoso (Brazil), Daniele Cesano (Italy),
Anilla Cherian (India), Nazli Choucri (Egypt), Angela Cropper
(Trinidad and Tobago), Carolyn Deere (Australia), Bharat H. Desai
(India), Neno Dimov (Bulgaria), Rudolf Dolzer (Germany), Elizabeth
Dowdeswell (Canada), Saliem Fakir (South Africa), Janine Ferretti
(Canada), Christiana Figueres (Costa Rica), Dan Fleshler (United
States), Claude Fussler (Switzerland), Arnoldo Jose Gabaldon
(Venezuela), Luis Gomez-Echeverri (Colombia), Pat Gruber (United
States), Michael Gucovsky (Israel), Peter Haas (United States), Scott
Hajost (United States), Parvez Hassan (Pakistan), Gudrun Henne
(Germany), Jim Hickman (United States), T. Christine Hogan
(Canada), Joy Hyvarinen (Finland), Jesse Johnson (United States),
Ilona Kickbusch (Germany), Maritta Koch-Weser (Germany), Koh
Kheng Lian (Singapore), Milwako Kurosaka (Japan), Alexander
Likhotal (Russian Federation), Karin Lissakers (United States), Frank

  

Loy (United States), Wangari Maathai (Kenya), Andrew Mack
(Australia), Dan Martin (United States), Claudia Martinez
(Colombia), Julia Marton-Lefèvre (France), Bill McCalpin (United
States), Kristin Morico (United States), Sascha Müller-Kraenner
(Germany), Daudi Mwakawago (Tanzania), Dhesigan Naidoo (South
Africa), Sunita Narain (India), Derek Osborn (United Kingdom),
Boyce Papu (South Africa), Franz Xaver Perrez (Switzerland), Kenneth
Prewitt (United States), Karl Rábago (United States), Tom Rautenberg
(United States), Julie Richardson (United Kingdom), Mark Ritchie
(United States), Michael Roux (Australia), Kim Samuel-Johnson
(Canada), Mark Schapiro (United States), P.J. Simmons (United
States), Udo Simonis (Germany), Sandra Smithey (United States),
Tom Spencer (United Kingdom), Matthew Stilwell (Australia),
Charlotte Streck (Germany), Simon Tay (Singapore), Beth Tener
(United States), Alvaro Umaña (Costa Rica), Simon Upton (New
Zealand), Annabell Waititu (Kenya), Joke Waller-Hunter (the
Netherlands), Wang Canfa (China), Patricia Waruhiu-Wangai (Kenya),
John Waugh (United States), Makarim Wibisono (Indonesia),
Xiangmin Liu (China), and Kees Zoeteman (the Netherlands).
An outstanding team of Yale students provided invaluable support
in research, editing, and organizing the book. We wish to acknowledge
the assistance of Elizabeth Allison, Andres Luque, Shafqat Hussain,
and Tyler Welti. Pierre-Luc Arsenault stepped in as an editorial assis
tant and has worked wonders. We wish to pay special tribute to Emily
Noah whose extraordinary skills in research, writing, editing, and
graphic design advanced not only the book effort but also the Global
Environmental Governance Project more generally.
Jane Coppock, the series editor, and Melissa Goodall, editorial
assistant, at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
deserve special recognition and thanks. Simply said, without them this
book would not have been possible. Their contribution to every stage
of the process and every page of the volume is invaluable. We are also
grateful to Barbara Ruth, Carolyn Deere, and Irina Faion for their
assistance at critical moments.
A book is not just about writing. Its ultimate purpose is to convey
an idea. In this regard, we are grateful for the use of David Walker’s
quilt art on the book cover, which communicates the myriad ways in
which humanity is interwoven and interrelated. Dottie Scott’s
resourceful assistance with the page layout was indispensable to the
production of the book on a tight schedule. We are also appreciative





  

of the efforts of the team at Yale’s Reprographics and Imaging Services
(RIS) where the book was produced. The Yale F&ES book series has
used these digital publishing services for many years, and the existence
of a facility where books can be designed, printed, bound, and mailed,
utilizing the latest in digital technology, has enabled many an author
to get ideas into print at a speed that was once considered inconceiv
able. On this particular project, our thanks go to Maura Gianakos and
Peter Johnson for the overall graphic design of the book, and to Joseph
Cinquino who, as always, managed the printing and production
process with efﬁciency and grace.
This project could not have gone forward without substantial sup
port from several funders. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation helped launch the Global Environmental Governance
Project in 1998 and has continued to support its activities.
Contributions from the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Global
Environment and Trade Study (and its funders including the Ford
Foundation and the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership)
have allowed the project to continue and expand.
Publishing a book is not the end of this sweeping project. While
this volume marks a major landmark in the Global Environmental
Governance Project, it also denotes the beginning of an expanded pol
icy and outreach effort. Building on its four-year initiative, the Yale
Center for Environmental Law and Policy, in cooperation with the
Globus Institute for Globalization and Sustainability in the
Netherlands, and the Commission on Globalization, has established a
Global Environmental Mechanism (GEM) Policy Action Group. The
goals of this Policy Action Group are to: (1) deﬁne a thoughtful, yet
rigorous agenda for global environmental governance reform; (2)
open a “back channel” dialogue among government ofﬁcials, NGO
leaders, academics, and business community representatives on ways
to strengthen global environmental institutions; (3) create a con
stituency for sustained involvement in a reform initiative; and (4)
work toward the implementation of the reform agenda.
We hope that, with the publication of this collection of reform
visions and options, the group of authors and collaborators can assist
decisionmakers around the world in beginning to deﬁne ambitious
yet feasible ways of converting global environmental governance chal
lenges into opportunities.
New Haven, Connecticut
July 2002



The Global Environmental Agenda:
Origins and Prospects
James Gustave Speth
summary
We have been moving rapidly to a swift and pervasive deterioration of
our environmental assets. In response, there has been an upsurge of
international environmental law and diplomacy, a vast outpouring of
impressive scientific research, and thoughtful policy analysis. What has
emerged over the past two decades is the international community’s
first attempt at global environmental governance.
Two developments were needed before the international
environmental movement could be born: (1) environmental policy had to
be legitimized at the national level, and (2) the life-sustaining processes
of the biosphere had to be perceived as a common concern of all peoples.
The first phase of global environmental governance has been instru
mental in raising domestic and international awareness for
environmental issues, but overall it has been marked more by failure
than success. The threatening trends that spurred international
attention twenty years ago persist essentially unabated, ozone depletion
being the principal exception. It is clearly time to launch a second phase,
moving us from talk to action.
Three broad paths to environmental governance can be discerned.
First, new institutions and norm-setting procedures are needed at the
international level. Second, bottom-up initiatives from non-government
organizations (NGOs), businesses, local governments, and other actors
should be encouraged. Third, we need to address more directly the
underlying causes of environmental degradation, such as population
growth, poverty and underdevelopment, inadequate technologies, and
market failure brought on by failure to insist on environmentally honest
prices.





  

the new ethical imperative
We have entered a new period in our relationship with the natural
world. Human inﬂuence is pervasive and deep. We impact hugely on
the great life support systems of the planet. We are now at the plane
tary controls, whether we like it or not. Scientist Peter Vitousek and his
co-authors stated the matter forcefully in a 1997 article in Science:
All of these seemingly disparate phenomena trace to a single
cause – the growing scale of the human enterprise. The rates,
scales, kinds, and combinations of changes occurring now are
fundamentally different from those at any other time in history;
we are changing earth more rapidly than we are understanding
it. We live on a human-dominated planet – and the momentum
of human population growth, together with the imperative for
further economic development in most of the world, ensures
that our dominance will increase…. Humanity’s dominance of
Earth means that we cannot escape responsibility for managing
the planet. (Vitousek et al., 1997)
Scientists are generally a cautious lot, so when our most respected
scientists issue a plea for “active management of the planet,” we must
take notice. Aldo Leopold, perhaps the most famous graduate of the
school that I now serve as dean, noted that “one of the penalties of an
ecological education is that one lives alone in a world of wounds.”
There is a lot of bad news in the world of environmental affairs, but
there is good news as well. One piece of good news is that the plea of
Vitousek is but the latest in a long line of appeals from the scientiﬁc
community, urging governments and others to take the task of pro
tecting the global environment more seriously.
Starting in the 1980s, governments and others did indeed take
notice and began the process of assuming responsibility for planetary
management. What has emerged over the past two decades is the
international community’s ﬁrst attempt at global environmental gov
ernance. All is not well yet in this new arena, but it is important to
acknowledge what has been accomplished.
Before examining these accomplishments in global governance of
the environment, however, a quick observation about vocabulary is in
order. “Global governance” does not imply a global government, nor



does it include only the actions of governments. Many non-govern
mental organizations (NGOs), businesses, and communities are
already playing large roles in the emergence of global environmental
governance as we know it today.
It is also interesting to contrast the use of language in the environ
mental ﬁeld and the ﬁeld of economics.

The phrase “managing the global economy” comes rather
easily. It is frequently heard because it is a priority enterprise
of governments, multilateral financial institutions, and many
others. But “managing the global environment”? It still sounds
futuristic, but it shouldn’t. The global environment is more
of an integrated system than the global economy. It is
even more fundamental to human wellbeing. It is impacted
powerfully by human activities, and it requires collective
management.

origins of the global environmental agenda
An agenda of the principal large-scale environmental concerns of the
international community has been deﬁned. In response to this agenda,
there has been an upsurge of international conferences, negotiations,
action plans, treaties, and other initiatives. New ﬁelds of international
environmental law and diplomacy have been born. There has been a
vast outpouring of impressive and relevant scientiﬁc research and
policy analysis. Increasingly sophisticated actions by an ever-stronger
international community of environmental and other NGOs have
flourished, ranging from the global to the local, from civil
disobedience to analytical think-tank publications.
Both national governments and multilateral institutions, from the
United Nations to the international development banks, have recog
nized these concerns, creating major units to address global-scale
issues. While many multinational corporations are still in denial, oth
ers have become highly innovative and have moved ahead with





  

impressive steps, often before their governments. In academia, inter
national environmental affairs has become a major subject of intellec
tual inquiry and teaching. A large body of scholarly analysis now
exists. And we are fast-approaching another of those milestone events:
the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg,
which follows the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.
Large-scale environmental concerns have attracted increasing
attention from governments, NGOs, multilateral agencies, and even
the business community. How did this agenda emerge? How were the
issues identiﬁed and framed? What has been accomplished to date in
the area of global environmental governance? By whom? How did
these actors gain recognition and political traction?

The Rise of Domestic Concern: The U.S. Environmental Movement

To put these issues in perspective, it is useful to start in the 1960s with
the emergence of the modern era of environmental concern. It was
driven by domestic, mostly local, issues: local air and water pollution,
strip-mining, highway construction, noise pollution, dams and stream
channelization, clear-cutting of forests, hazardous waste dumps,
nuclear power plants, exposures to toxic chemicals, oil spills, suburban
sprawl. Concern about these issues gathered strength throughout the
1960s.
In the United States, this concern led to the National
Environmental Policy Act in December 1969, and to the ﬁrst Earth Day
a few months later. Within the short span of a few years in the early
1970s, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Presidential
Council on Environmental Quality were established, the Clean Air
and Water Acts and other major federal legislation were passed, and
the federal courts were deluged with lawsuits brought by a new gener
ation of environmental advocacy organizations, often funded by
major U.S. foundations. It was during this period that groups like the
Natural Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense
Fund were launched.



The new environmental movement handed the business
community a long string of defeats, and it often left scientists
anxious in their efforts to keep up. Economists were aghast,
and ecologists, even lawyers, were lionized. Large majorities
of the public were strongly pro-environment. The news media
were full of stories, and the government responded with farreaching, expensive requirements and tough deadlines for
industry. A tipping point — a phase change — was reached.
What was once impossible became inevitable. The fire was lit.
How did this happen? A number of factors came together (Speth,
1985, 1988). First, there was the rising demand for environmental qual
ity in an increasingly afﬂuent post-war population. Between 1950 and
1970, U.S. per capita income rose by ﬁfty-two percent. People sought
the amenities of the suburbs, and by 1970 there were more Americans
in the suburbs than in cities or rural areas. National Park visitation
doubled between 1954 and 1962 and doubled again by 1971 (U.S.
Council on Environmental Quality, 1979).
Second, pollution and blight were blatant and inescapable. Smog,
soot, and the resultant smarting eyes and coughs from air pollution,
streams and beaches closed to ﬁshing and swimming because of water
contaminants, plastic trash and toxic chemicals that would not go
away, birds threatened by DDT, pesticide poisoning, ﬁsh kills, power
plants and highways in the neighborhood, marshes ﬁlled for new track
houses and streams channelized for navigation and drainage – all
these threats were highly visible and impossible to ignore.
Third, the social upheavals of the 1960s had given rise to a new gen
eration of questioning, politically active, and socially concerned young
people. The civil rights and anti-war movements showed that political
activism could work. Some of the active ﬁgures were also not so
young. Based on the teach-ins used to protest the Vietnam War,
Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson came up with the concept of a
national teach-in for the environment, and thus launched what
became the ﬁrst Earth Day.





  

Fourth, there was a widespread view that major corporations were
getting away with murder. Eloquent writers emerged to make the case:
Ralph Nader wrote Unsafe at Any Speed in 1965. Rachel Carson pub
lished Silent Spring in 1962. The play had to have a villain, and corpo
rate America was it.
Fifth, the likely opposition — the business community — was
caught off guard, without time to marshal its troops or gather its
ammunition. Even environmental NGOs were surprised. The Sierra
Club’s executive director later noted that they “were taken aback by the
speed or suddenness with which the new forces exploded….We were
1
severely disoriented” (Shabecoff, 1993).
Finally, there were the major precipitating events: the Cuyahoga
River in Cleveland bursting into ﬂames, the Interior Department’s
proposal to ﬂood the Grand Canyon, and, most signiﬁcantly, the Santa
Barbara oil spill in 1969. The rest, as they say, is history.
principal characteristics of
the early environmental agenda
The global-scale challenges that concern us today were almost
totally absent from the discussion in the 1960s and 1970s. Only glob
al population growth and protection of the ozone layer were includ
ed in the concerns of the time.
There was no major body of science – or group of scientists – push
ing these issues forward. Some individual scientists played major
roles – Paul Ehrlich, John Holden, Barry Commoner, and George
Woodwell among them. But the issues were advanced mainly by
events and by the realities of people’s everyday experiences.
Similarly, there was little need to try to define and promote an
agenda. The agenda was defined by everyday incidents and the accu
mulation of actions in response. It was Lois Gibbs and her efforts at
Love Canal, for example, that put the issue of abandoned hazardous
waste sites on the agenda, not scientists or the government, and it
happened after much of the early environmental legislation had
been passed.

1

Shabecoff’s A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement contains an excellent
survey of today’s environmental movement. See also the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality,
Environmental Quality: Tenth Annual Report, 1979.



The Emergence of Global Issues

If this was the domestic scene, where were the global-scale issues of
primary concern to us? Much as the domestic agenda of the 1970s was
forming in the 1960s, the global change agenda was quietly taking
shape in the 1970s. Throughout the 1970s, a steady stream of publica
tions with a planetary perspective emerged, calling attention to glob
al-scale concerns. Most were authored by scientists with the goal of
taking their ﬁndings and those of other colleagues to a larger audi
ence. A number of these reports were path-breaking, deﬁning the
global environmental agenda, but not all of them met with universal
acclaim.
seminal global environmental reports – 1970-1978
1970

2

Man’s Impact on the Global Environment, Report of
the Study of Critical Environmental Problems
(a scientific group assembled at MIT)

1971

This Endangered Planet, Richard Falk

1972

Exploring New Ethics for Survival, Garrett Hardin

1972

Only One Earth, Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos

1974

The Limits to Growth, Donella Meadows et al.

1978

The Human Future Revisited, Harrison Brown

1978

The Twenty-Ninth Day, Lester Brown

There were also numerous reports from scientiﬁc groups, especial
ly panels and committees organized by the International Council of
Scientific Unions, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). These reports
included the now famous 1974 study by Rowland and Molina, explain
ing the potential of CFCs to deplete the ozone layer. Their work
remains the only environmental research to date to win the Nobel
Prize. Also among these documents was the Charney Report, which
was published by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 1979, and
2

For complete citations, see reference section at the end of this chapter.





  

told us most of what we needed to know about climate change to take
action. These reports and the steady stream of publications from
Lester Brown and his team at the Worldwatch Institute collectively laid
out the key issues.
Then, starting around 1980, a series of reports appeared seeking to
pull together all of these issues into a coherent agenda for interna
tional action.
seminal global environmental reports – 1980-1990
1980
1980

3

World Conservation Strategy, IUCN and UNEP
The Global 2000 Report to the President, U.S. Council on
Environmental Quality

1981

Global Future: Time to Act, U.S. Council on Environmental
Quality

1982

The World Environment: 1972-1982, UNEP scientific team
(Holdgate et al.)

1983

Environmental Research and Management Priorities
for the 1980s, an international group of scientists
organized by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences

1987

Our Common Future, World Commission on Environment
and Development (the Brundtland Commission Report)

Predominantly scientiﬁc efforts were designed to bring global-scale
challenges forcefully to the attention of governments. These syntheses
collectively stressed ten principal environmental concerns:

•

Loss of crop and grazing land due to desertiﬁcation, erosion, con
version of land to non-farm uses, and other factors;

•

Depletion of the world’s tropical forests, leading to loss of forest
resources, serious watershed damage (erosion, ﬂooding, and silta
tion), and other adverse consequences;

•

Mass extinction of species, principally from the global loss of
wildlife habitat, and the associated loss of genetic resources;

3

For complete citations, see reference section at the end of this chapter.



•

Rapid population growth, burgeoning Third World cities, and
ecological refugees;

•
•

Mismanagement and shortages of freshwater resources;

•

Threats to human health from mismanagement of pesticides and
persistent organic pollutants;

•

Climate change due to the increase in greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere;

•

Acid rain and, more generally, the effects of a complex mix of air
pollutants on ﬁsheries, forests, and crops;

•

Depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer by CFCs and other
gases.

Overﬁshing, habitat destruction, and pollution in the marine envi
ronment;

Clearly this was a new agenda, very different from the one
that sparked the first Earth Day in 1970.

stage-setting developments
Political scientist Keith Caldwell has noted that two developments
were needed before the international environmental movement could
be born: environmental policy had to be legitimized at the national
level, and the life-sustaining processes of the biosphere had to be per
ceived as a common concern of all peoples.
Caldwell sees the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment,
the Stockholm Conference, as crucially important in both respects
(Caldwell, 1996). Ably led by Maurice Strong, the Stockholm
Conference forced many national governments to develop domestic
environmental programs – including those in Europe, which were lag
ging behind the United States at that point, though not today – and it
legitimized the biosphere as an object of national and international
policy and collective management.





  

The Stockholm Conference also had a further major consequence
– the creation of UNEP – which, as noted above, had a major role in
the 1970s in framing the global agenda. The United Nations Environ
ment Programme made estimates of deforestation and promoted
strategies of action, convened the 1977 international conference on
desertiﬁcation, and promoted international agreements on the protec
tion of migratory species and the World Climate Program of the
World Meteorological Organization, all in the 1970s.
By the mid-1980s, the intellectual and policy leadership of the sci
entiﬁc community, the NGO community (groups such as IUCN,
Worldwatch, and the World Resources Institute), and UNEP had paid
off: a new and international environmental agenda had been estab
lished, one that governments would have to address collectively in
some way to be credible. The press for action on these ten issues was
too strong to ignore. Intellectuals in the scientiﬁc and NGO commu
nities had excellent media access to keep the pressure on and keep the
issues in the public eye. It would take another decade for this to hap
pen fully, but by the mid-1990s each of the ten challenges had become
the subject of a major international treaty, plan of action, or other ini
tiative (although the freshwater and marine initiatives are arguably too
weak to count).
What we see, then, is that the global agenda emerged and moved
forward due primarily to a relatively small, international leadership
community in science, government, the UN, and NGOs. They took
available opportunities to put these issues forward – indeed they cre
ated such opportunities – so that governments had little choice but to
respond. The game that many governments played was to react, but
not forcefully.

domestic action and global indifference
Against this background, it is instructive to compare the emergence of
the global agenda with the emergence of the original, predominantly
domestic agenda a decade earlier. The differences have proven conse
quential in eliciting corrective action from governments. Several con
trasts deserve close attention.



•

The issues on the domestic agenda were acute, immediate, and
understandable to the public. Issues on the global agenda tend to
be more chronic, more remote (at least from the North), techni
cally complicated, and thus more difﬁcult to understand and relate
to. These differences have translated into major disparities in the
degree of public awareness and support.

•

The global agenda did not spring bottom-up from actual impacts
on people; rather, it was forged top-down at the international level
by science (often disputed science), by NGOs (often with circum
scribed credibility), and by a peanut-sized UN agency tucked away
in Nairobi.

•

Unlike the domestic agenda, respect for national sovereignty
requires agreement from many governments, often with different
rankings of priorities. No government can be compelled to agree
nor obligated without its consent. Thus treaties are hard to attain,
and forceful treaties are a rare commodity.

•

The domestic agenda was largely translated into legislation before
corporate and other opposition was aroused. Action on the global
agenda has been pursued in the context of an alerted, prepared,
and powerful opposition where corporate interests are viewed as
threatened.

•

The world’s most powerful country led in the ﬁght for nationallevel action in the 1970s, but has largely failed to provide interna
tional leadership on the global agenda. Indeed, the United States
has frequently been the principal hold-out on international envi
ronmental agreements.

•

The villainy of the global agenda is more ambiguous. The blame
for global-scale environmental problems cannot rest solely on the
shoulder of big corporations when lifestyles in the developed
world, mismanagement by governments of both the North and
the South, and other factors are so clearly implicated. Increasingly,
pollution comes not from something going wrong, but from nor
mal life.





  

•

Domestic agendas can be addressed primarily through regulatory
means, but the global agenda requires major expenditures by gov
ernments, including development assistance to the poorer coun
tries.

In light of these barriers to progress, it is a wonder that any has
been made at all. How should one assess the progress of the last two
decades – the decades during which we have been “on notice” that we
faced extraordinary global environmental challenges? As noted earlier,
there is a signiﬁcant list of accomplishments that have followed in the
wake of the emergence of the new global agenda. But as also noted,
there have been severe constraints on seeking concerted international
action. How has the play of these forces worked out in the real world?

assessment and prospects
Looking back, it cannot be said that the generations of the 1960s and
1970s did nothing in response to the global call for action. Progress has
been made on some fronts, but not nearly enough. There are out
standing success stories, but rarely are they commensurate with the
problem.

For the most part, we have analyzed, debated, discussed, and
negotiated these issues endlessly. My generation is a genera
tion, I fear, of great talkers, overly fond of conferences. But on
action, we have fallen far short. As a result, the threatening
global trends highlighted twenty years ago are still very
much with us, ozone depletion being the notable exception.
But if we have not succeeded in reversing these trends, perhaps we
have laid a good foundation for rapid action today. In fact, the results
of twenty years of international environmental negotiations are disap
pointing. It is not that what has been agreed, for example, in the con
ventions on climate change, desertiﬁcation, and biodiversity, is useless.
But these treaties are mostly frameworks for action; they do not drive
the changes that are needed. The same can be said for the extensive



international discussions on world forests, which have never reached
the point of a treaty.
In general, international environmental law and its hundreds of
treaties are plagued by vague agreements, minimal requirements, lax
enforcement, and under-funded support. The weakness of most envi
ronmental treaties should not be a surprise, however; they were forged
in negotiating processes that give maximum leverage to any country
with an interest in protecting the status quo. Similarly, the interna
tional institutions created to address these issues – the UNEP and
ECOSOC’s Commission on Sustainable Development – are among the
weakest multilateral organizations.

If the first phase of global environmental governance has
been marked more by failure than success, it is clearly time to
launch a second phase that corrects past mistakes and moves
from talk to action.

global environmental governance scenarios
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)
has sketched several broad paths in environmental governance:

•

The “FROG” – First Raise Our Growth – scenario calls for the res
olution of economic challenges ﬁrst. FROG is a business-as-usual
scenario, leading to huge environmental costs, even in the eyes of
business leaders.

•

“GEOPolity” is a success scenario in which sustainability is vigor
ously pursued. In this case, people turn to government to focus the
market on environmental and social ends and rely heavily on
intergovernmental institutions and treaties.

•

The ﬁnal scenario is “Jazz.” Jazz is not an acronym. It is a spirit, a
world of unscripted initiatives, decentralized and improvisational.
In this world, there is abundant information about business
behavior; good conduct is enforced by public opinion and con





  

sumer behavior. Governments facilitate; NGOs are very active;
business sees strategic advantage in doing the right thing (WBCSD,
1997).
The initial international response to the global change agenda has
been to try to move the world from FROG to GEOPolity. It isn’t work
ing. Getting serious requires new action on three mutually supportive
fronts.

Revising GEOPolity

The current world of GEOPolity is designed to fail. It can be
redesigned for success by insisting on new norm-setting procedures
and new institutions, including a Global Environmental Organization
(GEO). The case for an effective GEO is as strong as that for an effec
tive World Trade Organization (WTO). The international community
knows how to create plausible multilateral arrangements and has
often done so in other, mostly economic, areas (Speth, 2002).

Taking Jazz to Scale

A second path to the future is to implement measures that can take
Jazz to scale. Jazz is the most exciting arena for action today, with an
outpouring of bottom-up, unscripted initiatives from business, NGOs,
governments, and others:

•

Seven large companies, including DuPont, Shell, BP, and Alcan,
have agreed to reduce their CO2 emissions ﬁfteen percent below
their 1990 levels by 2010. Indeed, Alcan is reported to be on track
to reduce its emissions twenty-ﬁve percent below 1990 levels by
2010, and DuPont is on schedule to reduce emissions by sixty-ﬁve
percent.

•

Eleven major companies, including DuPont, GM, and IBM, have
formed the Green Power Market Development Group and com
mitted to develop markets for 1,000 megawatts of renewable ener
gy over the next decade.

•

Home Depot, Lowes, Andersen, and others have agreed to sell
wood (to the degree that it is available) only from sustainably



managed forests certiﬁed by an independent group using rigorous
criteria. Unilever, the largest processor of ﬁsh in the world, has
agreed to do the same regarding ﬁsh products.

NGOs have played important roles in forging these corporate

initiatives. They are the real maestros of Jazz. Local govern
ments, universities, and other entities have also contributed.
Over 500 local governments have now joined a campaign to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Speth, 2002).

Attacking the Drivers of Deterioration

The third and most important path to sustainability is to address more
directly the underlying drivers of environmental degradation (Speth,
1995).

•

Population. Analyses suggest that an escalation of proven non
coercive approaches could lead to a leveling off of global popula
tion at eight and a half billion people in this century. This will not
happen without adequate support for the United Nations’ Cairo
Plan of Action.

•

Poverty and underdevelopment. Poverty is an important con
tributor to environmental deterioration: the poor often have lit
tle choice other than to lean too heavily on a declining resource
base. But improved development prospects are also needed
because the only world that works is one in which the aspirations
of poor people and poor nations for fairness and justice are
being realized. The views of developing countries in internation
al negotiations on the environment are powerfully shaped by
preoccupation with their own compelling economic and social
challenges and distrust of the intentions and policies of indus
trialized countries. Sustained and sustainable development pro
vides the only context in which there is enough confidence, trust,
and hope to ground the difficult measures needed to realize envi
ronmental objectives.





  

Eliminating large-scale poverty is no longer an impossible dream.
It could be accomplished in the lifetimes of today’s young people.
But, as with population, achieving these goals is limited by inade
quate development assistance, in this case compounded by protec
tionist trade regimes and heavy debt burdens.

•

Technology. The only way to reduce pollution and resource con
sumption while achieving expected economic growth is to bring
about a wholesale transformation in the technologies that today
dominate manufacturing, energy, transportation, and agriculture.
Across a wide front, environmentally sophisticated technologies
are either available or soon can be. From 1990 to 1998, when oil
and natural gas use grew globally at a rate of two percent annual
ly, and coal consumption did not grow at all, wind energy genera
tion grew at an annual rate of twenty-two percent and photo
voltaics at sixteen percent. Denmark now gets ﬁfteen percent of its
energy from wind; Japan last year installed 100 megawatts of pho
tovoltaic power. Transformation of the energy sector must rank as
the highest priority.

•

Market signals. Needed changes in technology and consumption
patterns will not happen unless there is a parallel revolution in
pricing. The corrective most needed now is environmentally hon
est prices. Full cost pricing is thwarted today by the failure of gov
ernments to eliminate environmentally perverse subsidies (esti
mated globally at $1.5 trillion per year) to ensure that external
environmental costs are captured in market prices (Myers and
Kent, 2001). We have no reason to expect major environmental
improvement while these distortions persist.

conclusion
There is no great mystery about what must be done. What does remain
a great mystery is how we get on that path. Political systems alternate
between incremental drift and rapid change – a pattern of punctuat
ed equilibria. The global environment has been addressed incremen
tally, whereas we need major reform, a phase change, a tipping point,
a rapid shift to a new equilibrium akin to the outpouring of U.S.
domestic environmental concern in the 1960s and 1970s.



It is possible that we are seeing the birth of something like this shift
in the anti-globalization protests, in the far-reaching and unprece
dented initiatives being taken by some private corporations, in the
growth of NGOs and their innovations, in scientists speaking up and
speaking out, and in the outpouring of climate and other environ
mental initiatives by the religious community. We certainly must hope
that something new and vital is afoot.
There are many hopeful signs that things are beginning to change
for the better, but we are still at the early stages of the journey to
sustainability. Meanwhile, the forward momentum of the drivers of
environmental deterioration is great. As former Presidential Science
Advisor Jack Gibbons is fond of saying, “If we don’t change direction,
we’ll end up where we’re headed!” And today we are moving rapidly to
a swift, pervasive, and appalling deterioration of our environmental
assets. There is still world enough and time, but the next few decades
are crucial. The next doublings of the world economy cannot resemble
those of the past.
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Flying Blind: Assessing Progress
Toward Sustainability
David Hales and Robert Prescott-Allen
summary
For development to be sustainable, it must combine a robust economy,
rich and resilient natural systems, and flourishing human communities.
Rational pursuit of these goals demands that we have clear policy
targets, operationalize them in terms of actions and results, devise
analytical tools for deciding priority actions, and monitor and evaluate
our progress. Goals that are not measurable are unlikely to be achieved.
We invest in what we measure, and over time we become what we
reward. Without valid and reliable assessment methodology and tools,
we run the risk of achieving unintended and unanticipated results, and
of wasting much of our investment.
When the nations of the world convene in Johannesburg, South Africa
for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, it will again be
apparent that our worthwhile dreams have exceeded our capacity to
manage effectively, in large measure because we have no systematic,
valid, and reliable way to evaluate our progress, and no fixed point of
responsibility for this task.
This chapter offers a challenge to governments whose rhetoric calls
for democratic participation, transparent actions, and real results, but
whose practical actions fall short of these aspirations. There are no other
commitments remotely achievable for the Johannesburg Summit that
could be more valuable than a legally binding agreement to create the
means to authoritatively, candidly, and openly assess progress toward
sustainable development.





  

the sustainability challenge
As the gavel fell on the adoption of Agenda 21: Programme of Action for
Sustainable Development in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, there was a
strong sense that the nations of the world were on the road to sus
tainability. The catalytic force of the Earth Summit led to the
Convention on Biodiversity, the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, and the Convention on Desertiﬁcation, all of which entered
into force during the 1990s. While the speciﬁcs of ﬁnancial resources
and technology transfer were intentionally left vague, the basis for a
global partnership, seemed to be in place.
Institutions were devised for the implementation of the Rio
outcomes. In 1993, the General Assembly of the United Nations
established the UN Commission on Sustainable Development to
“review progress” on each chapter of Agenda 21 and assess overall
headway. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated to operationalize
the Framework Convention on Climate Change, including legally
binding targets for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. An
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests and an Intergovernmental Forum
on Forests have been established to apply the Forest Principles in
programs for action at the national level.
At every level, although not in every place, the roles of civil society,
transnational corporations, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have evolved. More than sixty countries have formed nation
al commissions for sustainable development, and more than four
hundred cities and municipalities have adopted local versions of
Agenda 21. Many corporations seem anxious to be seen as responsive
to societal calls to play their part in raising environmental and labor
standards worldwide. In 2000, the Organisation for Economic Co
operation and Development (OECD), together with representatives of
business, labor, and civil society, produced Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, one of several examples of texts encourag
ing corporate social responsibility. The World Economic Forum also
routinely discusses corporate accountability and the role of corpora
tions in promoting sustainable development.
Yet in 2002, as the gavel is raised to convene nations and their devel
opment partners in Johannesburg for the World Summit on
Sustainable Development, a working deﬁnition of sustainable devel
opment remains elusive (Esty, 2001a) and the institutional support
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structures for sustainable development at national and international
levels dysfunctional to the point of irrelevance (Upton, 2000).

A fundamental reason for high levels of dissatisfaction, dis
cord, and unease is the lack of capacity to show real progress
against the goals set by the Rio Conference.

the rio decade: assessing progress
Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration states that a “healthy and productive
life in harmony with nature” is at the core of sustainable development
and is an entitlement of people around the globe. Much has changed
since 1992, but in terms of achieving the goal of sustainability, what have
these developments meant? The answer, simply put, is that we don’t
know. A summary tour of “facts” serves to illustrate this uncertainty.
Are people richer or poorer?

The World Bank argues that poor people the world over have
increased their incomes, are better educated, and are living healthier
and more productive lives. However, when these ﬁgures are disaggre
gated by country, it is difﬁcult to determine how much of the progress
alluded to by the Bank has occurred in the past ten years. In many of
the least developed countries, annual per capita income has decreased
(UN, 1999). The gap between rich and poor has grown wider in many
places. By 2000, the income of the richest ﬁfth of the world’s people
was seventy-four times that of the poorest ﬁfth, and the assets of the
richest two hundred individuals exceeded the combined wealth of the
less wealthy forty percent of the world’s population (UNDP, 1999).
The economies of some countries – Singapore, South Korea, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan, for example – have done well. Indonesia, Thailand,
and Argentina made apparent economic progress for the ﬁrst part of
the Rio Decade, and have faced economic disasters since. In other
nations, little has changed. Average incomes in sub-Saharan Africa
continue to be stagnant, as they have been since the 1960s, and many
of the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia have
suffered through sharp rises in poverty in the 1990s.





  

Is there enough food for everyone?

Overall food production is sufﬁcient to feed the current global popu
lation of more than six billion people. Yet, the inability to transport
and distribute that food, interruptions in food supply due to political
instability, and chronic poverty have led to unremitting malnutrition
in many urban areas and across sub-Saharan Africa. There are no
major stocks of food ﬁsh that are not experiencing stress and decline,
and many are collapsing.
Has quality of life improved?

Life expectancy has risen slightly, with gains in developing countries
marginally outpacing those in the developed world (World Resources
Institute, 1998). There have been substantial medical breakthroughs,
but new threats to human health have also emerged. Major strides
have been made in the reduction of diseases that have plagued so
1
many for so long. At the same time, AIDS, the leading cause of death
in sub-Saharan Africa, has reduced life expectancy in twenty-nine
African countries by seven years (UNFPA, 1999). Children the world
over continue to die of treatable illnesses and maladies such as diar
rhea, and preventive health care and affordable medicines are unavail
able to most of the world’s people.
Are societies more fair and just?

The importance of good governance and democratic participation in
the authoritative allocation of resources has been emphasized in the
negotiated outcomes of every development-related international con
ference of the decade. Elected governments at the national level have
increased from 66 (out of 167) in 1987, to 121 (out of 192) at the end of
2001. In many places, however, democratic reforms are fragile at best,
and many of the world’s poor associate the growth of poverty with the
spread of democracy.
Are women and men treated equally?

The role of women in many societies has changed substantially, and
the international community clearly recognizes that gender equality is
1

For example, iodine deficiency has been reduced in many parts of the world, and river blindness
has been eliminated in eleven countries in West Africa, opening new lands to cultivation and
adding years of productive labor. Dracunculiasis (guinea worm) cases have dropped from over
three million per year, spread over Africa and Asia, to less than 10,000, mostly in the Sudan. Polio
is now confined to ten nations, compared to more than 150 in 1992.
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a fundamental part of social justice. Women now hold more than ten
percent of all national parliamentary seats, and the percentage of
female cabinet ministers worldwide has risen from 3.4 in 1987 to 6.8 in
1996. However, two-thirds of the illiterate adults in the world are
women and two-thirds of the children who are not in school around
the world are girls (UN, 1997).
Is the environment better off?

The world continues to lose habitats and animal and plant species at
an astounding rate. The capacity of natural systems to respond to
stress has thus decreased, resulting in ﬂoods, droughts, and other
severe natural disasters. During the 1990s, there was a net loss of for
est cover, although the rate of annual loss seems to have declined com
pared to the rate of annual loss over the decade from 1980 to 1990.
Developed countries have increased their forest cover since Rio, while
developing countries show substantial deforestation. The health of the
world’s coral reefs has declined signiﬁcantly since 1992, with more
than half of coral ecosystems currently considered endangered or
threatened (Wilkinson, 2000). Efforts to abate land-based marine pol
lution seem to have had only limited local effect. As Speth argues in
this volume, many of the key environmental trend lines are deeply
worrisome.
Are human demands on the environment sustainable?

Increasing human populations and inefﬁcient patterns of consump
tion continue to put additional pressure on already strained resources
and natural systems. Every second since the adjournment of Rio has
seen the birth of three new souls, each one of whom needs 1,400 calo
ries and four gallons of water a day to survive. Half of all humanity
now lives in cities, most of which are situated in coastal areas and river
valleys literally on top of some of the world’s most productive agri
cultural lands and marine ecosystems.
Humans have long affected regional weather, yet this generation is
the first to demonstrably affect the Earth’s climate. Synthetic
endocrine disruptors – copycat hormones – are capable of changing
basic life processes in ways that are difﬁcult to anticipate. The devel
opment of genetically modiﬁed species holds great potential for food
security but has generated serious concerns for unanticipated and
irreversible consequences to human and ecosystem health.





  

where are we on the sustainability curve?
Combining these facts and ﬁgures does not provide a comprehensive
picture of progress toward global sustainability. At best, we can say
that some human lives have improved and some are under greater
duress. Some natural systems seem to be doing better, others have
been irrevocably changed, and none remain unaffected. And the prob
lem is no less serious at lower governance levels. Assessing progress is
equally difﬁcult at regional, national, and local scales. National aver
ages mask substantial differences among groups and places within
countries, just as global ﬁgures obfuscate disparities among nations.
Even when the economy and the environment are considered sepa
rately, it is difﬁcult to summarize whether we are better or worse off than
a decade ago. From consideration of unconnected facts, even if they gave
a valid picture of the “economy” or the “environment,” it is impossible to
conclude just where we are in the transition to sustainability.

Achieving sustainability requires defining its components in
measurable terms and clearly fixing the responsibility to
assess progress comprehensively.

the value of measurement
We approach the tenth anniversary of Agenda 21 with few nations hav
ing adopted deﬁnitions of success in achieving sustainability and little
practical clarity at the international level. Although the Millennium
2
3
Goals and the Monterrey Consensus are substantial steps in the right
direction at the international level, we still have no reliable roadmap
to follow. Making progress toward sustainability is like going to a des

2

The eight Millennium Goals are set forth in the United Nations Millennium Declaration of
September 2000: (1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Improve maternal health; (3)
Achieve universal primary education; (4) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (5)
Promote gender equality and empower women, (6) Ensure environmental sustainability, (7)
Reduce child mortality; and (8) Develop a global partnership for development.

3

The Monterrey Consensus is the final document adopted at the conclusion of the UN
Financing for Development conference on March 22, 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, wherein
heads of state and government pledged to take a major step toward eradicating poverty and
achieving sustainable economic growth around the world. For more information about the
conference and the full text of the Consensus, see http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/
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tination we have never visited before, equipped with a sense of geog
raphy and the principles of navigation, but without a map or compass.
Rational pursuit of sustainable development demands that we have
clear goals, that we operationalize those goals in terms of measurable
results, that we devise analytical tools for deciding priority actions, and
that we monitor and evaluate our progress (Prescott-Allen, 2001). A
more quantiﬁed approach to sustainable development is necessary.

Goals that are not measurable are unlikely to be achieved. We
invest in what we measure, and over time, we become what
we reward. Without a valid and reliable assessment method
ology, we run the risk of achieving unintended and unantici
pated results, and of wasting much of our investment in the
future.
A core set of indicators, marking goals and achievements, could
help restructure our understanding of complex environmental and
socioeconomic problems and redeﬁne our thinking about appropriate
response strategies. Measurement provides an empirical foundation
for setting goals, for evaluating performance, for calculating the
impact of our activities on the environment and society, and for
benchmarking (IISDnet, 2000a).
Good data and information provide the tools for detecting aggre
gate effects and “tragedies of the commons” in the making. Given the
spatial and temporal dispersion of environmental problems, quantiﬁ
cation of trends and impacts is critical to the understanding of possi
ble cause and effect relationships and the initiation of a policy
response. Moreover, numerical analyses facilitate the evaluation of
policy success or failure and allow for faster redeﬁnition of alterna
tives. Facts, ﬁgures, and time series data on key indicators can narrow
the range of disputes and reduce the polarization that often marks
policy debates – whether about global climate change or pollution of
a local lake (Esty, 2001b).
Information systems can transform policy options as well.
Comparative analysis helps to target investment, spur competition,
and trigger innovation. Better and cheaper data also tend to increase





  

transparency and permit greater accountability. A quantified
approach to environmental policymaking, therefore, could lead to bet
ter decisionmaking, improved performance, and greater efﬁciency by
reducing uncertainty, enhancing comparative analysis, deﬁning points
of leverage, benchmarking, and revealing best practices (Esty, 2002).

measurement tools
Information is critical to sound decisionmaking. Its collection and
presentation, however, are vital to its relevance and impacts. The
tracking and aggregation of data are carried out at several levels and
with multiple purposes. Some of the most widely employed tools
include accounts, indicators, indices, and assessments.
Accounts

Accounts are selective collections of numerical data, converted to a
common unit (money, weight, area, or energy). They can reveal how
many people are working, and whether there are more or fewer jobs.
They can reveal the number of acres of wetlands in a particular juris
diction, and whether that number is increasing or decreasing.
Monetary and environmental accounting, the predominant approach
es to measuring progress, are indispensable, but insufﬁcient tools for
measuring sustainable development. Collections of facts rarely allow
for communication and consensus building among those who have
different values and perceptions.
The most inﬂuential accounting system is the System of National
Accounts, codiﬁed and adopted by the United Nations in 1953 and
most recently revised in 1993. The system records asset changes,
income, and costs that can be measured and compared in monetary
terms. It measures almost everything upon which humans can put a
price, but excludes everything that humans usually consider priceless
– from parenting and education to forests and air. The most common
indicators derived from the System of National Accounts are the Gross
4
Domestic Product (GDP) and the Gross National Product (GNP).

4 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the total added value of enterprises operating in
a particular country and the Gross National Product (GNP) measures the total added value of
enterprises owned by citizens of a particular country. For example, goods produced by an
American-owned firm operating in Japan would be included in the United State’s GNP and in
Japan’s GDP.
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Both GDP and GNP are inappropriate measures for human and
ecosystem wellbeing. They show income, but not income
distribution. They do not distinguish between productive and
destructive activities, or between sustainable and unsustain
able ones. Forest fires, hurricanes, cancer, crime, and disease
all add to the GDP because dealing with them requires money
to change hands.
It is as if a business kept a balance sheet by merely adding up all
transactions without distinguishing between income and expenses, or
between assets and liabilities. This leads to an overestimate of income
and encouragement of economic policies that cannot be sustained. We
need a different measure of progress, a clear guide through the jumble
5
of contradictory statistics.
Indicators, Indices, and Assessments

The primary alternatives to using accounts rely on assessments.
Assessments assemble, summarize, organize, interpret, and possibly
reconcile pieces of existing knowledge, and communicate them in a
simpliﬁed manner. They are context-speciﬁc and do not attempt to be
complete, but rely instead on measuring speciﬁc representative aspects,
or indicators. Because they can be selective, assessments are better
equipped than accounts to cover the wide range of issues necessary for
an adequate portrayal of human and environmental conditions.
Indicators represent a particular attribute, characteristic, or prop
erty of a system (Gallopin, 1997). They require numerical data and
time series to express trends. When a collection of indicators is aggre
gated mathematically, an index is produced. Indices simplify complex
phenomena and make it possible to gauge the general status of a sys
tem (IISDnet, 2000a; WEF, 2002).
5 While other approaches have been proposed, including the Index of Sustainable Economic
Welfare (ISEW) (Daly and Cobb, 1994) and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), the Achilles
heel of these and similar approaches is the difficulty of converting data to monetary units. For
things that are traded, the market price is used. For things that have marketplace equivalents,
oil in underdeveloped reserves for example, the market price is an adequate surrogate. For
everything else, contingent values or estimated cost of social and environmental damage
must be substituted. This reliance on monetary units as a single measurement obscures the
great diversity of methods, data sources, and assumptions that are actually used. Moreover,
monetary indicators cannot be forced to measure or explain non-monetary values.





  

A number of assessment initiatives have been launched in the past
few years as alternatives to traditional measurement practices focusing
on one or several systems. Among the most effective efforts are the
Human Development Report, the Living Planet Index, the Ecological
Footprint, the Environmental Sustainability Index, the Compass of
Sustainability, the Dashboard of Sustainability, and the Wellbeing
Assessment. These indices differ in scope, in the weight given to the
environment, and in the basis used for converting indicator measure
ments to performance scores. Table 1 (pp 42-43) provides a brief
overview of several key assessment initiatives.

the value and promise of integrated assessments
Rio deﬁned sustainability in economic, social, and environmental
terms, and postulated the interdependence and indivisibility of these
factors. We have learned, often to our chagrin, and usually to our frus
tration, that gains in economic welfare can often be offset by environ
mental costs, and that environmental protection can lead to social
costs. We need integrated assessment methodologies that will serve as
navigational tools, allowing us to deﬁne starting points and bench
marks along the way so that we can learn as we go.
Integrated assessments seek to provide relevant information to
decisionmakers rather than merely to advance understanding for its
own sake. They also bring together a broader set of areas, methods, or
degrees of certainty than would typically characterize a study of the
same issue within the bounds of a single research discipline (CIESIN,
1995). Integrated assessments separate signal from noise and help
make sense of the signals. They meet the need for substantive infor
mation and, when developed in a participatory fashion, provide the
additional beneﬁts of consensus on broad goals and support for difﬁ
cult political actions. Integrated assessments enable improved coordi
nation and targeting of resources. They can help decisionmakers
understand the linkages between short- and long-term needs and
between apparently diverse goals by illuminating both connections
and thresholds of impact. In addition, integrated assessments provide
mechanisms by which individuals can evaluate the sustainability of
their own behavior and hold governmental ofﬁcials and private cor
porations accountable.
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the bellagio principles for assessing
sustainable development
In 1996 the International Institute for Sustainable Development con
vened assessment specialists at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Conference
Center in Bellagio, Italy to develop principles to guide the assessment of
progress toward sustainable development. The Bellagio Principles state
that assessments should meet the following ten criteria:
1)

Guiding vision and goals: Assessments should be guided by a clear
vision of sustainable development and goals that define that
vision.

2)

Holistic perspective: Assessments should include review of the
whole system as well as its parts and consider the wellbeing of
sub-systems and both positive and negative consequences of
human activity in monetary and non-monetary terms.

3)

Essential elements: Assessments should consider equity and dis
parity within the current population and between present and
future generations.

4) Adequate scope: Assessments should adopt a time horizon long
enough to capture both human and ecosystem time scales.
5)

Practical focus: Assessments should be based on an explicit set of
categories that link visions and goals to indicators.

6) Openness: Assessments should have transparent methods and accessi
ble data; they should make explicit all judgments, assumptions, and
uncertainties in data and interpretation.
7)

Effective communication: Assessments should be designed to
meet the needs of the users and aim for simplicity in structure and
language.

8)

Broad participation: Assessments should obtain broad representa
tion of key professional, technical, and social groups, while also
ensuring the participation of decisionmakers.

9) Ongoing assessment: Assessments should develop a capacity to
repeat measurement to determine trends and be responsive to
change and uncertainty and adjust goals and frameworks as new
insights are gained.
10) Institutional capacity: Continuity of assessing progress should be
assured by clearly assigning responsibility and support in the deci
sionmaking process, providing institutional capacity for data col
lection, and supporting development of local assessment capacity.
Source: IISDnet (2000b), http://iisd1.iisd.ca/measure/bellagio1.htm





  

Table 1

Leading Assessment Initiatives

Method

Institution

Human
Development
Report

United Nations
Development
Programme

Environmental
Sustainability
Index

World Economic Forum
(Yale Center for
Environmental Law and
Policy, Yale University
and Center for Inter
national Earth
Science Information
Network, Columbia
University)
http://www.ciesin.org/in
dicators/ESI/downloads
html#report

Environment
• Environmental
systems
• Reducing environ
mental stresses
• Reducing human
vulnerability
• Social and
institutional
capacity
• Global stewardship

Includes twenty
indicators of environ
mental sustainability
classiﬁed in ﬁve
categories. Each
indicator includes
several variables, for a
total of sixty-eight
variables.

Living Planet
Index

World Wide Fund
for Nature

Environment
• Animal species
in forests
• Animal species
in freshwater
ecosystems
• Animal species
in marine ecosystems

Averages three indices,
which monitor the
changes over time in
animal species in
three different types
of ecosystems.

Environment
• Area of cropland
required to produce
crops consumed
• Area of grazing land
required to produce
animal products
• Area of forest
required to produce
wood and paper
• Area of sea required
• Area of land required
• Area of forest
required to absorb
CO2 emissions

Estimates a popula
tion’s consumption of
food, materials, or
energy, by adding up
six estimates of different
types of areas required
to produce the
resources consumed
by that population.
The Ecological Foot
print is measured in
“area units.”

People
• Life expectancy
at birth
• Education (school
http://www.undp.org/hd enrollment and
r2000/english/HDR200
adult literacy rate)
0.html
• GDP per capita

http://www.panda.org/
livingplanet/LPR00/
lpindex.cfm

Ecological
Footprint

Categories of
measurements

Redeﬁning Progress
http://www.panda.org/
livingplanet/LPR00/
ecofoot.cfm

Description
Includes four separate
indices:
• Human
Development Index
(categories of
measurements refer
to this index only)
• Gender-related
Development Index
• Gender Empower
ment Measure
• Human Poverty
Index (separate
indices for developed
and developing
countries)
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Method

Institution

Categories of
measurements

Compass of
Sustainability

AtKisson + Associates

Nature

http://www.iisd.org/
cgsdi/compass.htm

Dashboard of
Sustainability

An instrument panel
for each of the four
Economy
broad categories pro
vides both quantitative
Society
and qualitative inform
ation about progress
Wellbeing of individuals toward sustainability.
In each of the four
categories, there is a
minimum of three
indices (stocks, ﬂows
and responses) and ten
indicators. The four
categories are summed
into a Sustainable
Development Index

Consultative Group on
Sustainable
Development Indicators

Environment

http://iisd.ca/cgsdi/dash
board.htm

Society

Economy

Institutions
Wellbeing
Assessment/
Barometer of
Sustainability

Description

PADATA (Robert
Prescott-Allen), World
Conservation Union
(IUCN), International
Development Research
Centre (IDRC)

Ecosystem

www.iucn.org/info
_and_news/press/
wonback.doc

• Human
Wellbeing Index
• Ecosystem
Wellbeing Index
• Wellbeing Index
• Wellbeing/Stress
Index

People
Combines the
indicators into:

Graphic combination
of indicators of three
or four categories (the
ﬁrst three plus or
minus Institutions)
into a Policy Perform
ance Index
The Barometer of
Sustainability is the
only performance scale
designed to measure
human and ecosystem
wellbeing together
without submerging
one in the other. Its two
axes enable socio
economic and
environmental indica
tors to be combined
independently, keeping
them separate to allow
analysis of peopleecosystem interactions.





  

case study: wellbeing assessment
Wellbeing Assessment (Prescott-Allen, 2001) is an integrated assess
ment methodology that can be used in both public and private sectors
and from local to global levels. The basic hypothesis of Wellbeing
Assessment is that sustainable development results from effective pur
suit of human wellbeing and ecosystem wellbeing, and that the inter
action between the subsystems can be measured and indexed.
Wellbeing Assessment deﬁnes human wellbeing as “a condition in
which all members of society are able to determine and meet their needs
and have a large range of choices to fulﬁll their potential” and ecosystem
wellbeing as “a condition in which the ecosystem maintains its diversity
and quality (and thus its capacity to support people and the rest of life)
and its potential to adapt to change and provide a wide range of choic
es and opportunities for the future” (Prescott-Allen, 2001).

Measurements

Wellbeing Assessment measures the wellbeing of people and ecosys
tems separately, yet considers them jointly by organizing the informa
tion into two subsystems with ﬁve components each:
People
and Population
• Health
Wealth
• Knowledge and Culture
• Community
• Equity
•

Ecosystem

• Land
• Water
• Air
and Genes
• Species
• Resource Use

Wellbeing Assessment identiﬁes features of each dimension and
organizes them into a hierarchy of progressively more speciﬁc and
measurable parts. Indicators are chosen on the basis of representative
ness, reliability, and feasibility. This procedure establishes a logical link
between the subsystems and indicators, draws attention to elements
that cannot be measured or on which there are no data, and leads to
comprehensive consideration of human and ecosystem wellbeing.
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Methodology

Indicators are combined using the Barometer of Sustainability, a per
formance scale with two axes, one for human wellbeing, the other for
ecosystem wellbeing. Performance criteria – good, fair, medium, poor,
and bad levels of performance – are deﬁned for each indicator,
enabling indicator measurements to be converted to scores and dis
played on the axes.
Scores can be combined into higher level indices and ultimately
into a Human Wellbeing Index, an Ecosystem Wellbeing Index, a
6
Wellbeing Index, and a Wellbeing/Stress Index. Because of the ability
to include a large number of indicators, scores in Wellbeing Assess
ment are robust, and present a comprehensive picture less affected by
a lack of data or by inaccurate data on individual indicators. Although
underlying weights given to various variables and other assumptions
can be debated, the indices provide clear, rapidly communicated pic
tures of a society’s human and ecosystem wellbeing, how close a soci
ety is to its goal of sustainability and how it compares with other soci
eties, the rate and direction of change, and major strengths and weak
nesses of the human and natural systems of the entity being assessed.

the assessment challenge
More information and data do not necessarily mean greater
knowledge or efﬁciency. A ﬂood of unconnected and often apparently
contradictory facts can swamp the ﬂow of useful information for
decisionmaking. Assessing progress thus presents both a governance
and a methodological challenge.
From a governance perspective, authority and responsibility for
data collection, analysis, and assessment are scattered, the process is
dominated by special interests, and long-range planning and strategic
decisionmaking are undermined. At every level, the capacity to collect
and report data is fragmented and narrowly focused. When data are
collected, they are assembled for speciﬁc and immediate purposes and
then forgotten or poorly stored, usually separated from the assump
tions, values, and purposes used in their collection. Differences in col
lection methodologies are often obscured over time, and incompatible
data are combined in ways that, at best, dilute meaning.
6 Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of the Human Wellbeing Index and the Ecosystem
Wellbeing Index.





  

Figure 1

Human and Ecosystem Wellbeing Indices

Source: Prescott-Allen, Robert. 2001. The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of
Quality of Life and the Environment. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
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From a methodological perspective, we must learn how to deﬁne
sustainability in terms of indicators that can be tracked and moni
tored, understood and applied by decisionmakers, and that allow us to
efficiently manage our investments of time, money, labor, and
thought. And yet, even if we have such effective indicators, we still run
the risk of having an unintelligible hodgepodge of information on our
hands.
Numbers, moreover, are not value neutral (Esty, 2002). “Northern”
bias must be recognized and addressed.

There is a tendency to think of “developed countries” as coun
tries that have achieved sustainability. In fact, nations with a
high standard of living irreversibly change their own natural
systems, while potentially imposing excessive pressure on
the global environment. Successful assessment methodolo
gies will have to make evident and understandable the link
ages between consumption, deployment of advanced tech
nology, and resource impact, both local and global.
Assessments must also function adequately at various scales, from
local to global, and must lend themselves to aggregation and disaggre
gation without loss of validity and reliability. They must allow for
regional and global comparisons while retaining national and local
relevance. That means, at a minimum, that the actions of all countries
must be assessed on the same basic factors and measures, but that any
system adopted at an international level must lend itself to expansion
via local participation to reﬂect additional values, conditions, and
aspirations.
Examples of misleading global indicators abound, and pictures
painted with broad brushes, as at the beginning of this chapter, can be
both too rosy and too dire, often simultaneously. But to successfully
address these challenges, we will need to assess progress on multiple
fronts and at several levels simultaneously, and make decisions, the
consequences of which are anticipated and intended.





  

next steps: johannesburg and beyond
After a decade of investment and action, results are difﬁcult to docu
ment and almost impossible to interpret. When the nations of the
world convene in South Africa in August 2002 for the World Summit
on Sustainable Development, it will again be apparent that our worth
while dreams have exceeded our capacity to manage effectively, in
large measure because we have no systematic, valid, and reliable way
to evaluate our progress, and no ﬁxed point of responsibility for this
task.
The Monterrey Consensus emphasized the international commit
ment to the goals of the Millennium Declaration, namely, “to elimi
nate poverty, improve social conditions and raise living standards, and
protect our environment.” The achievement of these goals will require
an effective and transparent system for mobilizing public resources as
well as strong, accountable institutions and measurement of results.
The response from Johannesburg must be unequivocal and should
include the following elements:

•

A set of common indicators on which nations can collect and peri
odically report, allowing national and local governments to tailor
or add indicators of particular signiﬁcance to a local context;

•

A common, scientiﬁcally sound methodology for integrating data
sets into assessments of sustainability;

•

The establishment of national obligations to collect and report
social, economic, and environmental data, with sanctions for non
7
reporting;

•

Clear standards for periodic assessment of progress toward sus
tainability;

•

The creation of an independent International Scientiﬁc Panel on
Sustainability, similar to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, with the authority and responsibility to collect and
assemble data, and report fully, objectively, and publicly on
progress toward achieving sustainability;

7

Nations that do not report in a timely or adequate way could be ineligible for membership in
successor bodies to the Commission on Sustainable Development, and have their voting priv
ileges in multilateral environmental agreements suspended, for example.
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•

Commitment to fund these assessments and the activities of the
Scientiﬁc Panel on Sustainability, such as commitment from
donor countries to meet all costs of national reporting from the
least developed countries, including capacity building.

conclusion
The essential link between responsibility and accountability is a valid
and reliable measurement of change over time. This link was not
forged at Rio and has not been addressed since. Despite the ﬂood of
data over the past decade, information regarding the performance of
governments and society in the pursuit of sustainability has been nei
ther systematically collected nor transparently and objectively report
ed. We know little more today than we did ten years ago regarding our
progress and the overall effectiveness of our actions.
Governments are inherently uneasy about committing to goals and
managing for results, although none can deny that both steps are nec
essary for good governance. If they avoid the issue in Johannesburg as
they did in Rio, we need only look at the experience of the last ten
years to see the prospects for the next decade: more futile and incon
clusive discussions, more sterile political debates over who is not
meeting their obligations, and more wasteful investments nationally
and internationally. We will continue to “ﬂy blind.”
There are no other binding commitments (“Type I Outcomes”)
remotely achievable for the World Summit on Sustainable
Development that could be more valuable than a commitment to cre
ating the means to authoritatively assess progress toward sustainable
development.
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The North-South Knowledge Divide:
Consequences for Global
Environmental Governance
Sylvia Karlsson
summary
This chapter argues that there is a knowledge divide between the North
and the South resulting from the substantial difference in accumulated
scientific knowledge about the two regions and their current unequal
capacities for generating new knowledge. It outlines the consequences
of the divide for global environmental governance, including the risk
that (1) issues of the South will be less visible on the global governance
agenda, (2) that “globalized” knowledge generated in other ecological
zones and socioeconomic settings is less representative for conditions in
the South, and (3) that as a result, the South is unable to participate on
equal terms in global governance.
This chapter further discusses two main strategies for addressing
these consequences. The first strategy involves improving the generation
of new knowledge about the South. This could be accomplished by
strengthening the scientific community in the South, encouraging the
scientific community in the North to carry out more research on the
South, and expanding the groups that participate in the generation of
new knowledge. The second strategy entails changing how decisionmak
ers in global institutions deal with scientific knowledge. This could be
done by facing uncertainty with greater resolve, making better use of
existing knowledge about the South, and incorporating alternative
sources of knowledge.





  

the north-south knowledge divide
I see not just a gulf, but a yawning gulf, between the industri
alized countries and the developing countries in terms of sheer
numbers of scientists and engineers. (Serageldin, 1998: 43)
The world’s scientiﬁc community is heavily dominated by developed
countries, whether one looks at resources, the number of researchers,
or scientiﬁc “production.” OECD countries contribute ninety-four
percent of the indexed scientiﬁc literature. Moreover, measures of
inequality between countries are more pronounced in scientiﬁc
expenditures than in income: although the average per capita income
of the thirty OECD countries is about sixty times greater than that of
the roughly ﬁfty countries classiﬁed by the World Bank as “low
income economies,” average expenditures on science and technology
per capita in the former are 250 times greater than those in the latter
(Sagasti and Alcalde, 1999). More than ninety-six percent of world
patents are registered by Japan, the countries of Western Europe, and
the United States (Shrum and Shenhav, 1995).
The number of scientists/engineers per million inhabitants in
developing countries is 200 on average, while in developed countries,
it is 2,800 on average (Serageldin, 1998). Of course, the picture varies
greatly across developing countries, and a number of them have sig
niﬁcant research capacity. India, for example, has the third most pop
ulous scientiﬁc community in the world (Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999:
121). Africa, on the other hand, with ﬁfty-three countries, has only nine
merit-based science academies (Hassan, 2001).
Developed and developing countries tend to group into two very
rough physical and climatic categories. Developing countries, which I
refer to here as the “South,” are primarily located in sub-tropical or
tropical ecosystems. Developed countries, or the “North,” occupy
1
mainly temperate and arctic climates and ecosystems. Many
commentators point out that the amount of research in environment-

1

Obviously this categorization of the world into South and North is a gross simplification.
Exceptions, for example, include Australia and the southernmost parts of the United States in
the North, and the extensive arid regions of the South. Both categories encompass countries
with vastly different levels of economic development, among other differences. The World
Bank, for instance, uses four categories in its classification of economies by income (World
Bank, 1999). Nevertheless, because I wish to focus on the distinctions between both ecosys
tems and socioeconomic systems (see discussions in later sections), I confine the discussion
in this chapter to the two categories of North and South.



related disciplines such as biology, ecology, and ecotoxicology carried
out in sub-tropical and tropical regions is very small compared to
research in non-tropical latitudes (Bourdeau et al. 1989; Lacher and
Goldstein, 1997). In addition, the North and its temperate and arctic
ecosystems are sometimes cited as the “normal” or “standard” type in
ecological sciences (Pomeroy and Service, 1986).

The knowledge divide comprises multiple gaps – in basic
environmental and social data, monitoring of change,
assessments, and more comprehensive research on human
and social systems.

The Data Gap

The data gap is fundamental, since data availability is critical for mon
itoring, assessment, and further research. As stressed by Hales and
Prescott-Allen in this volume, even in industrialized countries, data
2
are often too limited or too disparate to be usable. In developing
countries, however, “even the most basic statistics are often lacking”
(UN Economic and Social Council, 2001) and “[m]onitoring and data
collection infrastructure of most developing countries is severely
handicapped or non-existent” (UN System-Wide Earthwatch, 2000).
The data gap is manifest for both local and global issues.
Information on mercury poisoning among populations in the
Amazon, for example, is largely absent, and yet pollution levels of
mercury from gold mining operations are signiﬁcant (Lacher and
Goldstein, 1997). Knowledge in the South about the effects of the use
of agricultural pesticides on human health and ecosystems is also eex
tremely limited (Karlsson, 2000).
In the area of global environmental change, the North carries out
almost all basic research and analysis, and the relevance of the results for
developing countries is not usually assessed (Gutman, 1994). Yet, it is
those countries that are most likely to be negatively affected by global

2

The scope of this gap is spelled out in the Environmental Sustainability Index (WEF, 2002). As
Esty (2002) argues, the importance of sound data as the foundation for environmental decisionmaking – at the global, regional, national, local, and corporate scales – cannot be overstated.





  

3

warming (Redclift and Sage, 1998). One of the exceptions to this pat
tern is India, which has a community of climate researchers. Their
research focus, however, has been almost exclusively on the impact of
climate change on coastal zones and agriculture, and hardly any of the
results have been published (Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999).

The limited contribution to the body of scientific knowledge
on global environmental issues from developing country
scientists is not only a reflection of the unequal research
capacity, but is also a result of different research priorities.
Environmental issues of more acute local importance, rather
than on a global scale, are engaging scientists in developing
countries (Biermann, 2001; Gupta, 2000; Commission on
Developing Countries and Global Change, 1992).
The knowledge divide between North and South regarding envi
ronmental issues could, from a historical perspective, be seen as just a
phase of the scientiﬁc development process. It could be regarded as
simply a knowledge gap that remains to be ﬁlled through more
research. However, when science, both natural and social, is entering
the policy process as the basis for environmental governance at the
global, regional, and national levels, the knowledge divide becomes
more than a purely scientiﬁc issue. It may have political consequences.

consequences of the divide for global
environmental governance
The international policy debate is in no small part shaped by the argu
ments emerging from scientiﬁc research and analysis (Kandlikar and
Sagar, 1999: 133). Policymakers put strong faith in science, particularly
in natural science, to discover environmental threats, interpret the
3

The IPCC finds that most of the less-developed regions are particularly vulnerable to climate
change, both because a larger share of their economies is in climate-sensitive sectors and
because they lack the resources to adapt. For example, small island states and low-lying
coastal areas are especially vulnerable to a rise in sea level and to storms and have a limited
capacity to respond to such events (IPCC, 2001: 16).



consequences, and even suggest policy options. At the global gover
nance level, this is illustrated by the fact that “scientists represent the
only members of civil society to be consistently asked to advise gov
ernment representatives” (UNEP, 2000: 13).
There are a number of scientiﬁc advisory processes at the global
level through which scientists are invited to give advice on environ
mental issues. Scientiﬁc expertise is sought in intergovernmental
bodies like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in
ad hoc expert groups to various conventions, in bodies that develop
technical standards and global assessments on the state of environ
mental knowledge, or in capacity building and multilateral aid
projects.
These scientiﬁc advisory processes contribute in three principal
ways to intergovernmental deliberations (UNEP, 2000):

•
•
•

Catalyzing action by using science to set the terms of the debate;
Ensuring a signiﬁcant scientiﬁc component in negotiations;
Establishing authoritative scientiﬁc standards for policy delibera
tions, decisions, and implementation.

Science is of significant importance to global deliberations.
Relevant questions in relation to the North-South knowledge divide
then become:

•
•
•

What knowledge do decisionmakers in global institutions consider?
If the desired knowledge is available, how it is used?
What type of inﬂuence does it have on the content and character
of global environmental governance?

Issues of the South Remain Off the Global Agenda

Many argue that environmental issues addressed by governance at the
global level tend to be those on the priority agenda of Northern coun
tries (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma, 1999; Gutman, 1994). These are
usually issues of a “global character,” often including climate change,
ozone depletion, and biodiversity. While the effects of climate change
are likely to be most adverse and severe primarily for developing coun
tries, these countries are the ones faced with more pressing immediate





  

concerns. Redclift and Sage (1998), for example, claim that for many in
the South, the global environmental agenda is “essentially a Northern
agenda, of little relevance to them.” The issues on which attention is
focused are often far from the experience of environmental degrada
tion of poor people in hamlets, villages, towns, and mega-cities in
large parts of the world, where “the ‘environment’ consists of problems
associated with health, shelter, and food availability” (Redclift and
Sage, 1998: 501). These environmental issues, which the South priori
tizes, are less visible on the global agenda.

The comparative invisibility of environmental issues
prioritized by the South can be linked to the North-South
power gradient within the current international system,
where the more powerful countries set the agenda.
Nevertheless, it can also be argued that Northern dominance
in setting the agenda is often supported by the invocation of
science.
It is difﬁcult for the South to put up science-based arguments for
alternative issues to prioritize. As Gutman (1994: 390) argues, the
South “is unable to express its environmental priorities or assess the
costs and beneﬁts of the international environmental agenda put for
ward by the North.” Agarwal et al. comment on the power of scientif
ic discourse in setting the agenda, and how that handicaps the South:
The focus on science can easily divert attention from problems
that have a focus in other issues like poverty. A science-based
environmental agenda is more likely to be an agenda determined
by the science-rich North, which can neglect the environmental
concerns of the poor nations. (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma,
4
1999: 5)
Issues of the South – Invisible Even When on the Agenda

While the discussion above is concerned with the issues that make it
to the global governance agenda, there are issues that are already on
4

Agarwal et al. here make use of the common definition of scientists as natural scientists, in
this case environmental scientists. I would argue that scientists in other disciplines, such as
sociology, economics, and development studies, do focus on other issues like poverty as sub
jects of study.



the agenda but whose relevance for countries in the South remains
invisible due to lack of scientiﬁc data.
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement
The WTO agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS
5

Agreement) illustrates this point. With increasing trade and stricter
standards established in importing countries, the issue of pesticide
residues in agricultural products has gained in importance. The
Agreement mandates that standards for the levels of pesticide residues
in traded agricultural products — the Maximum Residue Limits set by
the Codex Alimentarius — should be accepted by all parties to the
Uruguay Agreements. These standards have thus become, indirectly,
legally binding for the member countries of the WTO.

Developing countries, however, have problems in generating
residue trial data because the industry, which provides these
data, only does so for crops of major economic importance
(Codex Alimentarius Commission, 1997). The absence of
Maximum Residue Limits for pesticides on crops that devel
oping countries export can be a serious hindrance to trade.
Industrialized countries have well-developed and enforced national
legislation, as well as the capacity to produce residue trial data.
Developing countries, on the other hand, often lack this capacity.
Therefore, the globally agreed upon rules are least useful for those
countries which in theory would beneﬁt most from such coordinated
regulations.
Toxic Substances

Another case in point can be found in the provisions of the multi
lateral environmental agreements that address toxic substances posing
health or environmental risks. The process of adding substances to the
agreements requires a large amount of data showing the level and type
of risk. Notably, the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Pro
cedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in Interna
tional Trade (the Rotterdam Convention) of 1998 includes as one of
5

For a detailed description of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and its implications
for developing countries, see Karlsson (2000).





  

the essential criteria for adding further hazardous pesticide formula
tions to the Convention the “reliability of the evidence that the use of
the formulation” causes health problems (United Nations, 1998).
In this and other cases, developing countries face the risk of having
their priority substances of concern not addressed due to lack of hard
evidence of the health effects. There is little research in these countries
on risks from chemicals. The types of speciﬁc chemical risks they face
— which often come from the particular socioeconomic, institution
al, and cultural circumstances in which the substances are used in
developing countries — may therefore not appear on the priority lists
of Northern countries. For instance, pesticides that may be used under
strict safety conditions and without signiﬁcant risks in developed
countries, may pose signiﬁcant health risks in developing countries
when used by uneducated farmers without protective gear.
Inappropriately “Globalized” Knowledge

Another consequence of the knowledge divide occurs when
“globalized” knowledge is not appropriate for situations and problems
in the South. At the global level, scientiﬁc knowledge is often collected,
analyzed, and summarized into assessments of particular environ
mental problems. These efforts create a scientiﬁc foundation for
decisionmaking at the global level.
When most of the information assembled at the global level, or
incorporated into global models, is generated in non-tropical latitudes
and in developed countries, the assessments may be less valid for envi
ronmental problems in the South for the following reasons:

•

There are unique ecosystems and species of both ecological and
economic importance in the South that are only marginally pres
ent in some developed countries (e.g., rain forests, mangroves, and
coral reefs), and may not be sufﬁciently accounted for in global
assessments.

•

There is a range of managed systems (agricultural, silvicultural,
and aquacultural) equally unique to the tropics and sub-tropics.

•

Northern analysts may have unfounded assumptions, among
other things, about patterns of human behavior – for example,
that agricultural workers will wear protective clothing at all times
while spraying pesticides.



•

The type of diet, body weight, and general health conditions
assumed in the determination of tolerable levels of toxic
substances in the human body may be different. A level of contam
ination by a substance in a food crop that is a marginal part of the
diet can be relatively higher than in a food crop that serves as the
staple food. People already weakened from other diseases or mal
nutrition may also be more sensitive to toxic substances than the
average healthy person in a developed country.

The lack of good data, as well as the knowledge and science divide,
contribute to the relative invisibility of Southern issues on the global
governance agenda. In the area of climate change, for example, assess
ments have sometimes been inaccurate. The Indian Methane
Campaign was launched in 1991 in response to climate change studies
done abroad, including a study by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA, 1990), which attributed large emissions of methane to
Indian sources. The campaign made its own assessment of Indian
methane emissions and denounced the EPA’s ﬁndings (Kandlikar and
Sagar, 1999: 123).
Biermann (2001) cites the Indian scientists’ criticism of the IPCC
regarding the lack of a separate chapter in their report on the mon
soon, which is a central concern for research on climate change from
their perspective. Furthermore, the modeling of the cost of carbon
emission mitigation carried out for developing countries by scientists
in the North is not satisfactory because “it is generally characterized by
a lack of sensitivity to the differences between developed and develop
ing countries” (Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999: 130).
Although it might be expected that data from the North would be
misleading if merely extrapolated to the South, the extrapolation is
done time and again. Of course, tendencies to disregard local variabil
ity on both global and local environmental issues can be interpreted as
a pragmatic approach when there is a lack of local data. Whatever the
reason, however, biases and inappropriateness for the conditions in
developing countries are strongly noted in the South, particularly by
scientists who are often excluded from the global scene. The knowl
edge divide can thus impair global deliberations, when they are based
on an unsatisfactory understanding of the geographically distinct
causes and effects of the global problems.





  

Inadequate Participation of Developing Countries
in Global Governance

Another major consequence of the North-South knowledge divide
pertains to the inadequate participation of developing countries in the
provision of knowledge for global policy and action. The lack of
national scientiﬁc capacity weakens the position of developing coun
tries in multilateral negotiations and their participation in the con
ventions. Even in institutions designed to be “global,” such as the
6
IPCC, there is an enormous disparity in North-South participation.
Not only do developing country ofﬁcials lack scientiﬁc input from
their own researchers, but they also experience signiﬁcant difﬁculty in
coping with the masses of scientiﬁc and economic documents coming
from the West.
The lack of developing country science raises the question of a
Northern bias in global assessments. It appears that the Northern bias
may be more pronounced as one moves further from basic science
(Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999). Moreover, global environmental
assessments often fail to explicitly address value considerations, such
as equity (Biermann, 2001), which is of particular relevance to
developing countries.
In the environmental domain, both the strong dependence on sci
ence (natural science in particular), and the tendency to disguise value
7
judgments by “scientizing” the debate, increase the need to focus on
the lack of participation of developing countries in scientiﬁc advisory
processes. It is easy to fall into complacency by assuming that one need
not pay so much attention to geographical representativeness because
science is “objective” and, therefore, whoever is not involved in the
decisionmaking would have arrived at the same conclusions (Yearley,
1996: 118). Many researchers have pointed to the limits to complete
objectivity in research and to the cultural dependence and implicit
value judgments in natural science (Jasanoff, 1996).

6

In the 1996 IPCC Working Group I there were 158 authors from the United States, 61 from the
United Kingdom, 3 from India, and 7 from China. The relative participation looked similar in
Working Group II. Working Group III had 30 participants from the United States, 5 from the
United Kingdom, 7 from India, and 2 from China (Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999).

7

Jasanoff (1996: 173) defines the act of “scientizing” an issue as “at once to assert that there are
systematic, discoverable methods for coping with it and to suggest that these approaches
can be worked out independently of national or sectarian interests.”



With the value connotations associated with science, and particu
larly its application in policy, it is clear that the present participation
of the South in deliberations on global environmental governance,
both scientiﬁc and political, is inadequate. It is a question of equity
and fairness to present more balanced knowledge-based voices from
developing countries in these arenas.

bridging the knowledge divide: changing
the generation of knowledge
Acknowledging the existence of a knowledge divide between the
North and the South and its consequences prompts the question of
what can be done to address the situation. Over the long term, bridg
ing the North-South knowledge divide will require measures aimed at
reducing the divide itself. Increasing the generation of scientiﬁc
knowledge in the South and of the South will be critical in this respect.
Four strategies could be pursued: (1) strengthening the data and sci
ence foundations of the South; (2) strengthening the scientiﬁc com
munity in the South; (3) encouraging more research on the South
among Northern scientists; and (4) expanding the groups capable of
generating scientiﬁc knowledge.

Strengthening Southern Data and Science

The most straightforward way to bridge the knowledge divide is to
commit resources to strengthening the data and science foundations
on which global environmental governance efforts depend. The value
of baseline data comparable across countries is clear (Esty, 2002). Such
metrics allow for trends to be tracked, problems spotted, policies eval
uated, and “best practices” identiﬁed. Enormous potential gains could
be achieved across many environmental problem areas simply by
moving laggards toward the performance of those at the leading edge.
Because of the belief that poverty and environmental degradation are
causally linked (World Commission on Environment and
Development, 1987), it would be essential to improve data on sustain
able development and socioeconomic indicators as well as data on
environmental factors.





  

possible global environmental governance measures
global environmental data initiative to track a set of key socio
• Aeconomic
and ecological and environmental public health indica
tors in all countries of the world on a methodologically consistent
and comparable basis;
building a global environmental database, a true commit
• Beyond
ment to closing the North-South knowledge gap, which would
entail capacity building in the South. The developing world needs
more scientists, economists, and researchers of all sorts;
up this capacity, requires (as discussed below) sustained
• Building
commitments to education for several decades.

Strengthening the Scientific Community in the South

Part of the responsibility for strengthening the scientiﬁc community
in the South lies in the hands of developing countries themselves who
need to prioritize investment in science. But their efforts alone will
not suffice. The role for bi- and multilateral aid agencies and
Northern and international research programs in building this capac
ity is critical.
A number of actors are already involved in such capacity building,
from national space agencies to UN organizations, from the interna
tional academic community to individual researchers (Fuchs, Virji,
and Fleming, 1998; EUMETSTAT, 1997; UN Economic and Social
Council, 1997). It is even increasingly the case that international scien
tiﬁc advisory processes have as a goal the facilitation of national level
capacity building (UNEP, 2000).

However, much capacity building is currently aimed at
financing more Ph.D. degrees for developing country citizens,
providing funds for large scale cooperation projects on global
environmental change research, and granting travel money
to bring scientists from the South to scientific conferences
and expert meetings. These efforts do not suffice to provide
developing country scientists with a basic research
infrastructure.



Research funding is predominantly nationally based. Up until now,
there has been no explicit mandate in global environmental gover
nance (such as in the UN Environment Programme and the Global
Environment Facility) to fund basic research based on the competitive
merits of research proposals. Most of the resources go to assessments
of previous research rather than the generation of new knowledge.

possible global environmental governance measures
Establishment of small “micro research grants” for individual research
8

projects in countries with limited research capacity. Existing expert
bodies under multilateral environmental agreements or other UN
bodies could administer these grants. These agencies would have the
best overview of the specific research gaps hampering their work.

Similar to the success in the ﬁeld of micro credit, where very little
money goes a long way for development in poor communities, rather
humble research grants for salaries and equipment might lead to sub
stantial research results in many developing countries. When com
bined with assistance to make the results internationally available,
such measures could make signiﬁcant contributions to reducing the
knowledge divide.
Increasing the Number of Northern Scientists Working on the South

The second approach to increasing knowledge of environmental and
human systems in the South is to strengthen the scientiﬁc communi
ty of the North for the South, by increasing the number of Northern
scientists who conduct ﬁeld studies in the South. When they carry out
their work in close partnership with local scientists, they beneﬁt in
their own research from local knowledge and experience while also
contributing to the capacity of their Southern partners. This approach
may necessitate capacity building for the Northern research commu
9
nity on local ecological and socioeconomic contexts in the South.

8

I am grateful to Dr. Arthur L. Dahl for this suggestion and for contributing valuable input to
discussions on global governance measures in general.

9

Dasgupta (1998: 22) argues for such an approach among economists who study environmen
tal issues.





  

Northern scientists could learn to better incorporate the priorities and
realities of the South, both within research and policy processes.

possible global environmental governance measures
• Establishing of clear communication channels between UN bod
ies, such as convention secretariats, and Northern funding agen
cies, such as research councils and private foundations. Priority
research areas could thus be suggested;
• Convening UN expert meetings in the South, even if the majority
of experts are from the North, combined with field trips with local
experts.

Expanding the Number of Groups that Generate
New Scientific Knowledge

The third approach to reducing the knowledge gap is to expand the
groups that participate in the generation of scientiﬁc knowledge. The
limited numbers of scientists in the South, and the extremely limited
resources available for monitoring and research activities, warrant
more innovative approaches. For example, if high school students
across these countries, as part of their education, gathered basic data
on environmental and social parameters under the guidance of
researchers and with the support of the educational infrastructure, the
cadre of observers and the amount of data collected would increase
dramatically. There are already a number of successful examples where
this has been tried.

School children, non-governmental organizations, major
groups, and amateur volunteers have helped to collect data
and fill data gaps, and the UN Secretary-General has
encouraged the Commission on Sustainable Development to
develop this further (UN Economic and Social Council, 2001).



Including these new groups in science production is not only a
pragmatic approach to collecting data; it would also contribute to an
aspect of human development that all should be entitled to:
The intellectual tools and approaches of science should be made
accessible in all countries, and to all levels of the population, in
order to allow all persons to be active participants in ﬁnding
solutions to environmental problems and deﬁning appropriate
forms of sustainable development. (UN Economic and Social
Council, 1997)
A complementary approach would be to make the newest global
data (satellite images, for example) available for natural resource
management decisions at the local level.

possible global environmental governance measures
• Strengthening support for projects that incorporate training for
various civil society groups and the private sector, enabling them
to participate in data collection;
• Promoting the development of simple monitoring and research
methods that could be used by local groups;
• Establishing various central cores of stable funding for long-term
monitoring projects on specific environmental degradation prob
lems;
• Encouraging the international scientific community to make its
results public and available in usable forms for local populations
and decisionmakers.

Making the tools of the scientific enterprise available to larg
er sections of the population of the world would not only
bridge the knowledge divide, but is likely to increase the level
of trust between various stakeholders in decisionmaking
processes, from the global to the local level.





  

bridging the knowledge divide: changing
decisionmaking
Another approach to bridging the knowledge divide would be to take
the divide at face value and to focus on how it is addressed in gover
nance, trying to change the way decisionmakers deal with knowledge
and uncertainty. Getting global institutions to change their decisionmaking processes to reduce the negative consequences of the existing
knowledge divide could entail three strategies: (1) facing uncertainty
with more care and rigor; (2) making better use of available knowledge;
and (3) considering alternative knowledge in the policymaking process.

Dealing with Uncertainty

Facing uncertainty with more care will entail greater acknowledge
ment of the limits of knowledge, clearer focus on underlying assump
tions, and, at times, a precautionary approach.
Those engaged in global environmental policymaking must take
more care to construct their analyses on solid foundations. Special
attention must be given to getting data from the South. Modeling
must be done in ways that reﬂect the experiences and realities of the
developing world. Where extrapolations or assumptions are used, the
basis for these starting points should be made explicit. Ranges of val
ues and the use of multiple scenarios can also help to ensure that
uncertainties are addressed in ways that generate a more neutral ana
lytic foundation for global environmental action.

Utilizing Existing Scientific Knowledge in the South

A second approach that global institutions could adopt is to make
better use of the scientiﬁc knowledge about the South that is available.
It will take effort to ﬁnd these data. Travel may be necessary to
physically collect them, as this knowledge is unlikely to be catalogued
and found through the databases of libraries accessible over the
internet. It may require spending more time to locate scientists from
the South – or scientists from the North whose specialty is
environmental impacts in the South – and more resources to bring
them to meetings in scientiﬁc advisory processes at the global level. It
will certainly require some investment in verifying and quality



controlling the data found. Simultaneous translation at meetings may
also be necessary, as language frequently is an obstacle to
contributions from Southern scientists.
A lot of science from the South never reaches the international sci
ence arena. Many, especially younger, researchers in the South publish
in local journals, particularly in the ﬁelds of agriculture, silviculture,
and aquaculture (IDRC, 1991). In many cases, the language barrier pre
vents scientists from publishing in international journals and they are
conﬁned to the domestic or regional science community. Funds for
the translation of some of this body of knowledge would help to close
the knowledge gap.
Considerable information and analyses are also generated by agen
cies, domestic and foreign, governmental and non-governmental,
which work directly on environmental management and sustainable
development in the South. Much of the research and writing in the
development community, such as internal project reports, usually
remains in the gray literature and never reaches the scientiﬁc journals
(Kammen and Dove, 1997). This literature could be made more acces
sible and incorporated into global-level discussions.
possible global environmental governance measures
• Systematic efforts to bring forth “hidden” scientific knowledge to
scientific advisory processes at the global level;
• Broadening the disciplines represented in global decision process
es, i.e., including the social sciences, to expand the base of data
and information (UNEP, 2000);
• New commitments of resources for assisting scientists from the
South in making their research results internationally available –
both through publications and through participation in interna
tional meetings.

Incorporating Other Sources and Types of Knowledge

The third approach to changing decisionmaking requires a somewhat
different mindset within global institutions, in order to broaden the
categories of knowledge that are considered. It would ask decision





  

makers to acknowledge that highly validated science cannot do every
thing and that there may be value in examining the wealth of experi
ence captured in local and traditional knowledge, especially of indige
nous people.
The knowledge divide looks different if one includes local knowl
edge. For example, local people may have considerable knowledge of
species interconnections, natural variations in biogeophysical factors
in the local context, and an integrated understanding of how their
own actions inﬂuence the natural resources they depend on, even if
they cannot express this knowledge in the language of modern sci
10
ence. There is a considerable amount of local knowledge in these cat
egories that could be of value to decisionmaking. One scientiﬁc advi
sory body that has started to discuss how to approach traditional
knowledge is the Committee on Science and Technology of the
Convention to Combat Desertiﬁcation (UNEP, 1998). Non-govern
mental organizations (NGOs) are also a potential channel through
which such local experiences could reach the global level.

possible global environmental governance measures
• Systematic dialogue between government-appointed experts in
scientific advisory bodies and NGOs to explore ways of sifting out
the valuable local experiences of communities that do not nor
mally participate in policymaking processes. Such an exchange
could in turn encourage the participation of scientists from multi
ple disciplines and the formulation of further research priorities;11
• Scientific validation of alternative types of knowledge. To this
end, scientists should be encouraged to collect and “test” local
knowledge. Traditional knowledge should be “systematized” and
put to the tests of normal scientific validation and peer-review;
• Dissemination of alternative types of knowledge and information
to policymakers through the normal scientific channels.

10 In many cases, this knowledge is in the process of being lost because people migrate to urban
areas, are forced off their land, etc.
11

I am grateful to Professor Anders Hjort of Ornäs for contributing this suggestion.



conclusion
The world is divided into two civilisations that interact strong
ly, albeit in a one-sided way. One civilisation is based on the
growth of scientiﬁc knowledge, the other demonstrates a more
or less passive acceptance of results generated by the ﬁrst.
(Salomon, 1995: 9)
While Salomon makes this statement in the context of a general dis
cussion of the role of science and technology for development, this
chapter argues that the gist of his conclusion is also applicable to envi
ronmental governance at the global level, despite a signiﬁcant and
growing scientiﬁc enterprise in many developing countries. The natu
ral-science-dominated discourse on global environmental issues, the
reluctance to take action under uncertainty, and the limited scientiﬁc
capacity of the South put developing countries at a disadvantage in the
global environmental governance arena.
The “globalization” of knowledge based largely on ﬁndings in
Northern societies and ecosystems presents additional obstacles for
developing countries in global deliberations. Possible approaches to
addressing the knowledge divide and its negative consequences on
global environmental governance, discussed in this chapter, can be
summarized as follows:
measures to bridge the knowledge divide
Changing the Generation of
of Knowledge
Launch an initiative to collect
• baseline
environmental data
across all countries of the world;

•

Strengthen the scientific com
munity in the South;

Strengthen the scientific com
• munity
in the North researching
in the South;
Expand the groups participating
• participating
in the generation
of new knowledge.

Changing
Decisionmaking
uncertainty more
•Face
carefully and rigorously;
Use available knowledge
• about
the South better;
Identify, test, and, where
• appropriate,
incorporate
alternative sources of
knowledge.





  

The knowledge divide and its consequences cannot be considered a
problem of the South alone, but rather a collective problem for the
international community, since the North and the South are ultimate
ly part of the same physical and social whole. Any serious approach to
addressing the knowledge divide should consider not only the goal of
making global environmental governance more equitable and more
broadly knowledge-based, but also the deeper underlying issue of
what it means for people to be involved in the generation of knowl
edge about their own realities.
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The Role of NGOs and Civil Society
in Global Environmental Governance
Barbara Gemmill and Abimbola Bamidele-Izu
summary
This chapter identifies five major roles that civil society might play in
global environmental governance: (1) collecting, disseminating, and
analyzing information; (2) providing input to agenda-setting and policy
development processes; (3) performing operational functions; (4)
assessing environmental conditions and monitoring compliance with
environmental agreements; and (5) advocating environmental justice.
Three case studies – the Crucible Group, TRAFFIC, and global ecosystem
assessment processes – illustrate the success NGOs have had in stepping
up to these roles.
International decisionmaking processes seek legitimacy through the
involvement of civil society, yet formal mechanisms for NGO
participation within the UN system remain limited. Ad-hoc civil society
participation should be replaced by a strengthened, more formalized
institutional structure for engagement. The chapter offers concrete
suggestions for such measures, including:
use of the “commission” model for long-term, substantive
• Wider
involvement of civil society in global policymaking processes;
for the development of NGO networks;
• Assistance
Development
standards for civil society participation and
• engagement in ofinternational
decisionmaking processes;
Creation
of
a
comprehensive
database
• different geographic and political levels;of information and analysis at
of a larger part of the public in issue spotting,
• Involvement
assessment, and monitoring functions;
for knowledge-generating institutions in developing
• Support
countries.





  

introduction
Globalization has considerably weakened traditional governance
processes. Increasing global economic integration has reduced the
power of national governments while granting other economic and
political actors access to the world stage. The 1990s witnessed a dra
matic increase in the involvement of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in global governance (Charnovitz, 1997).

NGOs and other civil society groups are not only stakeholders

in governance, but also a driving force behind greater inter
national cooperation through the active mobilization of pub
lic support for international agreements.
Enabling the constructive participation of civil society in global
environmental governance is thus one of the most important tasks for
policymakers concerned with the effectiveness of global governance
(Gemmill, Ivanova, and Chee, 2002).
This chapter explores the potential for strengthened roles for civil
society, and especially non-governmental organizations, within a new
or a restructured global environmental governance system. We argue
that civil society should play a major role in ﬁve key areas:

•
•
•
•
•

Information collection and dissemination;
Policy development consultation;
Policy implementation;
Assessment and monitoring;
Advocacy for environmental justice.

We further contend that existing structures do not enable civil
society to fulﬁll these roles effectively and offer suggestions for reform
measures to facilitate the participation of civil society in global envi
ronmental governance.

  -

who and what is civil society?
The ﬁrst step in examining civil society participation is describing
exactly who is included within the delineation of civil society. In the
broadest sense, civil society has been characterized as a sphere of social
life that is public but excludes government activities (Meidinger,
2001). Michael Bratton describes civil society as social interaction
between the household and the state characterized by community
cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of
public communication (Bratton, 1994). The term civil society is gen
erally used to classify persons, institutions, and organizations that
have the goal of advancing or expressing a common purpose through
ideas, actions, and demands on governments (Cohen and Arato, 1992).
The membership of civil society is quite diverse, ranging from indi
viduals to religious and academic institutions to issue-focused groups
such as not-for-proﬁt or non-governmental organizations. In the realm
of environmental governance, NGOs are the most prominent actors
and therefore comprise the main focus of this chapter. NGOs are:
Groups of individuals organized for the myriad of reasons that
engage human imagination and aspiration. They can be set up
to advocate a particular cause, such as human rights, or to
carry out programs on the ground, such as disaster relief. They
can have memberships ranging from local to global.
1
(Charnovitz, 1997: 186)
NGOs involved in environmental governance are highly diverse,
including local, national, regional, and international groups with var
ious missions dedicated to environmental protection, sustainable
development, poverty alleviation, animal welfare, and other issues.
The diversity of civil society and its value to ofﬁcial intergovern
mental processes on the environment are acknowledged in Agenda 21,
the comprehensive sustainable development blueprint adopted at the
1992 Rio Earth Summit. The document does not make use of the term
civil society, although it expressly recognizes the members of civil
society as a major constituency.

1

Charnovitz further points out that, “Indeed, some NGO’s are more ‘global’ than intergovern
mental organizations. For example, the International Amateur Athletic Federation includes
twenty-one more members than the United Nations” (Charnovitz, 1997).





  

The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), responsible
for implementing Agenda 21, classiﬁes civil society into the following
2
Major Groups:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Women
Children and Youth
Indigenous Peoples and Communities
Non-governmental Organizations
Workers and Trade Unions
The Scientiﬁc and Technological Community
Business and Industry
Farmers

All of the Major Groups are ofﬁcially recognized by the United
Nations through an accreditation mechanism developed speciﬁcally
for NGOs (Pace, 2002).
A noteworthy question connected to the deﬁnition of civil society
is whether business and industry should be included in this social
grouping. While Agenda 21 considers business and industry part of civil
society, some observers contend that, because they already have con
siderable inﬂuence over international governance processes through
informal lobbying opportunities and formal inﬂuence channels, busi
ness and industry should not be included in civil society (Meidinger,
2001). Because this chapter focuses on the participation of NGOs, it is
not essential to resolve the business and civil society delineation ques
tion within these pages, although determining how business should
participate within governance is clearly of great importance.

overview of civil society participation: expanding
ngo involvement
The participation of civil society in global governance is increasing in
signiﬁcance, but is not unprecedented. NGO involvement is usually
considered a late-twentieth-century phenomenon, but in fact it has
2

The CSD also recognizes the role of local authorities, which are removed enough from the
international intergovernmental process to be considered civil society in the context of the
institution.
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occurred for over two centuries (Charnovitz, 1997). The recent rate of
proliferation of non-governmental organizations, however, is notable.
In 1948, for example, the United Nations listed forty-one consultative
groups that were formally accredited to participate in consultative
processes; in 1998, there were more than 1,500 organizations with vary
ing degrees of participation and access (Simmons, 1998). Numerous
factors, from the development of information technology to the
greater awareness of global interdependence to the spread of democ
3
racy, explain the rise of NGOs.
The United Nations is the intergovernmental organization that has
most openly recognized and endorsed the need to collaborate with the
4
non-governmental sector (Weiss, 1999). Historically, the UN cooper
ated with NGOs primarily as partners in the implementation of cer
tain programs, particularly in the areas of emergency response,
human rights, and election monitoring.

Due to their critical role in service delivery and implementa
tion, civil society organizations have long been recognized as
“partners” of the UN system, especially in environmental
negotiations.
Over the past decade, environmental NGO activity within UN
processes has intensiﬁed. Prior to the 1990s, while various social
movements may have utilized the UN as a global forum to call atten
tion to particular agendas, the focus was not on inﬂuencing the ofﬁ
cial UN deliberations. Through the process leading up to the 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), environmental organizations began intense internal capac
ity building efforts to gain more sophisticated understanding of the
international policymaking process (Conca, 1996). Some of the inno
vations at the time – most notably, parallel NGO fora held alongside
UN conferences – are now a routine element of intergovernmental
deliberations (Fomerand, 1996).
3

Interestingly, the first intergovernmental environmental summit, the 1972 UN Conference on
the Human Environment, is cited as one factor behind the rise in NGOs (Conca, 1996).

4

Other intergovernmental bodies, such as the World Trade Organization, the International
Monetary Fund, and the G-7 have no provisions for formal involvement of non-governmental
organizations, see Esty (1998) and Charnovitz (1996).





  

The UN Conference on Environment and Development was of par
ticular signiﬁcance to NGOs. Agenda 21 declared the need for new
forms of participation:
The United Nations system, including international ﬁnance
and development agencies, and all intergovernmental organi
zations and forums should, in consultation with non-govern
mental organizations, take measures to . . . enhance existing or,
where they do not exist, establish mechanisms and procedures
within each agency to draw on the expertise and views of non
governmental organizations in policy and program design,
implementation and evaluation. (UN, 1994: Chapter 27)
The 1992 Earth Summit thus afﬁrmed that the commitment and
genuine involvement of non-state actors are critical to reaching sus
tainable development goals.
Throughout the 1990s, NGOs continued to focus on ofﬁcial UN
deliberations and the international policy arena. A variety of channels
have served NGOs in their purpose of participating and inﬂuencing
international deliberations. NGOs sought accreditation at internation
al intergovernmental conferences where they could lobby government
delegates, organize brieﬁngs, and even ofﬁcially address plenary ses
sions. A number of government delegations to international confer
ences are now formally including NGO representatives. In the prepara
tory process for the 1996 UN Conference on Human Settlements
(Habitat II), for example, NGOs and local authorities participated in
the informal drafting groups that drew up the Declaration and
Programme of Action. Within the policymaking circle of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), NGOs had a say
in establishing the agenda and other aspects of the negotiations
process for the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Public Access to
Information, Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to
Environmental Justice. In both of these cases, a special, semi-ofﬁcial
status was accorded to civil society representatives.
Successes and Challenges in Civil Society Participation:
Differing Roles and Rules for Engagement

New forms of NGO participation have changed the nature of
international environmental policymaking. The international

  -

community has begun to recognize that effective global action
requires meaningful stakeholder involvement in international
policymaking and implementation (Wapner, 2000). NGO involvement
in global environmental governance can take a variety of forms (Esty,
1998, 2002; Charnovitz, 1997):

•

Expert advice and analysis. NGOs can facilitate negotiations by giv
ing politicians access to competing ideas from outside the normal
bureaucratic channels;

•

Intellectual competition to governments. NGOs often have much
better analytical and technical skills and capacity to respond more
5
quickly than government ofﬁcials;

•

Mobilization of public opinion. NGOs can inﬂuence the public
through campaigns and broad outreach;

•

Representation of the voiceless. NGOs can help vocalize the interests
of persons not well-represented in policymaking;

•

Service provision. NGOs can deliver technical expertise on particu
lar topics as needed by government ofﬁcials as well as participate
directly in operational activities;

•

Monitoring and assessment. NGOs can help strengthen inter
national agreements by monitoring negotiation efforts and
governmental compliance;

•

Legitimization of global-scale decisionmaking mechanisms. NGOs
could broaden the base of information for decisionmaking,
improving the quality, authoritativeness, and legitimacy of the
policy choices of international organizations.

Civil society’s involvement in global environmental governance has
enriched the process and strengthened outcomes in a number of
6
places and in a number of ways. In fact, it is the participation of non
governmental groups that makes the process “global” and not simply
5 For a further discussion of the need for both “competition” and “cooperation” from NGOs in
global-scale policymaking, see Esty and Geradin’s argument in Regulatory Competition and
Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives (2001).
6 For a detailed assessment of the value of multi-stakeholder participation in environment and
sustainable development policymaking processes, see Hemmati (2001).





  

channels for ngo participation
in international organizations
1. NGO representatives can be included on a national delegation to
an international conference to advise delegates from their govern
ment (Cairo Population Conference in 1994);
2. Representatives from a NGO can be included on a national delega
tion to an international conference to represent the NGO and con
duct negotiations (International Labor Organization);
3. NGOs can send delegates to semi-public international conferences
(IUCN has a membership that includes 699 NGOs as well as states
and government agencies);
4. An international organization can set up an advisory group that
includes experts from NGOs, who do not represent the NGO (UN
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters);
5. An international organization can give NGOs an opportunity to
participate in ongoing policy development (Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species);
6. An international organization can enlist NGOs to help in imple
menting programs (UN High Commissioner for Refugees);
7. An international organization can give NGOs an opportunity to
participate (not necessarily in a negotiating role) in an official con
ference to draft a treaty (ECOSOC);
8. An international organization can give NGOs an opportunity to
participate in preparatory committees for an international confer
ence (Rio Earth Summit in 1992, Johannesburg Summit on
Sustainable Development in 2002);
9. An international organization can hold a special session to give
NGOs an opportunity to make presentations (General Assembly on
sub-Saharan Africa in 1986);
10. An international organization can include NGOs as members
(International Commission for Scientific Exploration of the
Mediterranean Sea).
Source: Charnovitz, Steve. 1997. “Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance.” Michigan Journal of International Law 18(2): 281-282.
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“international.” While many governments agree that NGO participa
7
tion is indispensable, many also feel that the drawbacks of civil soci
ety participation may outweigh the beneﬁts. Arguments and concerns
abound on both sides. Some are fretful that NGOs might constitute
special interest groups, and that their participation would invariably
result in policy distortions. Others fear that intergovernmental deci
sionmaking processes would become bogged down by NGOs, which
are not necessarily representative of or accountable to their particular
constituencies (Nichols, 1996). Decisionmakers are also anxious that
NGOs may seek to usurp the sovereign powers of governments.
However, some of these concerns may be overstated, considering
the advantages of civil society involvement. Civil society can help
build the political will for a new approach to development that inte
grates environmental and social goals. Non-governmental organiza
tions can serve as alternatives to weak or inadequate democratic insti
tutions, as avenues for more inclusive dialogues, and as conduits for
disseminating information on activities and issues within the interna
tional system.
These and other signiﬁcant characteristics of civil society participa
tion in governance are explored in the following three case studies.
The Crucible Group: Harnessing the Power of Diverse Voices

The Crucible Group is a multinational, multidisciplinary gathering of
experts that ﬁrst met ofﬁcially in 1993 to discuss the control and
management of agricultural genetic resources. The initial goal was to
identify issues, trends, and use options. While agricultural genetic
resources are of crucial importance to biotechnology and genetic
engineering, there are serious debates surrounding their ownership
and control as well as the equitable sharing of beneﬁts. The group —
twenty-eight individuals from nineteen countries — included
grassroots organizers, farmers, trade diplomats, agricultural research
scientists, intellectual property specialists, and agricultural policy
8
analysts from both the North and South.
Recognizing the diversity of perspectives and priorities, the group
did not seek consensus, but was able to agree on twenty-eight recom
7 Many European governments, for example, provide a very significant part of the budget of
non-governmental organizations.
8 For more information on the Crucible Group and its activities, see http://www.
idrc.ca/books/725/preface.html





  

mendations for policymakers. The ﬁrst summary of the deliberations
and the recommendations, People, Plants, and Patents: The Impact of
Intellectual Property on Trade, Plant Biodiversity, and Rural Society, was
published in 1994 (IDRC, 1994). Having now evolved into the Crucible
Group II, with more than forty-ﬁve participants from twenty-ﬁve
countries, the group has continued to meet to revisit many unresolved
issues and consider a number of new ones. As a neutral forum, the
Crucible Group II has promoted open discussion among participants
who might otherwise never have been at the same table. The Group
launched a second volume, Seeding Solutions: Policy Options for
Genetic Resources, at the April 2002 Conference of Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity. The report provides valuable
input into the debate and development of guidelines on intellectual
property issues, rights of farmers, mechanisms for beneﬁt sharing, and
appropriate governance structures for conservation of plant genetic
resources.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the Crucible Group experi
ence:

•

A dialogue does not have to produce consensus to be useful for
governance purposes;

•

A process designed to include non-state actors will reﬂect a broad
er spectrum of views and may generate more creative approaches
to solving problems;

•

A process where government and non-government participants
are equal partners in a project is more likely to generate "buy in"
and thus useful results.

Not all governance projects involving civil society, however, have
achieved a balance of inﬂuence among participants. In fact, multistakeholder dialogues – especially those that are of very short dura
tion – are losing favor with many in civil society. Some feel that the
term stakeholder undermines communities and individuals struggling
for their rights and that it implies equality among participants, which
is not always the case. Clearly, for multi-stakeholder processes to serve
as a vehicle for meaningful civil society participation, they must pro
vide mechanisms for open, long-term discussions and deliberations.
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The Global Environment Outlook and the UN Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment: Helping to Fill Research and Analytical Gaps

One of the most important roles that NGOs can play in global envi
ronmental governance is to provide up-to-date information on criti
cal issues. Governments often turn to NGOs to ﬁll research gaps that
stand in the way of effective decisionmaking. Certain NGOs, such as
the World Resources Institute (WRI) and IUCN – The World
9
Conservation Union, have crafted their mandates around the role of
information provider. These groups are dedicated to the production of
accurate, up-to-date research and data on the most pressing environ
mental issues.

Whereas governmental bodies and intergovernmental organ
izations often lack analytical capacity or are hampered by
bureaucratic constraints and other obligations, NGOs can
focus on a dynamic research agenda, and move quickly to
address new issues.
The Global Environment Outlook (GEO) of UNEP and the recent
ly launched UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment are good examples
of formalized non-governmental assessment processes and inter-orga
10
nizational networking. At the core of these processes lies a global
network of collaborating groups responsible for regional inputs.
Global system assessment is integrated with local environmental
reporting. NGOs and other non-state actors such as academic and
research institutions are the main contributors, providing reports and
data analysis. In the case of the GEO assessment, the ﬁnal reports are
reviewed by government representatives before publication. NGOs
have not yet been allowed participation in the veriﬁcation process.
These large-scale assessments require considerable amounts of
funding. The contributions of charitable organizations, such as the
9 IUCN – The World Conservation Union is an important example of collaboration between state
and non-state actors. While formally an NGO, this organization includes a number of state
agencies among its members.
10 Different reports of the UNEP’s Global Environment Outlook Report Series can be viewed at
http://www.unep.org/GEO/index.htm For more information about the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, its activities, and publications, see http://www.millenniumassessment.org/
en/index.htm.





  

United Nations Foundation, for international environmental research
are indispensable. Funding matters do raise some concerns in terms of
the autonomy of NGO research and analysis. The complicated
dependence that NGOs and many academic and research institutions
have on governmental and other donor funding concerns some
observers in terms of the freedom civil society members have in con
ducting the research and analysis they contribute to governance
processes. The funding situation, however, is not likely to change.
Financial relationships and dependencies should therefore be trans
parent and open to scrutiny.

TRAFFIC: Ensuring Effective Implementation

A third example of civil society fulﬁlling an essential environmental
governance role is provided by TRAFFIC, the wildlife monitoring net
work for the 1975 Convention on International Trade in Endangered
11
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
TRAFFIC is a partnership between WWF – World Wide Fund For
Nature and IUCN – The World Conservation Union. It was estab
lished in 1976 to assist the CITES Secretariat in implementing the pro
visions of the Convention. The Convention covers more than 30,000
species of animals and plants and has been endorsed by over 150 coun
tries (Rosser, Haywood, and Harris, 2001). The diversity of the traded
goods covered under CITES, which range from medicinal herbs to
exotic pets, requires a level of international, on-the-ground coordina
tion that would be difﬁcult for a single intergovernmental institution
(Wijnstekers, 2001).
TRAFFIC is a key component in the implementation of CITES. The
NGOs behind the partnership are able to utilize their resources world
wide to operate twenty-two ofﬁces in eight regional programs, making
TRAFFIC the world’s largest wildlife trade monitoring organization
(TRAFFIC, 2001). Its program priorities are threatened species and
ecoregions, resource security, and international cooperation.
Members lobby decisionmakers to ensure that trade in plant and ani
mal species does not pose a threat to species conservation, and collab
orate with governments and the private sector in developing econom
ic incentive programs to encourage sustainable trade. TRAFFIC has
been particularly successful in data collection, on-the-ground inves
11 For more information about TRAFFIC, see http://www.traffic.org/
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tigative tasks, and in-depth research. Through its research and out
reach initiatives, TRAFFIC has become a key resource for governments
and other NGOs, providing decisionmakers with critical information
and analysis and prompting initiatives to ensure sustainable trade.

strengthening civil society participation in global
environmental governance
As indicated by the three cases discussed above, civil society – name
ly, the NGO community – has particular strengths to bring to global
environmental governance. The creativity, ﬂexibility, entrepreneurial
nature, and capacity for vision and long-term thinking often set NGOs
apart from governmental bodies. A revitalized global environmental
governance regime would thus beneﬁt from greater participation of
NGOs in global policy processes. What follows is a discussion of ﬁve
key potential roles for civil society organizations in a strengthened
global environmental governance system.
Information-Based Duties

As shown by the Global Environment Outlook and Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment processes, NGOs have much to offer in the way
of information collection, dissemination, and analysis. Numerous
other examples exist in which NGOs serve a key information-based
role. One of the most signiﬁcant relates to the Conferences of Parties
and other meetings held in conjunction with multilateral environ
mental agreements such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity
and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Often, the
meetings are distinguished less by what is said in plenary session than
by the wealth of research and policy documents produced by NGOs
and other civil society constituents and released speciﬁcally to coin
cide with the ofﬁcial events. Many conference delegates read these
opinion papers and other documents, which often shed new light on
the costs of inaction and the options for change. Another common
opportunity for civil society members to provide input into intergov
ernmental negotiations comes in the form of a single statement devel
oped by NGOs present and released at the close of the ofﬁcial event.
Measures to improve the utility of information exchange could
include:





  

•

Wider acceptance and use of the “commission” model. Short-term
consultations often yield less valuable information than do multistakeholder commissions (similar to the World Commission on
Dams) provided with sufficient investment of time and
12
resources.

•

Assistance in the formation of networks. UN convention secretariats,
for example, could facilitate ongoing, high-level multi-stakehold
er knowledge networks that make a directed effort to bring expert
ise to bear on science and policy challenges, including perspectives
from marginalized groups.

•

Mechanisms to support “give and take.” While ofﬁcials may read the
opinion pieces and research documents NGOs release, there is
often little feedback and very limited opportunities for back and
forth dialogue. The institution of “notice and comment” process
es, formal advisory panels, and other informal mechanisms for
information exchange between government ofﬁcials and NGOs
could pay real dividends.

•

Efforts to agree to disagree. Seeking “consensus” is often a mistake.
Consensus can be difﬁcult to reach, resulting in prolonged discus
sions of watered-down conclusions, “forced” agreements, and a
failure to communicate valid perspectives. An acceptance on the
part of intergovernmental decisionmakers of a civil society state
ment reﬂecting multiple opinions would often be more useful.

Inputs into Policy Development

Over the past decades, NGOs have assumed a more active role in the
process of agenda-setting and policy development (Porter, 2000).
NGOs have been instrumental in notifying the public, governments,
and international organizations of critical new issues for many years.
In 1945, NGOs pushed for inserting human rights language into the
UN Charter and have been active in that policy domain since. Global
environmental issues gained prominence in the 1970s also as a result
of NGO activities. In the 1980s, forestry concerns were included on the
agenda of intergovernmental deliberations under the pressure of
NGOs (Humphreys, 1996). In 1997, six NGOs played a key role,
12 For a discussion of the World Commission on Dams, see Streck, this volume.
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through the International Committee to Ban Landmines, in convinc
ing governments to embrace the successful intergovernmental landmine treaty (Weiss, 1999).
The ability of NGOs to place issues on the global agenda does much
to enhance their ability to participate in the later stages of decisionmaking. As pointed out by former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy, “Clearly, one can no longer relegate NGOs to simple advi
sory or advocacy roles . . . They are now part of the way decisions have
to be made” (cited in Simmons, 1998). The question of what consti
tutes meaningful civil society participation in decisionmaking, how
ever, is still being explored as NGOs and intergovernmental bodies
continue to develop working relationships.
To this end, the development of a structure for civil society partic
ipation and engagement in international decisionmaking processes is
necessary. Currently, modalities of involvement vary from being a full
13
partner as in the case of the International Labor Organization to
denial of access (even as observers) as in the case of the World Trade
Organization. While each international agency would need to tailor
participation standards to its particular objectives, a minimum set of
criteria should be elaborated. The following elements need to be
addressed:

•

Clear articulation of rules, rights, and commitments to consulta
tion with civil society beyond time-limited NGO fora;

•

Clearly delineated selection criteria for NGO participation in con
sultations and advisory groups, placing an emphasis on diversity;

•
•
•

Establishment of guidelines for the process of NGO contributions;

•

Commitment to respectful treatment of NGO documents;
Support for publication and dissemination of NGO submissions to
delegates at relevant international meetings;
Formalized submission process for NGO recommendations and
comments to intergovernmental bodies;

13 The International Labor Organization was established in 1919 with a tripartite governance
structure – governments, business, and labor are equal partners in the decisionmaking
process of the organization.





  

•

Provision for feedback and response to NGO submissions by inter
governmental bodies or national governments;

•

Mechanism for monitoring the implementation of these compo
nents.

A more formalized structure for NGO participation would be
useful in addressing some of the current obstacles to civil society
involvement in global environmental governance. The wariness that
governments and others have of NGO involvement might be reduced
if baseline standards defined the rights and responsibilities of
governmental and non-governmental entities in a clear and consistent
manner.

Operational Functions

As demonstrated by the example of TRAFFIC, the UN system usefully
engages civil society entities as operational partners in many circum
stances. The role of NGOs in implementation of worldwide policy
efforts has greatly increased since the mid-1980s, when NGOs began to
ﬁll gaps left in the provision of services by reduced roles for many
development agencies (Simon and Dodds, 1998). Non-governmental
organizations are particularly useful in an operational context, as they
can provide implementation tailored to speciﬁc conditions and can
“make the impossible possible by doing what governments cannot or
will not do” (Simmons, 1998). This is especially true with regard to the
management of natural resources, which is often best handled by
community-based organizations who have a stake in local environ
mental conditions and are free from many of the conﬂicting demands
experienced by governments. And, in fact, the preamble to Section III
of Agenda 21 underscores the need for individuals and groups, espe
cially at the local level, to participate in decisions that may affect the
communities in which they live and work.
A signiﬁcant portion of the world’s ecological “hot spots” are locat
ed in rural – often very poor – areas of developing countries. As a
result, the burdens of ecological damage, as well as the burdens asso
ciated with ecological regeneration, are borne primarily by people in
these areas (Agarwal, 1998). NGOs and other groups in the developing
world typically are poorly funded, have little access to information,
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and often lack a visible presence or audible voice in international gov
ernance processes (Breitmeier and Rittberger, 2000). The activities of
Shack/Slum Dwellers International, a network of grassroots develop
ment groups in fourteen countries, are illustrative of one way in which
Southern groups can build greater presence on the international stage.
Through the use of micro-ﬁnancing and other programs, Shack/Slum
Dwellers International leverages the resources of its member groups to
provide them with ﬁnancial support, information, and advice on
development strategies and related issues. Using their collective power,
the federation has developed a voice on the global policymaking stage
(Edwards, 2001).
The operational functions of NGOs within a reformed global envi
ronmental governance system could be strengthened by:

•

Expanded efforts at inclusion of local, community-based groups
with knowledge of the issues at hand;

•

Capacity building targeted at enhancing communication between
local groups and other governance partners;

•

Support for initiatives to measure and monitor service delivery by
NGOs — and the use of benchmarking and the identiﬁcation of
“best practices” as a way to improve performance.

Assessment and Monitoring

Performance assessments and monitoring of environmental condi
tions undertaken by NGOs may hold decisionmakers in international
arenas publicly accountable for decisions in ways that the intergov
ernmental system itself could never accomplish (Gaer, 1996). As
Thomas Weiss notes, “NGOs are . . . capable of making sensitive or
politically important information public – something that intergov
ernmental organizations often are reluctant or loathe to do because of
their dependence on member states for resources” (Weiss, 1999). A
number of NGO-led or assisted assessment initiatives are currently
under way.





  

As shown by TRAFFIC, for example, environmental NGOs are
critical actors in compliance monitoring of international
agreements and in finding more accurate compliance data
than governments are willing to provide. Much room exists,
however, for greater civil society involvement in this impor
tant area of governance.
There is an urgent need to account for the needs of developing
countries, to acknowledge the limitations they face in conducting
monitoring and assessment activities, and to provide support for the
enhancement of these functions within governments and civil society
alike. Key measures that could facilitate the assessment and monitor
ing role of NGOs include:

•

Creation of a comprehensive database for information and analysis
at different geographic and political levels. NGOs are key providers
of local environmental data and information. A coherent mecha
nism for data collection and analysis will encourage this function
and facilitate a two-way information ﬂow;

•

Involvement of a larger part of the population in assessment and
monitoring functions. The inclusion of civil society groups in data
collection would greatly contribute to ﬁlling knowledge gaps as
well as enhance knowledge development, increase interest, and
promote engagement. This will be especially beneﬁcial to devel
14
oping countries;

•

Support for knowledge-generating institutions in developing coun
tries. Universities are key generators of knowledge, yet they are
among the most under-funded institutions in developing coun
tries. Funding and communication technology transfer will be
critical to their ability to perform these functions.

14 For a detailed analysis of the gap between scientific capacities in developed and developing
countries, its consequences for global environmental governance, and recommendations for
bridging this knowledge divide, see Karlsson, this volume.
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Advocacy for Environmental Justice

Over the past few decades, NGOs in many countries have been
extremely effective in highlighting disparities in who bears environ
mental burdens and who gets the beneﬁts of environmental invest
ments. Some groups have issued reports. Others have brought public
interest litigation to defend environmental rights as well as to clarify
and enforce laws. If a reformed global environmental governance sys
tem were to include a dispute settlement mechanism, it is easy to see
the potential contributions NGOs and other civil society members
could make to such a structure. The submission of “friends of the
court” opinions would be well-suited to the skills and interests of
NGOs. In fact, the Aarhus Convention envisions a process by which
NGOs could seek judicial remedy against other parties, such as
national governments or private sector entities, for environmental
harms or crimes.

conclusion
Designing governance structures that draw NGOs into global-scale
environmental problem solving, policymaking, and implementation
remains an important global challenge. Civil society has much more
to offer to intergovernmental processes. Indeed, the very legitimacy of
international decisionmaking may depend on NGOs as a way to
ensure connectedness to the publics around the world and substitute
for true popular sovereignty, which international bodies, devoid of
elected ofﬁcials, lack. A number of UN projects and programs are
already beneﬁting from the contributions of NGOs in areas as varied
as information collection and dissemination, policy implementation,
monitoring and assessment, norm-setting, and policy development. A
revitalized global environmental governance system must facilitate
both an expansion of these roles for NGOs and the development of
better-deﬁned processes of participation.
A number of difﬁculties remain. Civil society participation requires
a signiﬁcant commitment of time as well as substantial ﬁnancial
resources from governments and intergovernmental bodies. Diversity
within the global civil society community precludes the reaching of a
consensus position that could be easily channeled into intergovern
mental negotiations. It is imperative that NGOs explore innovative





  

forms of networking through regional coalitions, for example, to help
ensure the inclusion of a multitude of voices from developing coun
tries and to make civil society involvement in governance more effec
tive.

The contributions from civil society participation need to be
enhanced through a strengthened, more formalized structure
for engagement. UN programs seek legitimacy for their poli
cies through the involvement of civil society, yet formal
mechanisms for NGO participation within many parts of the
UN system remain limited.
An improved governance structure would acknowledge the role of
NGOs and other members of civil society and devise formal channels

for participation. Ad-hoc acceptance of civil society participation
should be replaced by institutional arrangements among UN member
states, UN agencies, and NGOs.

  -
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Regional Environmental Governance:
Examining the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Model
Koh Kheng Lian and Nicholas A. Robinson
summary
Regional systems of environmental management are an essential com
ponent of global environmental governance, complementing gover
nance efforts at the national and global levels. This chapter analyzes the
role and functions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
in the environmental domain as one model for regional governance.
ASEAN’s tradition emphasizes non-interference in its members’

domestic affairs, seeks consensus and cooperation, and aims to facilitate
national implementation of regional agreements. Two main areas have
served as a focal point for regional environmental cooperation within
ASEAN: management of shared natural resources (biodiversity) and pol

lution control (air pollution from forest fires).
The ASEAN experience in environmental management illustrates the
strengths and limitations of environmental governance at the regional
level, with important lessons for the global level. The organization’s
emphasis on cooperation favors regional policy and soft law formula
tions. However, the general lack of concrete instruments for translating
ASEAN commitments into national level action has hindered implemen

tation of effective programs. ASEAN’s limitations could be reduced if the
organization were understood as an essential, but not exclusive, part of
an environmental governance system, working and cooperating with
international organizations to solve problems and implement solutions.





  

regional environmental governance
Global sustainable development requires actions to be taken in each
country in accordance with national capacities. The key to success in
addressing transboundary harms is a structure that connects interna
tional policymaking with national implementation. National action
can be encouraged through strengthened global networks, improved
data and information systems, and new ﬁnancing arrangements, but
work at the national level remains critical.
The regional level represents a critical middle ground between the
global and national scales (Dua and Esty, 1997). Contiguous states may
collaborate to sustain shared ecosystems and solve common problems.
Indeed, many transboundary issues appear ﬁrst at the regional level,
affecting several neighboring countries. Pollution of a shared river
basin or loss of habitat across the migration range of a species, for
example, are as relevant at the regional as at the national level. No
country can cope effectively with shared environmental problems on
its own. Regional systems of environmental management are thus
essential to securing agreements for, and implementation of, speciﬁc
action programs (Kimball, 1999).

Regional integration of national activities for sustainable
development can be advanced through measures such as
harmonization of standards, joint development of
environmental management systems, and collaborative
capacity building projects. None of this will happen, however,
without an effective institutional framework to facilitate it.

the association of southeast asian nations
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in
1967 to encourage stable relations among Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, and to resist the destabiliz
ing inﬂuences of the war in Vietnam. To promote stability, ASEAN fos
tered economic, social, and cultural cooperation in the spirit of equal
ity and partnership. The Association subsequently expanded its mem

  

bership to include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar
1
(Burma), and Vietnam.
During the first phase of cooperation, the national ASEAN
Secretariats carried out projects without a formal treaty system.
Subsequently, ASEAN has developed increasingly sophisticated meas
ures for policy coordination. The Association seeks to meet its goal of
closer cohesion and economic integration by building a recognized
ASEAN community. In 1997, the ASEAN heads of state and government
gathered in Kuala Lumpur to mark the Association’s 30th anniversary.
The outcome document of that meeting, ASEAN Vision 2020, attests to
the achievements of the past thirty years and elaborates a vision for
the future of the region:
That vision is of ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian
Nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability, and pros
perity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic develop
ment and in a community of caring societies. (ASEAN, 1997)
The Hanoi Plan of Action, 1999 – 2004, was formulated pursuant
to ASEAN Vision 2020 and covered some ﬁfteen areas relating to the
environment.

1 Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia
in 1999.





  

The “ASEAN Way”

Regional cooperation to build stable relations in Southeast Asia has
become known as the “ASEAN Way,” a collaborative approach empha
sizing three fundamental standards:

•

Non-interference or non-intervention in other member states’
domestic affairs, as underscored in the United Nations Charter,
Article 2(7);

•

Consensus building and cooperative programs rather than legally
binding treaties (but in an exceptional situation, a binding agree
ment may be possible);

•

Preference for national implementation of programs rather than
reliance on a strong region-wide bureaucracy.

The emphasis on consensus is also reﬂected in ASEAN methods for
dispute resolution. In the Paciﬁc region, due to the inﬂuence of the
British Commonwealth, most disagreements are settled with formal
judicial methods (Cameron and Ramsay, 1996). Disagreements
between the nations of ASEAN, on the other hand, are generally settled
through conciliation and consultation, which is seen as a way to min
imize tensions and avoid unnecessary conﬂicts (Narine, 1999).

ASEAN Organizational Framework for Managing
Environmental Matters

There is no core ASEAN bureaucracy. The small Secretariat, based in
Jakarta, has a limited facilitation role. Activities are undertaken by
each ASEAN member state at the national level. ASEAN embraces the
tenet of common but differentiated responsibilities. Members agree
on common measures, decide how to implement them, and con
tribute according to their capabilities, acknowledging that ASEAN
member states have achieved different levels of development and
therefore have different capacities for action.
When ASEAN was established in 1967, environmental management
was not expressly recognized as a concern (Koh, 1996). ASEAN
integrated the environment into its complex system of regional
consultations on economic, social, technical, and scientific
development following the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment in 1972.

  

ASEAN’s Senior Ofﬁcials on the Environment carry out a series of
activities in the environmental domain:

•

Preparing for ASEAN’s regional participation in international
environmental governance deliberations;

•

Establishing guidelines pertaining to pollution, biodiversity, cli
mate change, forests, and related environmental matters;

•

Working toward harmonization of environmental standards for
ambient air and river quality.

In each country, National Focal Points are responsible for carrying
out ASEAN initiatives. Member states are increasingly willing to
assume greater responsibilities to increase ASEAN’s environmental
effectiveness, as demonstrated by the Philippines’ decision to host
ASEAN’s Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation and Malaysia’s
agreement to manage the Marine Turtle Conservation Program. The
current framework for ASEAN environmental management and coop
eration is reﬂected in its institutional architecture (see Figure 1). This
structure facilitates cooperation among ASEAN member states and
enhances the Association’s ability to cooperate with other countries.
A Summit of the ASEAN heads of state and government, ASEAN’s
highest decisionmaking body, is held every three years. These highlevel panels pave the way for intermediate, ministerial-level meetings,
and provide proposals for decisions to be adopted by consensus at the
ministerial level. Ministerial meetings by sector – including agricul
ture and forestry, economics, energy, environment, ﬁnance, labor,
regional haze, rural development and poverty alleviation, science and
technology, and social welfare – are convened in tandem with the
Summit. Every three years, well before the meeting of the heads of
state and government, ASEAN holds a Ministerial Meeting on the
Environment.





  

Figure 1

ASEAN’s Organizational Framework
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approaches to solving environmental problems
The “ASEAN Way” faces new challenges as it knits together programs
across the ten Southeast Asian states, yet the very fact that the ASEAN
Way is regarded as a deﬁned approach, distinct from the more for
malistic parliamentary decisionmaking systems of Europe and North
America, is evidence for the proposition that ASEAN bears close study
by those interested in strengthening regional and global environmen
tal governance.
ASEAN’s approach to environmental governance and its institu
tional responsibilities and achievements can be illustrated by its efforts
to manage biodiversity conservation and to address transboundary air
pollution from forest ﬁres.

Biodiversity Conservation: Addressing Global Priorities Using
Regional Management

Southeast Asia is a “mega-rich” region in terms of biological diversity.
These resources require careful conservation management.
Unsustainable logging and conversion of forests into agricultural land
have had adverse impacts on biodiversity across the region.
Biodiversity conservation has thus become an issue of signiﬁcant
interest to ASEAN member states (Koh, 2002). Recognizing the need to
share information and to shape a common approach to biodiversity,
member states initiated a Working Group of ASEAN Senior Ofﬁcials
on the Environment and an ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity
Conservation. The four core functions of the Centre illustrate the
problem solving approach that ASEAN has adopted regarding envi
ronmental concerns:

•

Networking and Institution Building
Strong national institutions are critical for the implementation of
regional policies. To this end, a network of national biodiversity
reference units has been established, connecting scientiﬁc knowl
edge and promoting information exchange. The network is also
charged with the task of developing and implementing an exchange
program for academics and researchers from ASEAN institutions,
as well as designing policies for biodiversity conservation.

•

Data and Information Management
Sound data on natural resources and environmental trends are
critical for the effective design of policies and their implementa





  

tion. The Biodiversity Centre creates, shares, and maintains elec
tronic data repositories regarding biodiversity and has the capaci
ty to link its records to other international databases.

•

Research and Development
The accumulation of scientiﬁc knowledge and understanding is
seen as critical in the environmental domain where many uncer
tainties persist. The Biodiversity Centre has taken on the role of
coordinating regional efforts in determining research priorities,
organizing conferences to ﬁnalize the regional research agenda,
and providing funds for applied biodiversity research activities.

•

Education and Training
The sustained build up of capacity for the execution of common
policies and decisions is an important governance function. The
Biodiversity Centre assists institutions in formulating their training
needs, and designs and carries out training and education programs.
Across the region, in cooperation with the European Union, the

ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation is creating

management systems for biological conservation as a foundation for
sustaining the region’s natural resources. The Centre serves as the
main focal point for networking and institutional linkage among
ASEAN member countries, and with other regional organizations, to
2
enhance the region’s capacity to promote biodiversity conservation.
The process also prepares the ASEAN members to participate in the
Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity.
Transboundary Air Pollution: Addressing National Issues with
Regional Impacts

Air pollution from burning biomass in Southeast Asia has become a
recurrent environmental challenge that causes serious adverse eco
nomic and health impacts (Tan, 1996). The use of ﬁre to transform
forest areas into agricultural land has uncontrollable consequences
during the dry periods that the region experiences as a result of El
Niño climate oscillations. This problem is particularly serious in
Indonesia, where the practice of forestland burning is largely prohib
ited by statute, but where enforcement is hindered by lack of commu
nity education, inadequate administrative capacity, and corruption.
Once ﬁres spread out in dry weather, the capacity to extinguish them
2 For more information on these programs, see http://www.arcbc.org.ph

  

is limited and the smoke becomes a transnational pall, known as
“haze.” As a result, ambient air quality standards are breached and
breathing the air in certain cities throughout the region becomes a
health hazard (Tay, 1998).
In 1995, ASEAN adopted the Cooperation Plan on Transboundary
Pollution, which included measures for addressing transboundary
atmospheric pollution, transboundary ship-borne pollution, and
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. The Cooperation Plan
demonstrated a region-wide level of commitment and spirit of coop
eration on environmental issues that had not been seen before.
Unlike biodiversity, however, haze is a sub-regional issue, involving
the original ASEAN member states. Thus, rather than employing the
typical ASEAN-wide working group structure, a Haze Technical Task
Force was developed. The Cooperation Plan has been largely ineffec
tive, unfortunately, because it lacks an operational agenda. In the
absence of targeted mitigation activities, the region suffered a major
bout of transboundary air pollution in 1997. Progress has been too
slow to effectively avert the recurrence of the haze (Robinson, 2001;
Tan, 1999; Tay, 1998, 1999), reﬂecting the preference of the states of
ASEAN for cooperative and consensual discussions, or soft law, over
3
the adoption of international agreements, or hard law.
The recent landmark ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze
Pollution, however, signed on 10 June 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, demon
strates that in a crisis situation, ASEAN members can rally together to
reach consensus on a hard law instrument. The Agreement seeks to:

•
•
•

Prevent land and forest ﬁres through better management policies;
Establish operational mechanisms to monitor land and forest ﬁres;
Strengthen regional land and forest ﬁre-ﬁghting capability and
other mitigating measures.

Under the Agreement, parties oblige themselves to:

•

Develop information systems, including monitoring, assessment,
and early warning to prevent and monitor transboundary haze
pollution;

3 This reluctance is also evident in the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources, negotiated with the cooperation of the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), which remains to be ratified by enough
states to enter into force.





  

•

Provide necessary information regarding haze pollution originat
ing within their borders;

•

Take legislative, administrative, and other relevant measures to
implement the Agreement.

An ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution
Control was also established to facilitate cooperation among the par
ties. Similar to the ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity
Conservation, its functions comprise data and information collection
and analysis, networking, and capacity building. The Centre for
Transboundary Haze Pollution Control is mandated with information
clearinghouse functions regarding environmental threats, scientiﬁc
capacities, technological options, and ﬁnancing possibilities. It does
not possess enforcement power. Whether the policies promoted by the
Centre will be fully implemented at the national level remains to be
seen, however, since there are no enforcement mechanisms and agen
cies at the ASEAN level.

evaluation of asean’s contribution to
environmental governance
What can we learn from the ASEAN record of regional environmental
governance? First, ASEAN draws on a strong sense of regional identity
to bring together diverse cultures and political traditions to promote
cooperation and to shape common policies. Second, it does so by
respecting each country’s internal procedures, and building capacity
within each nation to meet agreed program objectives. Third, ASEAN’s
emphasis on consensus and capacity building is ill equipped to deal
with urgent events, as demonstrated by the lack of adequate response
to regional ﬁres and haze. This inadequacy has led some ASEAN
commentators to call for a stronger emphasis on the implementation
of policy and the initiation of necessary reforms (Tay, Estanislao, and
Soesastro, 2001).
When ASEAN’s environmental policies are considered in light of
the region’s environmental needs, several key strengths become
apparent:

•

Adaptation capacity. In many instances, ASEAN has demonstrated
an ability to adapt to new circumstances. ASEAN overcame the
reuniﬁcation of Vietnam in 1975, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia

  

in 1979, and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, when the
organization was expected to disband (Funston, 1999);

•

Effective regional policy formulation. ASEAN has been remarkably
successful in shaping a common regional environmental policy
4
framework (see box on ASEAN Sustainability Framework). By
respecting each country’s internal procedures, ASEAN has facilitat
ed cooperation;

•

Stable relationships among members. The non-interventionist
approach has contributed to building relatively stable relations
among member states. The community building process has facil
itated social and political interaction, rather than interference, and
has reduced intra-ASEAN tensions (Snitwongse, 1995);

•

Sound foundation for implementation. ASEAN’s consensus building
process has created a sound foundation for implementation. For
instance, the Working Group on Nature Conservation and
Biodiversity has drafted an ASEAN framework agreement on
access to genetic resources, which may be effective in shaping a
common approach among the administrations and parliaments of
the ASEAN States, or may form the basis for a new regional hard
law instrument. It also is likely to minimize – in advance – possi
ble regional trade disputes on the subject.

Despite the proliferation of policies on sustainable development,
declarations, resolutions, plans of action, and programs, the imple
mentation of agreements within ASEAN is usually rather slow. Some
of the key limitations and barriers to effectiveness include:

•

Non-intervention. The “ASEAN Way” follows too blindly the prin
ciple of non-intervention, undermining the possibility of adopt
ing practical measures to cope with regional problems. Diplomats,
political leaders, and scholars have urged ASEAN to re-examine
the meaning of its non-interventionist norm (Tay, Estanislao,
Soesastra, 2001);

•

Inadequate support. Lack of expertise, information and data, fund
ing, and organizational support within ASEAN have often led to
suboptimal results;

4 This common policy framework is the product of ASEAN Action Plans between 1978 and 1992,
culminating in a Strategic Plan, 1994-98 (Koh, K.L. 1996), which was implemented to establish
a region-wide process for implemention of Agenda 21.





  

asean sustainability framework
ASEAN’s policies, in soft law instruments, set forth a common regional
policy framework for sustainable development with the following policy
guidelines (Koh, 1996):
Management. Endorse and employ environmental
• Environment
impact assessments, optimal land use plans, and town and country

•

planning or zoning plans;
Nature Conservation. Develop new practicable approaches for
preserving forest wildlife and ecosystems; monitor the quality of
environment and natural resources to enable compilation of ASEAN
state of the environment reports;
Marine Conservation. Develop practicable methods for management
of pollution discharges;
Industry. Ensure reasonable control of waste discharges at the early

•
• stages of project formulation; recycle waste; develop suitable systems
•

•
•
•
•

for control of toxic and hazardous waste;
Education and Training. Enhance public awareness; introduce
environmental subjects in schools and universities; provide technical
training in environmental information systems; encourage wider
involvement in environmental management; promote cooperation
among governments, NGOs, universities, and business communities
within ASEAN;
Environmental Legislation. Develop appropriate legislation to
support proper management in the development of the
environment;
Information Systems. Establish monitoring programs for surveillance
of sensitive environmental resources; promote use of remote sensing
to establish databases; develop comprehensive environmental
information systems to facilitate decisionmaking;
Enhanced ASEAN Joint Action. Facilitate closer cooperation of the
ASEAN member states to act in unison in incorporating
environmental concerns into economic policies to provide better
foundation for natural resource management;
International Cooperation. Establish cooperation with developed and
developing countries and international agencies for transfer of
technology; share experiences in the management of the
environment.

  

•

Inadequate information. The absence of a monitoring and surveil
lance mechanism limits the ability of ASEAN to gather informa
tion on environmental trends and risks and to respond effectively;

•

Lack of a dispute resolution mechanism. Because the ASEAN Way
emphasizes decisionmaking through consensus building, it lacks
an effective dispute settlement process. Thus, ASEAN often opts
for conﬂict avoidance rather than conﬂict resolution (Narine,
1999: 360).

Learning from Success and Failure

In the ten years since the UN Conference on Environment and
Development, ASEAN has done much to both integrate all Southeast
Asian nations into one region, and to regard the region as a shared
ecosystem. The political cooperation and economic negotiations
toward more liberalized trade relations will be facilitated by the estab
lishment of a sound, common environmental policy framework.

The “ASEAN Way,” with its non-interventionist approach, has
promoted building stable relations, agreeing upon general
policy, and fostering capacity building measures. However,
arresting environmental degradation patterns also requires
affirmative action – which by definition must be interven
tionist, albeit in agreed ways, based on scientific knowledge.
A number of measures would enable signiﬁcant improvement in
that direction:

•

The Association could create a regional “cooperation team” to be
deployed throughout the region to prevent or contain environ
mental catastrophes, using appropriate information and scientiﬁc
knowledge. Such a system is already in place for marine oil spills
and could be replicated for terrestrial environmental problems.
ASEAN could draw on its rich history of cooperation to create such
teams. This would enhance respect for sovereignty, not undermine
it, as the inability to avert an environmental disaster is a greater
loss of sovereign authority than cooperation to control the harm.





  

•

ASEAN might agree to establish eco-labeling schemes for palm oil

•

ASEAN could mete out sanctions against palm oil companies that

and timber products in order to address the capital investment
that is a cause of the forest ﬁres in Indonesia and deforestation
throughout the region. This scheme would enable consumers to
make informed market decisions and would help deter the illegal
process of setting ﬁres to clear land.
are responsible for the ﬁres, rather than pursuing a conciliatory
approach of negotiating behind closed doors, "saving face" for
their neighbors.

ASEAN has adopted a reactive rather than a proactive approach to
environmental protection. Since there has been intermittent warfare
throughout the region for ﬁfty years, reluctance to intervene in mem
ber states’ affairs is understandable. Nonetheless, ASEAN member
states should differentiate illegitimate or hostile meddling in each
other’s affairs from the promotion of effective policies and environ
mental justice across the region.
In the case of Indonesian forest ﬁres, for instance, neither those
states whose nationals invest in the Indonesian palm oil plantations or
timber operations that instigate forest burning, nor Indonesia, whose
resources are being damaged, should tolerate the injury to other
ASEAN states from the haze. The prevalent regional attitude of defer
ence towards the domestic affairs of one’s neighbors can thus lead to
violations of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which stress
es that states have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the lim
its of national jurisdiction.” As Singapore Ambassador Tommy Koh
has observed, “ASEAN’s corporate culture prevented Indonesia’s
5
neighbors from engaging her in a free and candid exchange of views.”
6
Others in the region have arrived at similar conclusions.

5 Quoted in The Straits Times, 10 July 1998, at page 48.
6 For instance, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting of the member countries held in Manila
in 1998, Thailand urged ASEAN to adopt the principle of “flexible engagement.” The Thai for
eign Minister Surin Pitsuwan stated: “Perhaps it is time that ASEAN’s cherished principle of
non-intervention is modified to allow ASEAN to play a constructive role in preventing or
resolving domestic issues with regional implications.”This proposal was only supported by the
Philippines.

  

An analysis of the ASEAN Way in light of the organization’s
successes and failures reveals that ASEAN is better equipped
to deal with issues where members’ interests converge than
problems where members have opposing interests. Indeed,
ASEAN’s consensus-based approach works well when all
countries in the region share similar goals, but when states’
interests diverge, this same approach leads countries to
evade issues and avoid negotiations.
ASEAN has been shown to be effective in dealing with the manage
ment of common natural resources such as biodiversity. In the case of
the Indonesian haze, however, pollution from one country is causing
damages in neighboring areas, and the implementation of costly
measures in Indonesia may be required to preserve the environment
elsewhere in the region. Finding an effective solution to this issue may
necessitate more serious measures and could accelerate the evolution
of ASEAN from a regional body capable of arriving at an environmen
tal policy consensus to one capable of implementing that consensus.

prospects for cooperation: the regional-global
interface
Regional environmental governance structures are a part of an envi
ronmental governance architecture spanning the local and the global
levels (Esty, 1999). Initiatives at the regional level complement, rather
than substitute for, the policies and efforts of international institu
tions. To this end, global mechanisms need to facilitate regional envi
ronmental initiatives. Three major forms of cooperation between
ASEAN, or other regional organizations, and international environ
mental governance institutions could be especially valuable: informa
tion systems, international best practices, and dispute settlement.
Information Systems

Global-level governance structures could serve as an important source
of data and information, allowing for more effective regional policy
formulation. A repository of data on environmental indicators from
surveillance systems across regions would allow for the identiﬁcation





  

of risks, trends, causes, and possible responses. A Global
Environmental Information Clearinghouse, as outlined by Esty and
Ivanova in this volume, could serve in this capacity and ﬁll in the data
gap that hampers effective environmental policy at the regional and
national levels. Moreover, a global mechanism for information gather
ing and dissemination would promote a two-way ﬂow of information.
National and regional agencies and non-governmental organizations
could access a wide range of relevant data, allowing for better problem
identiﬁcation, prioritization, and resource deployment. At the same
time, regional organizations could serve an intermediary repository
function for local level information collection efforts and encourage
broader engagement in the policy process by a larger segment of the
general public (see Karlsson, this volume).
International Best Practices

Information sharing on implementation strategies, technologies, and
policies may be another area of potentially essential cooperation
between the global and regional levels. Best practices in problem solv
ing on a range of issues could provide a useful tool for regions facing
similar challenges. One area in which ASEAN could share its experi
ence, for example, is in the efforts to resolve conﬂicts between trade
and environmental interests, which “increasingly appear as ﬂash
points that divide nations, creating tensions that could cause some
countries to renege on commitments to an open market” (Dua and
Esty, 1997). ASEAN’s shrimp exports were embargoed by the United
States in 1996 on the grounds that shrimp trawlers in those countries
did not use the turtle-excluding device, a tool that signiﬁcantly
7
reduces the number of deaths of sea turtles in shrimp harvesting. The
embargo prompted a concerted effort at protection, conservation,
replenishment, and recovery of sea turtles and of their habitats, based
on the best available scientiﬁc evidence, taking into account the envi
ronmental, socio-economic, and cultural characteristics of individual
8
ASEAN members. Information on best practices and policies con

7 Malaysia and others challenged the U.S. trade restrictions under the dispute settlement pro
cedures of the World Trade Organization. In October 2002, however, the WTO Appellate Body
ruled in favor of the United States, confirming that the ban of shrimp represented a valid envi
ronmental concern compatible with WTO laws (USTR, 2001).
8 Under the agreement, each ASEAN country is to nominate specialists to form a Technical
Experts Working Group, the purpose of which is to prepare a Marine Trade Conservation
Programme and Work Plan for endorsement by the ASEAN Fisheries Working Group and
approval by ASEAN agriculture and fisheries ministers.

  

cerning the effective management of trade and environment interests
could form one of many areas of collaboration among regions, facili
tated by a global information clearinghouse.

Dispute Settlement

International organizations could also assist regional bodies and
member states in resolving disputes. As exempliﬁed by ASEAN, when
conciliation is not possible and interference with the national policies
of a member state is not a viable option, resolving disputes becomes a
signiﬁcant challenge. However, countries may be willing to accept
arbitration from an external court or organization that is trusted as
impartial by all parties involved in the dispute. Resorting to such a
venue would not conﬂict with the principle of non-intervention in
domestic affairs, and might enable countries to reach agreement on a
set of difﬁcult issues. One example of a situation in which ASEAN
members have referred to an international body is the dispute between
Malaysia and Indonesia over the islands of Sipidan and Litigan, which
was referred to the World Court (Narine, 1999: 377). Similar interna
tional arrangements could also be used for environmental matters.

conclusion
Regional environmental governance through ASEAN offers valuable
lessons for intra-regional cooperation. Notwithstanding the evident
need within ASEAN countries to devote greater attention to imple
mentation of shared policies, ASEAN has been successful in shaping a
common regional environmental policy framework and establishing a
basis for capacity building throughout the region. ASEAN’s consensus
building process may have created a sound foundation for future
implementation of common policies. But the weaknesses of this
process are evident too – especially where views, values, and interests
diverge. Over the longer term, the ﬂexibility of the “ASEAN Way” may,
in fact, help ASEAN to build a stronger basis for regional action and
effective policymaking. As emphasized by Ambassador Tommy T.B.
Koh, chair of the UN Conference on Environment and Development
in Rio:





  

The dream of a united Europe has been shared by Europeans
for more than 300 years. That dream is still not completely
realized. Viewed in this light, the progress that has been
achieved by ASEAN in the last seven years has been quite
remarkable. Although ASEAN was formed primarily for the
purpose of promoting economic and cultural cooperation
among the member nations, the two outstanding achieve
ments of ASEAN to date have been the forging of a sense of
community among the ﬁve member nations and what I will
call conﬁdence-building. (Koh, 1998)
Regional environmental governance represents an indispensable
link between, and complement to, national and global initiatives. As
illustrated by the ASEAN case, to be more effective, regional systems
for environmental governance need to supplement cooperative policy
formulation with effective mechanisms to facilitate implementation of
policies at both the sub-regional and national levels.
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Global Public Policy Networks
as Coalitions for Change
Charlotte Streck
summary
Numerous international agreements have been concluded over the past
few decades, yet on a global scale environmental quality has deteriorat
ed. Traditional legal and institutional arrangements for environmental
protection have not lived up to the task. The time is ripe to complement
the traditional governance system with innovative elements of “net
worked governance,” bringing together governments, the private sector,
and civil society organizations.
Over the last decade, global public policy networks have emerged as a
possible element of such a governance structure. These open, flexible,
and transparent structures have formed around issues of common inter
est. The World Commission on Dams, the Global Environment Facility,
and the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are three examples of
networks that have been instrumental in forging successful working
arrangements. These models are worth examining more closely. Global
public policy networks, coordinated by international organizations,
might help to close the current gap between needs and results in global
environmental governance.





  

the limits of traditional bureaucracies
Global problems demand global responses. Key issues that pose a
direct threat to the common future of our planet include climate
change, depletion of the ozone layer, loss of biodiversity, maritime
pollution, and trade in hazardous waste, among others. Traditionally,
global governance was viewed as intergovernmental cooperation to
solve common environmental problems. Governments today are com
peting with private entities for power, inﬂuence, and representation
(Reinicke, 1998; Strange, 1996, 1997). A world of growing internation
al interdependence, increasing economic and political liberalization,
and technological change cannot be regulated at the national level or
by traditional intergovernmental cooperation alone (Rischard, 2001).
Several key characteristics distinguish today’s reality from tradi
tional governance contexts:

•

National economies are increasingly integrated through trade and
ﬁnancial ﬂows, the spread of knowledge, and the movement of
people;

•

Technological change and economic integration have created
transnational economic and social networks of interdependence
that are difﬁcult to regulate through national legislation;

•

Traditional bureaucracies often lack the knowledge and ﬂexibility
to react to today’s complex and fast-moving governance chal
lenges.

The instruments of international policymaking currently at our
disposal – international treaties, institutions, and agencies – have
proven insufﬁcient to meet the challenges of an increasingly global
ized and interdependent world in a timely and efﬁcient manner. New
institutional and operational responses are necessary to deliver meas
urable environmental results through an inclusive and transparent
process. Flexible and integrative networks may show one way to
address international problems more quickly and effectively than
existing hierarchical and sluggish structures are able to.



Recent trends in international governance indicate that the
focus has shifted from intergovernmental activities to multisectoral initiatives – from governance at the international
level to governance across different levels, and from a largely
formal, legalistic process to a less formal, more participatory
and integrated approach.

emerging alternatives: global public policy networks
Global public policy networks are a recent addition to the system of
global governance. Such networks have appeared mainly at the inter
national level, where a constant need for policy solutions and the lack
of a central government leave room for innovative structures. They are
multisectoral partnerships linking different sectors and levels of
governance and bringing together governments, international organi
zations, corporations, and civil society.
Global public policy networks offer a promising model for how to
handle new governance problems because complex political, economic,
and social systems cannot be governed by a single sector – the public
sector – or from a single level – the national level. Governance struc
tures building on networks are able to bridge the gap between the
public, the for-proﬁt, and the non-proﬁt sectors and integrate human
and ﬁnancial resources to ﬁnd solutions to multifaceted problems.
Networks have emerged around issues of public health, ﬁnancial reg
ulation, international crime, and the global environment.
Where networks appear spontaneously around certain problem
areas, they should be integrated more consciously into a system of
global environmental governance. The effectiveness of less formalized
and ﬂexible networks could then point toward a more viable solution
to protect the global commons.

features of global public policy networks
Global public policy networks generally form around issues of an
international character. They minimize hierarchy through the involve
ment of multiple stakeholders across many sectors. The network par





  

ticipants bring complementary resources to the process, allowing for
synergies and more effective responses:
A typical network (if there is such a thing) combines the volun
tary energy and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the
ﬁnancial muscle and interest of businesses and the enforcement
and rule-making power and coordination and capacity-build
ing skills of states and international organizations. Networks
create bridges that enable these various participants to exploit
the synergies between these resources. They allow for the pool
ing of know-how and the exchange of experience. Spanning
socioeconomic, political, and cultural gaps, networks manage
relationships that might otherwise degenerate into counterpro
ductive confrontation. (Reinicke and Deng, 2000)
Several key features characterize successful global public policy
networks:

•

Diversity. The trilateral nature of global public policy networks,
involving the public sector, civil society, and business, makes them
distinct institutional arrangements. In the context of economic,
social, and cultural globalization, the participation of the private
sector has become critical to ﬁnding effective solutions to interna
tional problems. At the same time, political liberalization has led
to a rapid growth of transnational advocacy coalitions of non-gov
ernmental organizations (NGOs), which need to be involved in
policymaking (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu, this volume; Tamiotti
and Finger, 2001; Wapner, 2000).

•

Openness and ﬂexibility. Global public policy networks offer pol
icy mechanisms adaptive to a constantly changing environment
and open to new actors. Different approaches of policymaking
and varying cultural perspectives increasingly demand recogni
tion and integration. Networks provide a vehicle for incorporating
such diverse perspectives, including local knowledge, and involv
ing affected communities in the problem-solving processes.

•

Speed. Global public policy networks provide for rapid responses
and rapid “activation of reputational effects” (Rischard, 2001).
They are well equipped to quickly identify issues, outline a vision,



options, and an action plan, and launch a concrete effort for their
attainment. Moreover, through the political energy and urgency
they generate, networks can put pressure on traditional institu
tions to respond in a quicker and more efﬁcient manner.

•

Subsidiarity and legitimacy. Global public policy networks
respond effectively to the need for delegating policy processes to
the governance levels that can most effectively formulate and
implement policy solutions. They provide a means of imple
menting agreements and policies at various levels of decisionmaking. Through the open architecture now allowed by the
internet, participation in networks at multiple levels is facilitated,
leading to greater legitimacy and ultimately to the development of
common global norms.

Due to their structure, networks are largely opportunistic, and are
most likely to emerge in situations of political deadlock. A stalemate
can trigger a special engagement by institutions and individuals who
can assume leadership roles in bringing stakeholders together. Global
public policy networks can also emerge wherever national policymak
ers lack the information, knowledge, or means to address complex
policy issues, or where responses need to be built on a broad consen
sus of stakeholders. Finally, networks may arise around treaties, where
diverse stakeholders are expected to take a coordinated approach in
translating international consensus into action.

functions of global public policy networks
There is so much variation among networks that no consistent pattern
of network-building under speciﬁc circumstances and conditions has
1
yet been observed. However, it is possible to highlight different func
tions that networks perform even though no simple typology can do
justice to the full range of network activities:

•
1

Agenda-setting. Global public policy networks can bring new
issues to the international agenda and initiate public discourse on
the issues at stake. Moreover, they can “increase the prominence of
issues that are already on the global agenda by articulating clear
See Global Public Policy Network Project: Case Studies: http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net/About
GPP.htm





  

and focused goals, often justifying them on incontrovertible moral
grounds” (Witte, Reinicke, and Benner, 2000). A handful of
individuals with the right leverage and powers of persuasion can
create a common vision and convince important actors to throw
their weight behind an issue.

•

Standard-setting. An important role for global public policy
networks is the development of soft law guidelines and other nonbinding legal instruments. Whereas treaties often provide a
framework for international cooperation in a certain policy ﬁeld,
conferences of parties and other fora of international negotiations
are not suited to formulating quick policy responses on burning
issues. Networks can help affected parties or their representatives
reach compromises that can then be poured into soft law agree
ments or standards.

•

Generating and disseminating knowledge. The rapid change in the
state of knowledge, and in the technological capabilities for its
transmission, have often left governments at a disadvantage in
comparison with the private sector, and even NGOs. Global public
policy networks can serve as tools for gathering existing knowl
edge in a fast and efﬁcient manner and even for the generation of
new knowledge where gaps have been identiﬁed. A number of net
works – the Roll Back Malaria Initiative of the World Health
Organization, the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research, and the Global Water Partnership – have
made the generation and dissemination of knowledge their pri
mary activity.

•

Bolstering institutional effectiveness. By addressing participatory
shortcomings, global public policy networks can facilitate building
institutions, increasing their effectiveness and broadening their
constituency base. During the institution building stage, multisectoral networks can help raise awareness of issues and gather
political and ﬁnancial support. Subsequently, institutionalized
multi-stakeholder participation can ensure transparency, encour
age ﬂexibility, and allow for adaptability to change.



•

Providing innovative implementation mechanisms. Some global
public policy networks could be formed with the speciﬁc purpose
of translating the results of intergovernmental negotiations into
concrete action.

the value and promise of global public policy networks
Ultimately, global public policy networks represent a potential strate
gy for governments, businesses, and NGOs to address the challenges of
interdependence and globalization in an effective, participatory, and
sustainable manner.

The promise of these networks lies in two central domains.
First, through their ability to formulate quick responses to
urgent problems, networks offer the opportunity to close the
operational gap that characterizes international environ
mental policy today. Second, through their multisectoral and
non-hierarchical structure, networks promise to bridge the
participation gap that often is the main reason behind
international political deadlocks. Because of these two
characteristics, global public policy networks generate
benefits that go beyond the sum of their parts.

case studies: network structures in environmental
policy
Global public policy networks in the environmental domain are more
prevalent than any other type of public-private network, with the
possible exception of public health networks. These networks,
however, vary substantially from case to case, and carry out many
different functions. The following examples illustrate the range of
inter-sectoral cooperation, the variety of functions and operational
arrangements, and the respective lessons for global environmental
governance.





  

Standard-Setting Networks
Case Study: The World Commission on Dams

Large dams bring together many of the issues central to conﬂicts over
sustainable development at the local, national, and international
levels. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) demonstrates the
potential of multi-sectoral networks to contribute to international
consensus building and standard-setting.
Origins of the World Commission on Dams

For many years, large dam projects were synonymous with develop
ment and economic progress. Costs were underestimated and many
environmental and social impacts ignored. Over time, civil society
from both the North and the South organized to protest the construc
tion of large dams. A global alliance of NGOs was formed, through
which coordinated resistance grew and even escalated into conﬂicts.
By the early 1990s, opponents and proponents of large dams had
reached a stalemate that brought several large dam projects to a halt.
The World Commission on Dams was formed in 1998 as a two-year
initiative in response to this political deadlock.
Operation of the World Commission on Dams

Inclusiveness, openness, and transparency are the key principles
around which the WCD was formed. The mandate of the Commission
was broad and comprehensive – to undertake a global review of the
effectiveness of large dams for development and to establish interna
tionally acceptable criteria and guidelines for future decisionmaking
on dams. Twelve individuals, acting in their personal capacities and
chosen to reﬂect regional diversity, expertise, and stakeholder per
spectives, comprised the Commission.
With funding from a variety of public, private, and civil society
organizations, the WCD conducted a comprehensive global review of
the performance and impacts of large dams. It held public consulta
tions on ﬁve continents and was funded through a new model involv
ing contributions from governments, businesses, and NGOs. The
Commission operated under the core values of equity, efﬁciency, par
ticipatory decisionmaking, sustainability, and accountability, which
provided the essential test to be applied to decisions relating to the
construction of large dams. The Commission developed criteria for



future large dam projects and formulated a set of guidelines for Good
Practice on how to meet these criteria. The ﬁnal report was published
2
at the end of 2000 (WCD, 2000).
Lessons for Global Environmental Governance

The WCD illustrates the potential of collaborative arrangements to
overcome an international stalemate and to formulate a set of soft
guidelines that can alter the political landscape around an issue rife
with conﬂict. Several important lessons can be gleaned from the
inception and operation of the WCD (Witte, Reinicke, and Benner,
2000):

•

Establishing a basic measure of trust is critical for consensus
building and standard-setting in a conﬂict-ridden environment,
although it is time consuming and costly.

•

A truly trisectoral structure, process, and funding, as well as sourc
ing of knowledge are key to building consensus and closing the
operational and participatory governance gaps.

•

Time limitation is an important precondition for effectiveness of
concrete initiatives. Time-bound activities ensure the pertinence
of the results and preclude degeneration into a “talk shop.”

•

In highly contentious policy arenas, a participatory and inclusive
approach, using open sourcing to pool knowledge, is imperative
for producing effective and politically sustainable results.

The completion of the process that the WCD had embarked upon
generated a series of reactions. The criticism from some governments,
industries, and community-based organizations, together with an
unenthusiastic response by the World Bank, showed that the consensus
of the Commission did not translate into a broader stakeholder con
sensus (Dubash et al., 2001). While it was unrealistic to believe that the
Commission could solve all of the issues around the construction of
large dams, it created a document which initiated a process that could
lead to a consensus. Without a doubt, the WCD has created a standard
– albeit informal and not legally binding – against which future proj
ects involving the construction of large dams will be measured.
2 The 2000 report of the World Commission on Dams is available online at
http://www.dams.org/report





  

Networks and Institutional Flexibility
Case Study: The Global Environment Facility

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has attempted to
operationalize a unique and integrative governing structure which
combines structural ﬂexibility with a strong ability to adapt to a
changing environment. The Facility answers new challenges of
international public policy with a new type of international
institution, bridging the traditions of UN and Bretton Woods
agencies, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Origins of the Global Environment Facility

The Global Environment Facility was established as a three-year pilot
program in March 1991. It provides co-ﬁnancing to developing
countries and economies in transition for projects with global
environmental beneﬁts. Its grants ﬁnance only for the incremental
costs of projects – the extra costs incurred in the process of
redesigning an activity vis-à-vis a baseline. The Facility’s ﬁnancing is
available for investment and technical assistance in ﬁve focal areas—
global warming, biodiversity, international waters, ozone depletion,
and persistent organic pollutants. The operational responsibility is
shared among the UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank as
implementing agencies.
Operation of the Global Environment Facility
During its pilot stage, the GEF attracted signiﬁcant criticism. The

dominant role of the World Bank provoked mistrust from developing
countries, which saw the GEF as an instrument of conditionality. Non
governmental organizations possessed no formalized rights within its
framework. Following the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, however, the role
of the GEF as the key ﬁnancing mechanism for the global environment
was recognized and a restructuring for its integration into the UNdriven convention system ensued.
As a result of negotiations around the restructuring, the GEF
emerged as a new international entity linking different interests and
stakeholder groups. Developing countries, UN agencies, and the
majority of NGOs were in favor of a mechanism with a governance
structure similar to the UN system and the values of the UN regime,
namely, transparency, accountability, democracy, and universality. In
addition, NGOs demanded more participation in GEF procedures and



projects. The World Bank and OECD countries, on the other hand,
preferred the governance structure of the Bretton Woods system and
argued in favor of efﬁciency, cost effectiveness, effective management,
and executive abilities. The new governance structure became an
amalgamation of traditional features of UN and Bretton Woods insti
tutions. Through the restructuring process, the GEF became more
transparent, more democratic (with a double majority voting system),
and more detached from the control of the World Bank (Streck, 2001).
It built a signiﬁcant role for NGOs, recognizing the value of institu
tionalizing alternative perspectives (Esty, 1998).
Lessons for Global Environmental Governance
Although today’s GEF is far from ideal, its governance structure shows

features of a network that tries to ﬂexibly integrate multiple actors.
This network structure has contributed to several key strengths of the
GEF:

•

Adaptability. Comprising actors with divergent and shifting inter
ests, the GEF must adapt in order to survive. Its mandate and over
all goal of protecting the global environment requires it to respond
to a constantly changing environment both outside and inside the
organization.

•

Cooperation. Despite the differences in resources, ideology, and
interests among GEF participants, there is a common understand
ing among all countries that cooperation is necessary to address
global environmental issues. Cooperation between North and
South is greater in the GEF than in other fora. The increasing par
ticipation of developing countries over the years indicates a gener
ally positive outlook for the GEF.

•

Transparency and participation. The GEF is among the most
transparent of the existing international institutions. NGO repre
sentatives are allowed to attend the GEF Council meetings not only
as observers, but also as active participants. They have a right to
make statements on each topic on the agenda except during the
discussion of the GEF budget. NGOs played an important role in
the establishment and restructuring of the GEF and continue to
facilitate coalition building, to inﬂuence the debate, and to serve as
partners in implementing GEF projects.





  

•

Innovation. The GEF submits itself to internal and external evalu
ations and is characterized by a strong ability to innovate, evolve,
and change. Soft law agreements dominate over legally binding
treaties. The renunciation of binding and sometimes narrow legal
structures enables the creation of new and innovative mechanisms
that comprise the GEF.

ngo activities within the global environment facility
•

Contribute to consultations prior to each Council meeting;

•

Observe at Council meetings;

•

Engage in working groups on demand by the GEF
Secretariat;

•

Generate data, information, and independent analyses;

•

Provide inputs to other activities initiated by the
Secretariat (monitoring and evaluation activities, pro
grams, and operational strategies)

•

Lobby for donor contributions.

However signiﬁcant, the strengths of the GEF do not disguise
important ﬂaws within the institution. Shortcomings include the very
limited integration of the private sector, a problem of asymmetry of
power, and overall operational complexity.

Implementation Networks of the Kyoto Protocol
Case Study: The “Flexible Mechanisms”

Through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint
Implementation (JI), the ﬂexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the
Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change estab
lished a platform that allows public-private networks to develop, exe
cute, ﬁnance, and supervise projects. The different stages of the project
cycle involve a broad range of actors from developed and developing
countries, as well as from international development and ﬁnance insti
tutions. The design of these new institutional mechanisms allows for the
emergence of international implementation networks.



Origins of the Flexible Mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol

Through the so-called “ﬂexible mechanisms” of project-based emis
3
sion crediting or emission trading, the Kyoto Protocol fosters the cre
ation of markets for greenhouse gas emission reductions. Under JI and
CDM, Parties that have agreed to abide by greenhouse gas emission
reduction targets may achieve some portion of their targets beyond
their own borders. The global climate beneﬁts from emissions reduc
tions regardless of where they occur. The CDM encourages the
achievement of emissions reductions in developing countries and the
Joint Implementation mechanism in economies in transition. These
ﬂexible mechanisms are designed to enhance the cost-effectiveness of
greenhouse gas emission reduction policies (Freestone, 2001).
The Prototype Carbon Fund is a multi-donor trust fund estab
4
lished and administered by the World Bank. Launched in 1999, the
Carbon Fund brings interested parties from developing and industri
alized countries together to implement projects that follow the rules
set forth under the Kyoto Protocol. At its second closing in 2000, six
5
6
countries and seventeen private sector entities had agreed to partic
ipate in the Carbon Fund. Public sector participants contributed U.S.
$10 million each and private sector participants $5 million each, bring
ing the size of the fund to $145 million. The Fund’s projects are expect
ed to generate emission reductions that, once certiﬁed by an accredit
ed independent third party, could be used by industrialized countries
toward their compliance with emission reduction obligations under
the Kyoto Protocol.
Operation of the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms

The World Bank launched the Carbon Fund even before the Parties to
the Convention on Climate Change had approved the implementation
guidelines for the mechanisms. By creating the Fund, the World Bank
took the lead in implementing CDM and JI projects and the ﬁrst step

3 Emission trading, established under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, forms part of the flexible
mechanisms. However, since it does not involve the execution of projects, it does not promote
the creation of implementation networks.
4 Resolution 99-1, authorizing the establishment of the Prototype Carbon Fund, was approved by
the Executive Directors of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
5 Canada, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
6 These include Tokyo, Chubu, Chugoku, Kyushu, Shikoku, and Tohoku, Mitsubishi and Mitsui
(Japan); BP (United Kingdom); Deutsche Bank and RWE (Germany); Electrabel (Belgium); Gaz
de France (France); Norsk Hydro and Statoil (Norway); Fortum (Finland) and Rabobank (through
Gilde Strategic Situations BV) from the Netherlands.





  

from talk to action. It created a “prototype” network designed to
evolve and provide a platform for discussion for participating govern
ments and companies. The Fund is intended to translate emerging
international obligations into the hard law of property rights. By
preparing the early market in carbon transactions, it also opened the
door to a new source of income for developing countries and
economies in transition while promoting a shift toward less environ
mentally destructive behavior.
The Carbon Fund pays for the emission reductions it purchases on
delivery. It bundles projects to reduce transaction costs. Assets are
certiﬁed and veriﬁed by an independent third party. In order to be
certiﬁed, the projects must lead to real, signiﬁcant, and long-term
climate change mitigation beneﬁts and result in emission reductions
additional to any that would occur in the absence of the project. While
in the years to come other networks are likely to emerge in this area,
the Carbon Fund already shows how various actors can work together
to translate the international agreement on project-based activities
under the climate change regime into action. The Carbon Fund thus
combines some of the features of the “internalization deals” described
by Whalley and Zissimos in this volume, as it compels private actors
to consider the incremental costs of climate change to others.
Lessons for Global Environmental Governance

A greenhouse gas emission control implementation network is
emerging under the framework of the project-based mechanisms of
the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM and JI provide examples of incentivebased mechanisms supported by a global public policy network:

•

Dealmaking. The ﬂexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol open
the door for negotiated project arrangements underpinning the
broader framework of international law and demonstrate the via
bility of project-based “dealmaking.”

•

Matching interests. The ﬂexible mechanisms bring together the
7
public and the private sectors. The motivation behind the engage
ment of different participants varies. Industrialized countries and

7

Non-governmental experts are represented in a Technical Advisory Group to the Prototype
Carbon Fund. NGOs are also important partners in raising general awareness and in provid
ing a platform for knowledge dissemination. Environmental NGOs also play an important role
in developing and implementing projects.



private companies are interested in supporting emission reduc
tions for credit against their reduction targets. Developing coun
tries and development agencies are interested in promoting devel
opment. Civil society seeks to foster activities to mitigate global
warming and to bring development to local communities. These
various interests can be matched through bargains and deals.

•

Matching resources. Each actor brings different and important
resources to the table – funding, projects, opportunities to cut
emissions, specialized knowledge, or political leverage. Each par
ticipant in the fund in general and in each project in particular has
an interest in the success of the fund and its operations.
Participants are able to cooperate in order to achieve the common
goal – to the beneﬁt of the global environment.

supporting global public policy networks
International organizations can play an important role in fostering
and supporting global public policy networks. They could perform a
convening and a supporting function, providing leadership, a plat
form for sustained deliberation, and ﬁnancing. International organi
zations could also serve as advocates and implementors of the norms
developed by global public policy networks (see box on International
Organizations and Global Public Policy Networks). Proposals to
strengthen global environmental governance should be developed
with an eye toward the potential of such cooperative arrangements.





  

international organizations and
global public policy networks
International organizations can help to create and sustain global public
policy networks through various roles:
• International organizations may act as conveners, bringing all the parties
to the table, mobilizing key constituencies and providing a forum to
exchange views. United Nations agencies in particular have acted as con
veners, successfully making use of their credibility across different sectors.
• International organizations can provide a platform or “safe space” for peo
ple and institutions coming together in a network, by establishing a level
playing field for negotiations. In highly contentious policy domains, pro
viding such a haven and bringing together outside parties may also have
a catalytic effect on negotiations.
• One of the clear lessons learned from the empirical work on trisectoral
networks is that social entrepreneurship is of crucial importance for the
setup of a network. While there is no reason to believe that such leader
ship must necessarily emerge from the public sector, political high-profile
leadership on the part of international organizations in the initiation
phase has in some cases proven to be decisive.
• International organizations can advance norms developed by public policy
networks. Sustainable development and human rights are two realms
where the interplay between public policy networks and international
bodies has helped to change global understanding and expectations.
• International organizations also serve as multilevel network managers.
With the dual trends of greater devolution of authority through decen
tralization and the strengthening of supranational forms of governance,
the challenge for international organizations is to develop strategies for
simultaneously interacting with the appropriate levels of governance on
particular issues at appropriate stages of the public policy cycle. By serv
ing as a hub, international organizations can facilitate multi-tier linkages
(local-national-global) in public policymaking.
• Despite often limited budgets, international organizations sometimes act
as financiers, providing resources for a range of programs related to the
implementation of global public policies.
Source: Witte, Reinicke, and Benner. 2000. “Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public
Policy Networks.” International Politics and Society, 2/2000.



conclusion
A sound institutional architecture for global governance must com
bine features of traditional intergovernmental cooperation, imple
mentation of national legislation, and innovative networked gover
nance approaches. Instruments of international law and intergovern
mental cooperation need to be supplemented by structures that can
react faster and promote consensus among stakeholders.
Dynamic in both process and structure, global public policy net
works can provide alternative means to ﬁnding solutions where tradi
tional policy or lawmaking have not or cannot deliver effective results.
Networks can facilitate international policy processes as well as
encourage and assist effective implementation. Networks, however, are
dependent on existing or future international organizations to provide
a platform through which stakeholders can engage in collaborative
management of global affairs.
Strong environmental governance structures, built on a set of net
works, coordinated and initiated by international organizations, may
close current participatory, operational, and institutional gaps in glob
al environmental governance and provide a more successful means of
addressing environmental threats to our planet.
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Sustaining Global Environmental
Governance: Innovation in
Environment and Development
Finance
Maritta R.v.B. Koch-Weser
summary
The 1992 Rio Earth Summit established a sustainable development plan
of action, Agenda 21, but failed to achieve a global governance and
finance system strong enough to implement it. Experience suggests that
the additional funding needed for global-scale investments in environ
ment and sustainable development is unlikely to come from the public
sector alone. New efforts to fund the necessary initiatives must therefore
come from enlightened citizens, social entrepreneurs, and the growing
segment of the business community that associates shareholder value
with sustainability and corporate social responsibility.
This chapter highlights a series of policy reforms that must underpin
any improvements in global environmental governance. It argues, in
addition, that funding must be increased significantly, and proposes the
creation of 1) a Johannesburg Commission on Sustainable Development
Finance, and (2) a new global financing mechanism – a Sustainable
Development Exchange Facility.





  

the millennium gap
To improve global environmental management, we need a stronger
global environmental governance system. Stronger governance
requires not only a solid ﬁnancing system, but, very importantly,
environmentally friendly national and international ﬁscal policies and
legislation.
No matter how much the 1992 Rio Earth Summit appears to have
galvanized governmental and public support for the environment,
recent budget numbers stand in stark contrast to public rhetoric.
Accelerated, often irreversible losses of biodiversity, forests, and ocean
resources attest to the fact that we are not meeting the Rio targets.
Instead, we are witnessing a deepening crisis.
Budget numbers reveal waning international commitment to the
environmental cause and broader, overall stagnation in ofﬁcial devel
opment assistance. Today’s public ﬁnance picture for the environment
is epitomized by the limited resources of the United Nations
Environment Programme. UNEP’s core budget of some $44 million
annually (UNEP, 2001: 45) falls woefully short of its needs in fulﬁlling
its global mandate.
Overall, trends in development aid allocations show continuous
decline. The gap between ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA)
pledges by the international community and actual contributions has
never been wider.

Despite unprecedented levels of global wealth, the long
standing pledge by governments to contribute 0.7 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) to development assistance has
remained largely unfulfilled. Instead, contributions since 1992
have fallen to 0.2-0.1 percent of GDP in many developed
countries.
At the same time, the 2000 UN Millennium Summit committed
national governments to numerically speciﬁc and time-bound targets
for sustainable development. The global community has committed
itself to halving absolute poverty by the year 2015 (lifting some 750

-

million people out of poverty over the coming decade). To achieve this
goal, the world needs an estimated additional annual amount of $50
billion in ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA).

This wider-than-ever gap – “the Millennium Gap” – between
meager ODA pledges, on the one hand, and growing new
commitments, on the other, must be narrowed and closed.
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in
Johannesburg could continue to chart the course that the 2002
Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development outlined. In the
Monterrey Consensus, heads of state agreed to mobilize ﬁnancial
resources and to achieve the national and international economic con
ditions required to fulﬁll internationally agreed development goals,
including those contained in the UN Millennium Declaration.
It remains to be seen whether the Monterrey Conference should be
hailed as a major success. So far, all it seems to have produced is a
broader feeling of goodwill and promises for timid increases in devel
opment ﬁnance – many of which have yet to be approved and enact
ed by national parliaments.
In fact, the Monterrey Consensus provides neither new visions nor
grand designs. In addition, a few weeks after the Monterrey
Conference, its promises for greater global fairness have been derailed
by stepped-up trade distortions in the form of increased agricultural
subsidies.
The leaders gathered in Monterrey also failed to come to the rescue
of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) – the only true additional
line of environmental grant funding made available by the interna
tional community since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Established in 1991
as an experimental program, the Global Environment Facility was
1
instituted as a permanent body after the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. GEF
funding is available for investments and technical assistance to address
ﬁve major threats to the environment – global warming, biodiversity
loss, degradation of international waters, ozone depletion, and persist
ent organic pollutants. The World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP share the
responsibility for operating the GEF. Ofﬁcial pledges to the GEF had
1 See Streck, this volume, for an analysis of the GEF.





  

increased in earlier years – in 1994, thirty-four nations promised $2
billion in support of the GEF’s missions and in 1998, thirty-six nations
pledged $2.75 billion (GEF, 2002). Recently, however, and in spite of its
ﬁne performance, liquidity at the GEF has reached a low point.
It is ironic that at the very time we approach the Johannesburg
Summit, funding for the GEF has fallen and stalemate about its future
has ensued. Some of the GEF’s sponsors are failing to meet their fund
ing obligations. And the majority – who would be willing to continue
to contribute and perhaps increase their support – does not wish to
bail out those who fail to pay up, and on goes the downward spiral.
This is a most depressing spectacle.

the fifty billion dollar challenge
An additional $50 billion per year – the sum stipulated by the inter
national community to close “the Millennium Gap” – is a large sum.

It has become clear that, for the time being, there is no
prospect of achieving this goal within the current ODA frame
work alone. We must therefore chart a second, complemen
tary path to fulfill the commitments our societies have made.
We could meet the “ﬁfty billion dollar challenge” by scaling up a host
of already successful innovative strategies and by testing some more
recently proposed additional options:

•

Voluntary efforts. Most require synergies between, on the one
hand, civil society voluntarism and private sector social responsi
bility systems, and, on the other hand, government legislation con
ducive to voluntary giving.

•

Mobilization of large numbers of small contributions. In the elec
tronic billing and internet age, billions of tiny contributions can be
raised at minimal administrative cost, and aggregated as sizable
additional funding sources.

-

•

Creation of special funds, credit insurance, and lines of socially
and environmentally oriented banking.

•

New paths of government engagement. Charges for the use of the
global commons, voluntary or imposed charges on capital ﬂows or
2
3
currency transfers, or Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are among
the proposals.

A scaling up of a broad-based approach to innovative
sustainable development finance, involving all of the above,
would need to be promoted from a suitable institutional
base. Thus, institutional reform and a commitment to a
stronger environmental policy structure must be advanced in
tandem with a new system of finance.

policy reforms plus finance
Before setting out an innovative ﬁnance agenda for Johannesburg in
more detail, there is a need to address the arguments of policy reform
advocates who suggest that the world should ﬁrmly hold on to its
national purse strings until major policy reforms are put into place.
They rightly claim that the lack of ﬁnance for sustainable development
is of subordinate importance when compared to the importance of
policy reforms. They also stress the need to root out poor governance
and corruption, and establish new partnerships and alliances.
Some commentators argue that only if structural reforms on a
greater scale came along would all be well. Consider, they say, the
amounts – hundreds of billions of dollars – that could be mobilized
2 Such charges are known as the Tobin tax – a very small tax, a fraction of one percent, on cur
rency transfers across borders. It is intended to discourage speculation, but to remain small
enough not to affect trade in products and services. See Patomaki (2001) for the case for a
Tobin tax.
3 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are a form of financial assistance to developing countries. They
are a claim on the freely usable currencies of International Monetary Fund (IMF) members, in
that holders of SDRs can exchange them for these currencies (IMF, 2002). When countries
exchange their SDRs for hard currency, they have to pay interest on the amount they receive,
but not so long as they keep their allocations in the form of SDRs. See Soros (2002) for a
detailed analysis of SDRs.





  

by debt relief, reductions in subsidies and other perverse economic
incentives, and the elimination of trade barriers. They are right in
many respects. The current global regime is off balance. What can
small amounts of ODA achieve in the face of much larger, countervail
ing currents? This case has already been made convincingly for more
than ten years now – starting with the World Bank’s 1992 World
Development Report on Environment and Development. It is addressed
under the World Bank’s debt initiative for heavily indebted poor coun
tries, and under various proposals advocating the cancellation of debt
servicing on old debts and the increase of grants and loans to develop
ing countries (Sachs et al., 1999; Greenhill, 2002). Likewise, there is
broad recognition of the fact that a reduction in import barriers in
developed countries can positively support poverty alleviation in
exporting countries in the developing world (IISD, 1994).

As much as they are needed, policy reforms should not be
construed as substitutes for actual finance. They will not
trickle down soon as direct sources of finance for urgently
needed programs. Nor should they be construed as the pre
condition for any stepped-up support in line with the UN
Millennium Goals.
The “ﬁfty billion dollar challenge” remains: additional cash ﬁnance
for development is needed now to pay for nature protection, educa
tion, sanitation, cleaner production, preventative health, natural disas
ter mitigation, and many other pressing needs.
Some analysts say that it is not money, but development effective
ness – the efﬁciency with which available funds are used – that is the
real problem. Arguments that the key problems are institutional and
that money does not matter are wrong-headed. To the contrary, insti
tutional performance usually improves with adequate ﬁnance. In
many poor countries, success can only come when institutions are
strengthened ﬁnancially and when public employees receive incomes
decent enough to keep them outside the corruption trap.
A related concern is transparency and good governance. Some will
say that not a penny should be given to developing countries so long

-

as they fail to root out corruption and poor governance. This view
reﬂects universally held ideals as well as research ﬁndings. A report of
the United Nations General Assembly states that “transparent and
accountable governance” is necessary for “the realization of social and
people-centered sustainable development” (UN General Assembly,
1997). Similarly, studies by the World Bank have shown that develop
ment effectiveness is closely correlated with good governance
(Buckley, 1999; Evans and Battaile, 1998). Transferring scarce resources
to corrupt governments with proven records of misusing aid may
aggravate poverty among the world’s most vulnerable nations
(Easterly, 2001). The World Bank and many bilateral donors put their
money strategically where they witness better governance and with
hold it explicitly from others.
And yet, the “good-governance-or-else” policy can also reﬂect an
alarming lack of sincerity and understanding of institutional
complexities. The quest for pure and transparent governance as a
precondition for aid serves, at times, as a moral case for inaction – to
the detriment of the poor and of urgent, time-bound sustainable
development needs. If, for example, an ecosystem or biological species
were threatened with extinction, we are obliged to ask whether their
eternal fate should really be made so single-mindedly contingent on
the quality of a temporary, current local government.

Some people and some threatened ecosystems will need
support in spite of governments. And we cannot address the
threats in the poorest regions if we insist on corruption being
cleared up first. Development finance must not stay away,
but try to make a positive difference within the current
reality by advancing the good elements and people within
bad systems.
In addition to reforms in policies and good governance, emerging
public-private partnerships are frequently seen as one of the most
effective strategies to address environmental and broader sustainable
development issues. Public-private partnerships offer an alternative to





  

privatization “by combining the social responsibility, environmental
awareness and public accountability of the public sector, with the
ﬁnance, technology, managerial efﬁciency and entrepreneurial spirit
of the private sector” (UNDP, 2002). Moreover, government efforts to
develop partnerships with the private sector would lower the risks and
costs of investments for private ﬁrms (Shin, 2001). However, publicprivate partnerships at times seem to be prematurely hailed as “the
solution.” For now, many of them remain exceedingly ad hoc and
small scale. To be considered a major global avenue to sustainable
development, these partnerships must mature.
To sum up, efforts to advance policy reforms, development effec
tiveness, good governance, and public-private partnerships should all
be seen as underpinnings, but not as substitutes, for improvements in
sustainable development ﬁnance. Regardless of what other strategies
are undertaken to promote sustainable development, the need for
additional ﬁnance from new sources remains unchanged.

a johannesburg commission on sustainable
development finance
Two years ago, there were hopes that Johannesburg might become a
watershed – overcoming the post-Rio shortcomings in global
environmental governance and ﬁnance. These hopes have not been
realized. The Monterrey conference took a step in the right direction,
but did not go far enough. Time has now run out for a serious ﬁnance
initiative to emerge in Johannesburg. Instead, the best possible WSSD
outcome would be to launch a serious, in-depth technical work
process, which might lead to tangible reforms over the course of the
coming two years. The pre-Johannesburg process has produced an
analysis of current shortfalls as well as many good ideas. These ideas
now need to be galvanized in a follow-up process. A Johannesburg
Commission on Sustainable Development Finance should be
launched at the Summit – with terms of reference and the requisite
political support and funding.

-

A Commission on Sustainable Development Finance should
be launched to serve as an incubator for new ideas to pro
mote development of funding instruments and institutional
options. A technically skilled and multi-disciplinary team
should be assigned to work for one to two years on financial,
legal, and institutional designs, outside the formal public sec
tor domain. Developing new financing systems requires
space for entrepreneurship and innovation outside custom
ary institutional confines.
The proposed Finance Commission should build on the achieve
ments of previous government-focused initiatives, such as the Zedillo
Commission. New emphasis should be placed on voluntary contribu
tions by non-government entities, including corporations, NGOs, and
citizens. The Johannesburg Commission should also examine the pos
sibilities for encouraging private agents to participate in development
ﬁnance efforts, and simultaneous ways to involve the public sector.
The Finance Commission should develop design options and test
concepts in the context of a meaningful consultation and engagement
process. Its work should lead to pilot projects and actual start-up
engagements.
Members of the Johannesburg Commission on Sustainable
Development Finance should come from the world of innovative
leaders and entrepreneurs, think tanks, foundations, NGOs, the pri
vate sector, and the government sector. Because the requisite thinking
“outside the box” will require large degrees of creativity, freedom, and
independence, the process of innovation would best be driven by
those operating from outside the ofﬁcial family of environmental and
development institutions.





  

the zedillo commission
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed the Zedillo Commission,
a panel of eleven financial experts under the Chairmanship of former
Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, in December 2000. Members
included former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and
former French Finance Minister and President of the European
Commission Jacques Delors. Annan asked panel members to identify
practical means of fulfilling international commitments to fight
poverty, as set out at the 2000 Millennium Assembly, and building
political momentum for the March 2002 Monterrey Conference on
Financing for Development.
The report of the Zedillo Commission, Financing for Development,
was presented in June 2001 at UN Headquarters in New York. The
report advanced several reforms, including the creation of an
International Tax Organization that would develop national tax pol
icy norms, consideration of a global tax on carbon emissions, and
new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocations by the IMF. Unlike
several civil society organizations, the Commission expressed skepti
cism at the idea of an international tax on financial transactions
(Tobin tax). The Commission also suggested that the World Trade
Organization attempt to fully integrate developing countries into
the world trading system and called for the consolidation of the var
ious organizations that share responsibility for environmental issues
into a Global Environmental Organization.
http://www.un.org/reports/financing/index.html

a new global financing mechanism: a sustainable
development exchange facility
The proposed Johannesburg Commission on Sustainable
Development Finance should consider setting up a Sustainable
Development Exchange Facility. Such a Facility would complement
current multilateral and bilateral funding. The existing multilateral
institutional system for ﬁnancing sustainable development relies pri
marily on the World Bank and the regional development banks in
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. The United Nations

-

structure of the proposed johannesburg
finance commission
Membership: The Commission Members would be experts drawn
primarily from non-governmental organizations and corporations,
with some representatives from international organizations and the
public sector. They would guide and oversee the work of a technical
secretariat.
Secretariat: A small technical secretariat, under the leadership of a
director appointed by the Commission, would – in close consultation
with innovators, experts and subject matter leaders around the
world – carry out the day-to-day work of the Commission.
Mandate: The Commission would be given a mandate to:
• Identify creative ways of raising funds for sustainable
development, emphasizing the interconnection between private
capital and social capital (non-governmental social entre
preneurship for sustainable development).
• Conceive of a system that would permit the continuous
generation of new sources of funding. During its mandate and
subsequently through a successor institution, the Commission
would permanently seek new sources of funding.
Duration: The Commission’s original mandate would extend over
two years. It would be succeeded by a more permanent system,
perhaps conceived along the lines of the Sustainable Development
Exchange Facility outlined below, in order to continue the task of
finding new sources of funding for development.

Development Programme also plays a critical role in capacity build
ing, and the Global Environment Facility supports environmental
efforts of global signiﬁcance.
The purpose of a Sustainable Development Exchange Facility
would be to achieve genuine ﬁnancial “additionality.” Its quest for
funds should not interfere or compete with current fundraising by
civil society organizations or public entities. Such an Exchange
Facility would succeed the proposed Johannesburg Finance
Commission once its mandate expires.





  

The Exchange would develop several business options in parallel, in
response to varying needs. It would:

•

Raise and channel funds for loans or credit guarantees among the
banking and insurance industries;

•

Seek to raise funds for grants among the private sector and civil
society;

•

Develop ﬁnancial sources based on international charges and
taxes;

•

Foster productive interrelationships between civil society and
business initiatives and governmental schemes, such as tax breaks
and other incentive systems;

•

Become a continuous driver for ﬁnancing deals, continually seek
ing out new and creative funding modalities;

•

Be a trustworthy link for ﬁnanciers and donors with implement
ing institutions, which would become eligible for funding on the
basis of a certiﬁcation system.

The Sustainable Development Exchange Facility would need to be
incorporated as a cooperative, franchise-type system. It could com
bine the functions of a foundation and/or trust with services among
its certiﬁed membership. The Exchange’s governing body would com
prise representatives predominantly from the private sector and civil
society. At the same time, it would need to have strong and structured
links to public sector local, national, regional, and international
institutions.
The Exchange could start small and grow as “proof of concept” is
achieved. To help attain the UN Millennium goals, the Exchange
would have to be designed to eventually reach globally signiﬁcant pro
portions. Pre-existing Exchange-type facilities (which exist under var
ious social entrepreneurship ventures) could opt to accede to it.
The proposed Exchange would need strong leadership and con
vincing performance to engage increasing numbers of ﬁnanciers and
donors. It must be designed as a learning institution with continuous
innovation functions to develop ever-smarter new instruments and
methods. Above all, it must insist on and monitor the integrity and
efﬁciency of the programs and institutions to which it channels funds.

-

The structure of the Exchange would bring into interaction four
elements: ﬁnanciers and donors, recipients, certiﬁcation services, and
ﬁnancial services (Figure 1). It would be supported by two external
pillars: eminent experts, as a resource for the Exchange’s certiﬁcation
services, and public sector development programs and supportive
governmental structures.
Figure 1

Exchange Facility Structure
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Recipients of the Exchange Facility

The Exchange Facility would function as a results-oriented environ
ment and development resource service for accredited users.
Recipients would typically be non-proﬁt organizations focused on
sustainable development through programs in environmental protec
tion, poverty alleviation, provision of basic social services, or renew
able energy projects. Private companies and public entities in need of
compensation for adoption of environmentally superior business
practices or technologies could also qualify as users with the
Exchange.
For the recipients, the Exchange would facilitate matching pro
posed projects with ﬁnancier and donor funds. Against a simple set of
eligibility standards, it would apply streamlined project review and
approval procedures, relying primarily on the track records and
Exchange certiﬁcation of applicants.





  

Financiers and Donors to the Exchange Facility

Sources of funding for the Exchange Facility could fall into a series of
highly varied categories.
Donations would remain a central category. Some of the funding
might come from governments. All funding would be on a voluntary
basis, including:

•

Regular voluntary subscriptions. Very small amounts could have a
signiﬁcant cumulative effect. If given the option, individuals
worldwide could choose to contribute through different kinds of
payment plans. For example, contributors’ utility, telephone or
credit card bills could be rounded up to the dollar every month, or
an amount of $0.05 could be deducted from their bank accounts
after a certain number of transactions as a contribution to the
Exchange Facility.

•

Corporate grants. Corporations could be encouraged to make
donations. These could take the form of one-time grants. They
could also take the form of a long-term commitment of a very
small percentage of revenue from a product line to match an envi
ronmental cause that requires continuous funding. Corporate
grants of this sort could be publicized, beneﬁting the corporation’s
reputation, and advancing the general concept that shareholder
value is associated with corporate responsibility and sustainability.

•

Donations by philanthropists. Affluent individuals could be
encouraged to make signiﬁcant grants to ﬁnance projects in their
name.

•

International lotteries. In addition to voluntary donation pro
grams, the Exchange Facility, with the approval of national gov
ernments, could organize an international lottery and/or collabo
rate with existing lottery systems. Given the international nature
of the initiative, all citizens would be eligible to participate and
potentially win a considerable amount in convertible currency.
The proceeds from the lottery would be contributed to and ear
marked by the Exchange Facility for projects of global environ
mental signiﬁcance.

-

Private sector ﬁnance would be equally important. The Exchange
Facility should seek to collaborate with private sector ﬁnanciers will
ing to accept below market proﬁt levels for environmentally friendly
ventures. The Exchange would, for example, work with:

•

Development ﬁnanciers willing to invest in development and
environment projects that promised at least a minimum measure
of return;

•

Insurance companies or banks willing to guarantee/provide col
lateral for meaningful commercially fundable environment and
development entrepreneurship ventures.

Public contributions could also become signiﬁcant. The Exchange
Facility could work with governments and international organizations
worldwide to set up other international schemes that would not place
a burden on national budgets. These could include:

•

International transaction surcharges. These taxes could involve
micro-percentages on capital ﬂows, currency ﬂows, or trade- or
labor-related transactions. The Tobin tax on international curren
cy transfers is an example of this kind of surcharge. While the
Tobin tax itself has its critics, some of its underlying concepts
could inspire alternative schemes suitable for fundraising for
development ﬁnance.

•

User charges for global public goods. Very small fees could be
imposed on goods that relate to car registrations, international
travel or tourism – for instance, in connection with charges on
aviation gasoline, ﬂight tickets, or high seas transportation. In
aggregate, these could add up to very signiﬁcant sums.

•

Global energy or carbon tax. Some scholars have called for a tax on
carbon emissions to secure a more appropriate level of global
emissions – a proposal that has been endorsed by the Zedillo
Commission. By linking the money levied through such a tax with
the proposed Sustainable Development Exchange Facility, such a
carbon tax could produce a double beneﬁt for the environment.





  

The Certification System of the Exchange Facility

A certiﬁcation system would regulate recipient access and participa
tion in the Exchange. For donors and ﬁnanciers, such a system would
provide a guarantee that their money is likely to be well spent, by
organizations that have demonstrated their competence in the past.
Certiﬁcation would give ﬁnanciers a realistic picture of the qualities
and risks of applicant recipient institutions.
The certiﬁcation system would draw on eminent experts world
wide. Some would come from academia and civil society, others from
institutions like the World Bank, the UNDP, and the secretariats of
various multilateral environmental agreements. A Global
Environmental Mechanism and its global environmental information
clearinghouse could also play a role in the proposed certiﬁcation
process (see Esty and Ivanova, this volume).

Demonstrable achievement and good past performance
would be at the core of applicant certification. Development
entrepreneurs and other potential recipients would need to
apply to the certification system before receiving any finan
cial (applicant certification) support.
Recipients who participate in the Exchange should also be required to
submit to periodic re-certiﬁcation; that is, to a general review of their
achievements and administrative and accounting practices. Poor per
formers would lose their certiﬁcation temporarily or permanently
depending on the case. In reviewing proposed projects and programs,
the Exchange would rely largely on the good judgment of applicants,
provided their past record lent them sufﬁcient credibility. Within tight
timeframes, criteria, and service standards, a basic review of projects
would be carried out.
Institutional reviews in the course of the certiﬁcation process
would also permit the Exchange to attend to rather speciﬁc requests
and designations made by donors. The Exchange could thus serve as a
broker between donors and users, matching particular donor prefer
ences to particular recipient institutional proﬁles.

-

A Financial Service Window

A ﬁnancial service window could also be established to administer and
leverage funds received from donors. A ﬁnancial service window
might foster the development of a web of standardized high quality,
transparent, and duly audited transactions between participating cer
tiﬁed sponsors, ﬁnanciers, and recipients. The ﬁnancial service win
dow would support certiﬁcation services in monitoring the progress
of ongoing projects.

While the certification service window would evaluate
progress primarily in terms of sustainable development
criteria, the financial service window would audit the users
and ensure that funds had been used appropriately. The
financial service window could also provide feedback to
donors through regular financial and other progress reports,
and use the results in the overall promotion of the Exchange.
Beyond directly funded projects, funds could be used to leverage lim
ited resources. The monies might be used to stimulate and promote
investment by private companies in cleaner production technologies
(Deere and Bayon, 2002). Financial incentives could be particularly
effective at promoting environmental investment among small and
medium-sized enterprises whose characteristics, cost structures, and
technical support needs allow them to respond better to promotional
strategies than to imposed charges or taxes.

the benefits of an exchange facility
The proposed Exchange Facility would aim to be an efﬁcient connec
tion between private capital and social capital. It could develop into:

•

An instrument to facilitate the work of those who serve the poor
directly. A fundamental constraint of the current institutional
arrangements for ﬁnancing environment and development is the
mandate of the Bretton Woods institutions to provide ﬁnancing





  

exclusively through national governments. So long as internation
al institutions are obliged to reach the poor through the manda
tory intermediation of governments – many of whom who are
not committed to the wellbeing of their citizens – many efforts
will come to naught. Instead, much like servicing the commercial
private sector through the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), social entrepreneurs should be treated under the Exchange
as direct clients in recognition of their key roles in front-line
development work.

•

Just-in-time funding. Based on its institutional certiﬁcation sys
tem, the Exchange could be designed with the capacity to approve
new projects in a short time – from a few weeks to a few months
– in contrast to ofﬁcial ODA processes, which often take years.

•

Emergency stand-by funding arrangements. In some cases, even a
response time of a few weeks can be too long. In this regard, the
Exchange Facility could establish an emergency oriented stand-by
system with the potential to rush with funds to the site of critical
problems. This mechanism might be deployed to protect endan
gered environmental species or resources in times of calamity,
war, migrations, ﬁres, ﬂoods, and other disasters. To facilitate
these operations, an “International League of NGOs” might organ
ize environmental monitoring efforts along the same lines that
Amnesty International does for human rights (Susskind and
Ozawa, 1992: 159) and might ﬁnd interested donors through the
Exchange.

•

Continuity funding. More than any of the existing sources of fund
ing for development, the Exchange would prioritize sustained
support for long-term programs, recognizing the importance of
operation and maintenance beyond project start-up periods. For
example, following start-up environmental investments in the
1980s and 1990s, funding is now required for the long-term main
tenance of established protected areas and services. Ecosystem
conservation requires small, uninterrupted contributions, rather
than one-time grants. In linking donors to users, therefore, the
Exchange could encourage long-term matching of funds and
donor-users relationships.

-

•

Low transaction costs. The Exchange would work with a minimum
of core staff, and rely otherwise on outside technical experts who
would be engaged on a task basis. To the greatest extent possible,
the Exchange should remain an (almost) virtual institution, rather
than turning into yet another development bureaucracy.

The effectiveness of the Exchange will depend on the degree of con
vergence between the interests of ﬁnanciers, donors, and recipients.

Donors and Financiers of the Exchange Would Benefit From:

•

The ability to earmark funds in accordance with geographical,
thematic, or institutional preferences they might have;

•

Transparent information about the project selection process, cri
teria, and results;

•

Feedback on funded projects through internet-based reports from
recipient institutions and users, along with periodic monitoring,
evaluation, and independent audit reports, as well as the option to
visit sites;

•

Quality assurance services.

Recipients of Funds From the Exchange Would Benefit From:

•

Assistance in matching highly varied needs with the equally
diverse interests of the donor community;

•

Advice and support for efforts to seek commercial loans for viable
sustainable development investments;

•

Guarantees and insurance instruments to back up market-based
transactions for the environment;

•
•
•
•

Advice on the design and development of projects;
Leveraging and co-ﬁnancing for cooperative funding schemes;
Grants for operations not eligible for commercial ﬁnance;
Advice on sound management and reporting practices.





  

conclusion
The “Millennium Gap” can be narrowed and eventually closed.
Multiple ﬁnancing mechanisms could be mobilized and, in aggregate,
provide the required additional funding. Much of the initiative to
make this happen will need to come from civil society and the private
sector, in close collaboration with governments.
This agenda can only advance with careful technical design – a task
the proposed Johannesburg Commission on Sustainable Develop
ment Finance should take on. The design of the Finance Commission
will need to be tested, implemented, and reﬁned – a task for which the
proposed Sustainable Development Exchange Facility would be well
suited.

-
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Making Environmental Deals:
The Economic Case for a World
Environmental Organization
John Whalley and Ben Zissimos
summary
Others in this volume have spelled out what the problems are on the
global environment front. We discuss how these issues might be
addressed. We advance a rationale for a new international environ
mental body – a World Environmental Organization or WEO – whose
primary function would be to facilitate bargains on the global
environment.
We use, as a point of departure, the international trade regime. The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization
(GATT/WTO) tries to liberalize trade in goods and services by removing
border impediments through negotiated exchanges of trade policy con
cessions. We suggest that a World Environmental Organization (WEO)
should have a similar principal focus, namely, removing impediments to
bargaining (and trades) on the global environment. Exchanges of com
mitments on forest cover, maintenance of coral reefs, species manage
ment, biodiversity protection, and other environmental concessions in
return for cash, policy changes (trade policy changes, for instance), and
other considerations might fall under the bargaining umbrella of a WEO.
We contend that such bargains would result in improved environ
mental quality and transfers of resources for developmental purposes to
poorer countries, which are the main custodians of these assets.





  

what we are not proposing
Our idea differs from those underpinning other recent proposals for a
global environmental body, stemming, in one way or another, from
the trade and environment debate now embroiling the World Trade
Organization. Calls have come from high levels, including WTO
Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, for a new body separate
from the WTO, where environmental issues could be discussed.
According to several academics, such a body would be more qualiﬁed
than the WTO to resolve conﬂicts between trade agreements and the
environment (Charnovitz, 1993; Runge, 2001; Esty, 2000). Prominent
politicians, such as French President Jacques Chirac, former French
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and former Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, have suggested the need for both a strengthened and con
solidated global environmental agency, and an agency to oversee pres
ent international environmental treaties and other arrangements now
1
in place.
Our view is that these calls have not really focused on how to
address central or substantive environmental policy problems, but
instead have dealt with tangential issues, in proposals that are likely to
be inconsequential in impact. Even worse are vague proposals to
strengthen the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), to
oversee enforcement of existing environmental treaties (which con
tain their own enforcement arrangements), or to provide an alterna
tive location in which to discuss trade and environment issues (von
Moltke, 2001; Juma, 2000). Neither the restructuring proposals nor the
tinkering reforms deal with the central global environmental problem,
namely, the relative lack of internalization of cross-border and global
externalities.
The issue is not one of seeking out mutually agreed upon state
ments of principle of what constitutes sound environmental manage
ment (in the tradition of sustainability, the Stockholm Declaration,
the Brundtland Report, the Rio Declaration, and Agenda 21) or sug
gesting reorganization of current institutional arrangements, but
rather of how we design mechanisms to achieve internalization goals.

1

For texts of speeches, see Ruggiero (1998), Panitchpakdi (2001), and Jospin (2002).

  

the challenge of internalizing cross-border externalities
We regard the lack of “internalization of cross-border and global exter
nalities” as the central global environmental problem. An externality is
a (usually negative) consequence of the production of a commodity that
is not reflected in its price. In other words, society’s valuation of the
good does not reflect its real social and environmental cost. For exam
ple, pollution emitted from an industrial plant that affects residents of
the neighboring area is regarded as an externality. When the plant’s
operating decisions do not take these consequences into consideration
(i.e. do not compensate the population, do not alter the price of the
products, or the process through which they are manufactured), the
externality is not internalized.
“Failure to internalize,” means, essentially, the collective failure to pay
for the environmental costs associated with having commodities in the
marketplace. These costs are often not borne by the producers and are
either assumed by governments or never addressed, leaving others to
suffer the consequences.
Internalizing cross-border externalities entails finding ways to prevent
or repair damages that transcend borders or affect global systems like
the atmosphere or the oceans. In the case of the industrial plant, if the
people who suffer from air pollution could measure the harm done to
them and negotiate compensation from the polluters, the externality
would be internalized. Facilitating the negotiation of similar deals for
transboundary and global concerns would be one of the central tasks of
a World Environmental Organization.

current arrangements do not address
internalization
We see the present global environmental regime as deﬁcient in attain
ing the internalization goal we suggest. The principles embodied in
the Rio Declaration and a series of approximately 200 largely issuespeciﬁc environmental agreements (UNEP, 1996) have, in our view,
relatively little to do with solving the problems caused by the environ
mental consequences of market transactions that are not factored in
by parties to the transaction.





  

Even though a small number of recent treaty arrangements encour
age bargaining deals between parties with different interests (for
example, the Kyoto Protocol allows countries to buy or sell permits to
emit CO2), we suggest that the patchwork quilt of issue-speciﬁc, sci
ence-driven global and regional treaties have not achieved full inter
nalization, as might be possible under a World Environmental
Organization (WEO). These narrow topic and largely non-side pay
ment negotiations have spawned shallow treaties under which oppor
tunities for achieving more substantial joint gains are not discussed.

Currently, few mechanisms guide and focus efforts to inter
nalize externalities that cause global environmental failure.

a dealmaking agency could address
internalization
We suggest that these failures of negotiation can best be corrected
through a new agency that aims to account for as many of the social
costs of market transactions as possible through innovative and
aggressive environmental dealmaking. The World Environmental
Organization we propose remedies what we regard as a relative lack of
2
Coasian deals to internalize externalities at the international level.
Such a WEO could be designed to cover all externalities, both within
and across countries. Our main focus is on cross-border externalities,
since within-country externalities can in principle be dealt with by
solely domestic initiatives.

2 Coase (1960) suggested that those who cause and those who receive damage can (and often
do) bargain between themselves so as to internalize externalities. For this to occur, Coase
stressed that property rights assignments are needed to clarify who has rights to do what. In
the case of a factory that causes air pollution, for instance, a Coasian deal is possible if all par
ties agree that the factory owners must compensate people who suffer from pollution, or that
those who suffer from air pollution should compensate the factory owners for using cleaner
but more expensive production technologies.

  

We see the central objective for a WEO as facilitating crosscountry deals on environmental issues with the aim of raising
environmental quality. Those who have custody of assets in
one country should, through bargained deals, be able to get
those abroad who value these assets highly to pay for higher
standards of environmental management for the wider
benefit.
The result would be improved environmental quality, as well as
monetary transfers to custodians of assets, many of whom are in poor
countries. We do not claim that such an innovation will fully and
immediately achieve complete internalization, but we do think that
signiﬁcant improvement on the current situation is possible through
such an approach.
Entities such as a WEO also sometimes evolve out of small begin
nings, and slowly grow into full form. Only time will tell whether the
institutional structure we outline here emerges from the present glob
al environmental regime, or whether radical response to future exter
nal shocks will ultimately prove to be the main driving force.

initiating cross-country internalization deals
The central activity of a World Environmental Organization would
consist of generating internalization deals between countries (and/or
groups of agents within countries) on global environmental issues.
Deals would involve verifiable environmental commitments
exchanged across countries in return for various forms of compensa
tion, including cash. The deals could be government-to-government
deals of various kinds, or also involve private sector agents (compa
nies, representatives of community groups) in various ways.
The deals could have speciﬁc environmental goals. For species, for
example, the target might be species population levels by a speciﬁed
target year. For biodiversity, it might be access to undisturbed lands
guaranteed over a period of time. For coral/oceans, it might be the
portion of unimpaired coral in coastal waters. For carbon emissions,





  

it might be a maximum emission level from the country over a time
period, or (as in the Kyoto Protocol) cutbacks from emission levels.
With water, where there are international disputes over ﬂow rates
through territories and water quality indicators, these could also be
bargained for in return for considerations, as above. Toxic waste com
mitments could be bargained for in terms of annual levels of dis
charges. All these deals would constitute implementable and veriﬁable
environmental commitments, and could be bargained over in a WEO
for considerations in cash or other compensation.
While some of these commitments are currently covered by treaty
arrangements in various forms, a WEO would allow deals to go con
siderably further. As such, there seem to be no conﬂicts with existing
treaties. If new WEO deals go beyond what is in treaties, the treaties
simply become redundant. If WEO deals are not up to the terms of
treaty arrangements, they will not be concluded.

The effect of these deals would be for agents who were the
source of global environmental damage to take into account
the costs of that damage to others through their private
decisions.
Species and forests would be protected in the interests of foreign
consumers, who in turn would pay for environmental quality
improvements. Carbon emitters, for example, would take into account
the costs that incremental climate change inﬂicted on others; defor
esters would take into account the incremental loss to others in glob
al amenity value and habitat loss. Custodians of assets would be com
pensated in the case of forest stewardship, or emitters in the case of
carbon if they agree to use more expensive but cleaner production
technologies. Explicit bargained arrangements involving both govern
ments and non-governmental groups would thus reﬂect negotiated
deals in which property rights dictated the direction of payment for
reduced environmental damage.

  

weakening the impediments to internalization deals
Ambiguous property rights, free riding, time inconsistency, and con
tract enforcement are four central reasons why global externalities go
un-internalized. The difﬁculty of assembling coalitions and the prob
lem of side payments are other related concerns. A central aim of a
WEO would thus be to weaken the impediments to internalization
3
deals that currently exist.
Property Rights and Environmental Dealmaking

A key impediment to global environmental dealmaking in a World
Environmental Organization will clearly be the ambiguities of proper
ty rights both across and within countries.
Across countries, national governments often assert their implicit
right to regulate and protect economic activity, involving different
claims over environmental assets. OECD countries often argue, for
instance, that forests are the lungs of the earth (globally communal
property) and thus they have the right to, say, block imports of tropi
cal lumber until improvements in environmental quality (forest cover
targets) occur in exporting countries. Developing countries with for
est cover argue that this is eco- (or green) imperialism, which forces
them to slow their growth and development, and yields environmen
tal beneﬁts mainly to wealthy countries. They argue that they should
instead be compensated for showing environmental restraint over the
use of their own environmental assets. The issue is whether forests are
a global or a national asset.
Within countries, there are also substantial ambiguities as to
property rights over environmental assets. Some countries have multi
level government registration of ownership (national and provincial),
which produces conﬂicting claims that courts often do not adequately
resolve. Native peoples may have various rights to biological species,
even if formal land rights are held elsewhere. Squatters in some
countries exert de facto property rights over species, forests, and
biodiversity.
3 Note that a WEO such as we propose is some distance from the current WTO. While the latter
is both a rule and a bargaining framework, it is restrictive, since no cash is allowed in bargain
ing and the rules of the WTO Charter (via GATT 1994) also constrain allowable bargaining (such
as through the Most Favored Nation rule, which prevents pair-wise deals). The WTO Charter’s
initial focus was more on preventing a reversion to the global trade regime of the 1930s in the
postwar years, as well as further liberalizing through negotiated exchanges of concessions,
than on internalizing externalities.





  

examples of bargains
A government in country X with no rainforests might strike a deal on
behalf of its citizens with a government of country Y with rainforests.
Its effect might be that a specified fraction of land in country Y would
remain under forest cover for a specified time period (twenty or forty
years, for example). In return for this commitment, the government
of country X would pledge to transfer a sum of money to country Y at
the end of the period. The commitment would need to be verified in
some way and country Y would need to impose this undertaking
upon its residents. This could be done through logging bans, export
taxes on logs, logging licenses, or other internal arrangements.
Alternatively, a group of concerned citizens in country X could
negotiate independently of their national government with a com
munity group that has custody of an environmental resource in coun
try Y. They might again agree to a transfer of financial resources
directly to the group at the end of a time period if a particular envi
ronmental target is met (again, say, forest cover). Issues of verifica
tion and compliance would arise in both cases.

For a WEO, this raises difﬁcult questions of who is to deal with whom
to generate environmental quality-enhancing bargaining. Coase (1960)
argued that clear assignment of property rights is needed before any
environmental dealmaking occurs, and a central task for a WEO would
be to help to clarify property rights to facilitate such deals. Property
rights related problems partially explain why cross-country deals on
environmental issues have been science-based and lowest common
denominator in outcome, rather than Coasian in character, and why
property rights issues would have to be a part of WEO activity.
This will not be easy, although some aspects may be more
straightforward than others. Where multiple land registration
schemes operate, a WEO could help simplify and consolidate them.
Where non-timber rights to forests arise, for example, a WEO might
codify them and bring them in as part of the deal. Across countries, a
WEO could accept that de facto rights devolve to the country with
assets on its territory.

  

Because coercion is not a viable solution, bargained compensation
would seem to be the only practical way forward, although this
involves effectively ceding currently contested property rights over
environmental assets in developing countries. The operational princi
ple, in the absence of international courts with clear authority to rule
on such rights, would seem to be that custody of assets yields ability to
bargain, and that bargaining becomes more satisfactory as an inter
nalization device the more secure the custody is.
Some environmental conﬂicts at the international level are them
selves primarily about property rights. An example of this is water
conﬂicts, where one country controls the headwaters that ﬂow to
other countries further down the river. Here, negotiated deals, say, to
maintain water ﬂow relative to target levels in return for other conces
sions, could be brokered by a WEO. Documenting existing overlap
ping and inconsistent property rights where they occur may help
resolve the situation. Suggesting ways to proceed where property
rights are contested might also help.
We do not claim that a WEO could deﬁnitively resolve all interna
tional property rights issues. Coase, in any case, suggested that they lie
outside of formal economics and rest on arguments of natural justice.
The aim would be both to contribute to the alleviation of some dis
putes and to work with de facto rights on other cases through existing
custody of assets.

The Problem of Free Riding

The problem of free riding can occur when the beneﬁts of pollution
control accrue to many different nations regardless of their behavior.
By bargaining for environmental protection in another country, coun
try A would assume all the costs of environmental protection, but
environmental protection would beneﬁt other countries as much as it
would beneﬁt country A. Nations would have an incentive not to enter
into a deal, hoping that someone else would do it for them. For exam
ple, if countries, or groups within countries, hold existence value over
forests abroad, and if bargained environmental deals were bilateral,
countries could free ride on each other’s deals, since the beneﬁts from
a deal committing a country to preserve its forests accrue to countries
other than those that are party to it. Free riding greatly undermines
the attractiveness of environmental deals at the global level, since the
beneﬁts of any pair of bilateral actions are spread much more widely.





  

Deals made only by subsets of affected parties would therefore be
difﬁcult to conclude and would likely span groups of countries with
similar interests on both sides of the environmental resource. A
strength of a WEO would be its potential ability to orchestrate simul
taneous deals across groups of affected parties. This would further
raise the degree of internalization of the global externality achieved in
the deal through crossovers, and hence would reduce free riding.
As another example, all OECD countries may beneﬁt from a species
population target negotiated, say, in Cameroon by Germany (or a
German NGO).

A WEO could help countries capture the benefits to others
from free riding through multilateral rather than bilateral
dealmaking, with packages of environmental deals put
together in rounds of negotiation, much as the WTO utilizes
crossovers of benefits in one area and costs in others in
allowing countries to conclude mutually advantageous deals
on trade barrier reduction.
A WEO could even aggressively seek out dealmaking opportunities
by proposing a package of deals to consortia of interested parties, and
in this way reduce free riding beneﬁts.

The Problem of Time Consistency

Time consistency is a problem because an arrangement entered into
by one government might not be honored by a later government that
is either unwilling or unable to fulﬁll the terms of the agreement made
to another state. If Brazil, for example, were to promise to restrain
deforestation over some number of years in return for ﬁnancial
inﬂows, then if the funds were paid immediately, Brazil could request
more funds after initial receipt. But if funds were to be paid at the end
of the period, Brazil would have no assurance that payment would be
forthcoming.
Some form of intermediary guarantor, therefore, seems needed by
both sides to reduce the risks involved in bargained environmental
transactions. A WEO could act as such a guarantor by receiving funds

  

for deals agreed to and holding them in escrow, pending execution of
the commitment. If the environmental target were deemed to be met,
funds would then be released to the country or group making the
commitment, and if not, returned to the country or group pledging
the funds.

Problems of Contract Enforcement

Enforcing the environmental deals concluded within a World
Environmental Organization would require robust procedural
arrangements. Who ensures that a pledged environmental target has
actually been met, and what are the remedies if this is not the case?
Under a WEO, staff could monitor compliance on environmental
commitments, and make determinations of whether or not
commitments have been met. A set of agreed upon procedures for
veriﬁcation would be needed to this effect. These, in turn, would
require undertakings from parties to deals monitored by the WEO to
accept WEO determinations, and a system of dispute resolution and
appeal.

Difficulty of Assembling Coalitions

There are difﬁculties in putting together coalitions for dealmaking
aimed at reducing transaction costs. Often it is difﬁcult to determine
the beneﬁts from deals, and hence who should be approached with
dealmaking proposals. Preferences underlying deals need to be esti
mated and represented, because revealed “willingness to pay” meas
ures are hard to put together. Parties to deals typically have little infor
mation on what deals may be worth to other parties, and hence how
to negotiate. Who assesses and acts on behalf of the collective willing
ness to pay in OECD countries for global environmental improve
ments? If it is to be national governments, how are they to do this and
with what effect? A WEO could play a role by undertaking studies,
producing willingness to pay estimates for enhanced global environ
mental quality, setting out scenarios for deals, and orchestrating and
stimulating the process with information.





  

The Problem of Side Payments

It is often said that side payments do not occur to any signiﬁcant
degree in existing inter-country environmental arrangements, and
that ﬁnancial resource transfers from countries that belong to the
OECD where demand for global environmental quality is high, to
lower income countries with signiﬁcant endowments of environmen
tal assets, are small and do not take place on a regular basis. If resource
transfers do occur, it is usually as a result of a country’s being a signa
tory to one of the global treaties, such as the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), rather than
as a negotiated environmental deal focused on internalization. Under
the current system, negotiations occur for speciﬁc Conventions or
Protocols, each addressing a major global issue. By encouraging ongo
ing negotiation and constant dealmaking between countries, a WEO
would make side payments much more common.

Overview of the Role of a World Environmental Organization

We envision a World Environmental Organization that could under
take activities underpinning environmental dealmaking on a global
scale, aiming at accounting for as many social costs of market transac
tions as possible. It would not have the power to conclude deals (these
would be for national governments to decide on) but proposals for
deals, mechanisms to support deals, arrangements to enforce deals –
all would be the bailiwick of the WEO.
A WEO could act as an intermediary on deals of the type sketched
out in this chapter. It could receive and hold funds until determina
tions were made as to compliance (with either transfers to the custo
dian country, or return to the other country). A WEO could provide
veriﬁcation as to whether the terms of deals had been met, and act as
a dispute settlement and arbitration vehicle. This would go much fur
ther than the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol,
which initiates and oversees North-South transactions on climate
change with oversight by the Conference of the Parties (Sebenius,
1994).

  

A WEO could be proactive in identifying areas and countries
between which deals would make sense, even to the point of
initiating proposals. It could coordinate single country offers
and explicitly seek to internalize free riding in the deals it bro
kered. It could propose mechanisms to be used in countries to
assess and reflect collective willingness to pay.
In setting out our view of a WEO, we see a possible progressive
graduation from weaker to stronger forms as the likely evolution. Such
an entity in its strong form is unlikely to be implemented quickly, and
the demand for it, as much as anything else, will reﬂect the level of
concern for global environmental quality and the global costs stem
4
ming from lack of internalization.

developing environmental/non-environmental
policy linkage
By bringing global environmental arrangements under a single bar
gaining umbrella, a WEO should also make it easier for cross-country
concessions to be exchanged between environmental and non-envi
ronmental areas, potentially leading to both a stronger environmental
regime and gains elsewhere. Thus, developing countries might make
concessions on their internal environmental management in return
not only for cash, but also for improved trade access. A problem in
making such concessions is how to do it within the existing patchwork
quilt of global environmental arrangements. By systematizing these
arrangements, a WEO could better facilitate bargains of this kind.
The WTO involves bargaining concessions on trade barrier reduc
tions, but no cash is exchanged and only national governments may
bargain. A WEO could go further. Cash for commitments could be
allowed, and bargains would not be restricted to national govern
ments. A WEO can be seen as a parallel and expanded bargaining
framework for country and group concessions. Linkage to non-envi
ronmental issues, while a second or third step, implies that bargaining
4

In a parallel paper (Whalley and Zissimos, 2001), we set out three variants of a possible WEO
progressing from weaker to stronger forms, which we suggest could be implemented gradu
ally, moving from one to the next.





  

need not be restricted to cash compensation for environmental com
mitments. A wider forum for global bargaining could evolve from the
WEO, encompassing both the WTO and various issues on which
groups want to exchange concessions.
Developing countries have been cautious over such bargains,
arguing that they should be compensated for undertaking environ
mental restraint of the form sought by OECD countries. They are
fearful that a willingness to bargain indicates both a relaxation of this
position and, implicitly, a concession on property rights. But the
opposite is true.

A World Environmental Organization would give developing
countries the opportunity to take advantage of their property
rights and obtain resource transfers for environmental
restraint. Thus, by providing institutional support for
bargaining across issue areas, incentives to cooperate would
be multiplied, and the basis for global environmental
cooperation significantly broadened.

Underpinning Domestic Environmental Policy

An international environmental entity such as a WEO could also lend
support to domestic groups (including NGOs) trying to raise levels of
5
compliance with domestic environmental laws. Governments in coun
tries with such problems, in turn, might be able to use the WEO as a
masthead to support domestic policy change in the environmental area.
A WEO might also consolidate the information clearinghouse func
tions of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), and
build a wider range of information sources, again underpinning
domestic policy. It could also help build institutional capacity in less
developed countries, based on the recognition that, in the past, com
pliance has been hampered by administrative weakness and poor
institutional infrastructure.
5

If an NGO vehemently opposed a deal its national government entered into that was bro
kered by a WEO, it remains to be worked out whether the NGO should be able to appeal the
case to the WEO. Our inclination would be to treat these as issues to be resolved within the
domestic political process.

  

possible form of a world environmental organization
Structure
• Head Office
• Governing Council
• All WEO members would have a seat *
• All sign protocol of accession to uphold all WEO decisions
• Chief Officer
Mandate
• To improve global environmental quality through structured
environmental deals
Issues Covered
• All issues on which agents wanted to strike deals
• Primarily transboundary issues and global commons issues**
Services Offered
• Facilitation of deals
• Verification of deals
• Property rights verification
• Intermediation of financial arrangements
• Advancement of cross-country negotiations
• Initiation of proposals
Structure of Deals
• No set format for negotiations
• No principles or general rules
• Country-to-country, including non-state parties
• WEO notified once deals are completed
Possible Additional Activities
• Call for negotiating rounds on the environment
• Initiation of negotiations to streamline, codify current treaties
• Exploration of cross-linkage negotiations
• Exploration of whether WEO commitments might underpin
domestic environmental policy
*

Whether non-governmental organizations as well as countries would be members
needs to be determined.
** Environmental issues within countries could also be dealt with but are more likely to
be resolved through a process outside a WEO, since the impediments to successful
bargaining are fewer.





  

potential benefits to developing countries
While we see a WEO playing a central role in achieving improvements
in the areas of global dealmaking, there could be additional potential
beneﬁts of the resulting environmental deals for developing countries.
These beneﬁts would be an important step in driving forward efforts
at global environmental protection, considering that developing
countries often see economic development and poverty alleviation as
more urgent priorities and have traditionally been reluctant to
embrace environmental treaties proposed by the developed world:

•

Low-income developing countries may be able to obtain valuable
resources for development by making commitments to undertake
environmental protection at home;

•

Negotiations could be about much more than the environment,
since these countries will also be able to bargain collectively on
both environmental and non-environmental dimensions of issues
in a WEO, substantially enhancing their bargaining power;

•

Issue linkage in negotiation between environmental and nonenvironmental areas would be made easier through a WEO, since
these links require a level of coordination across sub-areas and
regions in the environmental area that is currently difﬁcult to
imagine occurring without agency support;

•

Opportunities may exist for countries experiencing difﬁculties in
implementing their own domestic environmental policies to use
the political support of an international entity such as a WEO to
achieve their objectives;

•

A WEO could act as a focal point for developing country coalition
formation in negotiation. By formulating joint positions in WEO
negotiations, developing countries with similar interests might be
able to act together. Resource transfers to developing countries in
return for strengthened environmental regimes might be more
signiﬁcant if developing countries were to bargain jointly through
a WEO rather than as single countries.

  

possible reasons for caution on the part of
developing countries
Developing countries may, however, be cautious about such proposals.
Their concerns would likely be:

•

Whether advantages to them would be large enough to contribute
signiﬁcantly to development;

•

Whether any new ﬂow of funds and technology would justify the
raised expectations of improved environmental performance;

•

Whether an additional global “pressurizing agency” along the lines
of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
might result;

•

Whether growth and development might be slowed by taking on
environmental commitments. The heterogeneity of both interest
and circumstance across individual countries may further compli
cate a developing country reaction to our WEO proposal.

Caution toward a WEO may be a likely initial response, and one
that has to be clearly acknowledged, but we would argue that potential
gains remain. For now, the catalyst for a possible global environmen
tal body is seen as the trade and environment conﬂict in the WTO, but
we think this may change. If major additional global environmental
damage occurs in the next few years and cooperation might have mit
igated it, this could prove to be a more powerful catalyst.

conclusion
The central aim of the World Environmental Organization we pro
pose, regardless of the speed at which it evolved, would be to redress
international environmental negotiation failures in a way that would
move the global economy closer to achieving fuller internalization of
global environmental externalities. Its overarching purpose would be
to improve environmental quality worldwide. It is our contention that
such an organization would provide more concrete beneﬁts to the
environment than any arrangement or organization that currently
exists, and for that reason, we urge serious consideration of its merits
by the international community.
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Revitalizing Global Environmental
Governance: A Function-Driven
Approach
Daniel C. Esty and Maria H. Ivanova
summary
We advance the case for a Global Environmental Mechanism (GEM) on
the basis of our analysis of four key questions: Do we need environmen
tal efforts at the global scale? What functions are essential at the global
level? Where has the existing system fallen short? What would an effec
tive institutional mechanism for addressing global environmental prob
lems look like?
Our central argument is that there exists today a set of inescapably
global environmental threats that require international “collective
action.” They demand an institutional mechanism at the global level, we
argue, but one quite different from traditional international bodies. We
propose not a new international bureaucracy but rather the creation of a
Global Environmental Mechanism that draws on Information Age tech
nologies and networks to promote cooperation in a lighter, faster, more
modern, and effective manner than traditional institutions.
We see three core capacities as essential to a GEM: (1) provision of ade
quate information and analysis to characterize problems, track trends,
and identify interests; (2) creation of a policy “space” for environmental
negotiation and bargaining; and (3) sustained build-up of capacity for
addressing issues of agreed-upon concern and significance. We envision
a GEM building on the expertise of existing institutions and creating new
mechanisms where key functions are currently not being provided or are
inadequate.





  

a need for effective environmental institutions
Ten years after the Rio Earth Summit, and thirty years after the
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the world com
munity lacks effective institutional and legal mechanisms to address
global-scale environmental degradation. This deﬁciency weighs ever
more heavily as nation-states come to recognize their inability to
address critical problems on a national basis and to appreciate the
depth and breadth of their interdependence.
Devised during the infancy of environmental awareness, when
problems were perceived as largely local, relatively distinct, and subject
to technological ﬁxes, the current international environmental regime
is weak, fragmented, lacking in resources, and handicapped by a nar
row mandate. There is motion, but there is little progress. More than
500 multilateral environmental treaties are now in existence (UNEP,
2001), more than a dozen international agencies share environmental
responsibilities, and yet environmental conditions are not improving
across a number of critical dimensions. Problems such as climate
change, ocean pollution, ﬁsheries depletion, deforestation, and deser
tiﬁcation persist – with trends that are often broadly negative.
Moreover, advances in a range of ecological sciences continue to
unveil new threats to the global commons – from airborne mercury
to disrupted hydrological systems – as well as new interrelationships
among issues.
The environmental challenges we now face clearly illustrate the
extent of interconnectedness of the earth’s ecological as well as eco
nomic systems. These problems demand collective action on a global
scale, yet there is no established and effective forum where parties can
engage in a sustained and focused dialogue, identify priorities, and
devise action plans for tackling environmental concerns with world
wide implications. Absent a vibrant international environmental
body, many decisions with serious environmental repercussions are
taken within the economic, trade, and ﬁnance institutions, where
short-term economic priorities often trump long-term sustainability.
Some of the current failings can be attributed to a history of man
agement shortcomings and bureaucratic entanglements, but other
aspects of the problem are deeper and more structural. Governments
have failed to create a functional institutional architecture for the
management of ecological interdependence. The fact that other glob

  

al challenges – international economic affairs, population control, and
various world health problems (e.g., eradication of polio and small
pox) – have been addressed more successfully is notable.

The disconnect between environmental needs and environ
mental performance in the current international system is
striking. New institutional mechanisms for better global
governance are urgently needed.
The haphazard development of international environmental laws
and agencies has left three important institutional gaps in the existing
global environmental governance system: (1) a jurisdictional gap, (2)
an information gap, and (3) an implementation gap.

Jurisdictional Gap

The discrepancy between a globalized world and a set of inescapable
transboundary problems on the one hand, and a dominant structure
of national policymaking units on the other, has led to a gap in issue
coverage. National legislatures often do not see their role in addressing
worldwide transboundary harms, while global bodies often do not
have the capacity or the authority to address them.
The United Nations lacks a coherent institutional mechanism for
dealing effectively with global environmental concerns (Palmer, 1992;
Esty, 1994). The UN Charter provides for no environmental body.
Responsibilities are instead divided among a suite of agencies, includ
ing the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Meteorological
Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the Inter
national Oceanographic Commission, the UN Educational, Scientiﬁc
and Cultural Organization, the Commission on Sustainable
Development, the Global Environment Facility, and the UN
Development Programme, with a coordinating and catalytic role
assigned to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Adding to this
fragmentation are the independent secretariats to the numerous
treaties, all contending for limited governmental time, attention, and
resources. The Economic and Social Council of the UN has the gar





  

gantuan task of coordinating all of these diffuse efforts and has proven
incapable of carrying out its mission (Palmer, 1992).
A mere program in the UN system, UNEP has accomplished more
than its limited mandate might seem to make possible and its minute
1
budget might have been expected to allow. UNEP has supported the
creation of a large body of international environmental law and has
contributed to efforts to generate environmental data, assessments,
and reporting. A number of UNEP executive directors have been force
ful advocates for change and international environmental coopera
tion. But UNEP has no executive authority. It has failed to coordinate
the various global and regional environmental arrangements around
the world and “lacks political clout to serve adequately as the lead
international organization for the protection of the global environ
ment” (Dunoff, 1995).
The scattering of environmental activities across many
international organizations has greatly compromised participation,
especially that of developing countries. Negotiations on a variety of
critical pollution control and natural resource management issues
often occur simultaneously around the world. Moreover, the costs
associated with attending intergovernmental sessions to negotiate
international environmental agreements and treaties are high, both in
terms of direct economic expenses and opportunity costs of days away
2
from the already understaffed environmental ministries. Countries
with limited diplomatic and ﬁnancial resources have thus been forced
to choose which conferences to attend, or whether to attend them at
all (Kelly, 1997).

1

UNEP was created following the Stockholm Conference in 1972 with the mandate “to provide
leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing and
enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of
future generations” (UNEP, 2001): http://www.unep.org/about.asp Its annual budget of $100
million is comparable to that of many environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
such as the U.S. National Wildlife Federation (Kelly, 1997).

2

Edith Brown Weiss (1995) points out that “A normal negotiation may require four or five
intergovernmental negotiating sessions of one to two weeks each during a period of eighteen
months to two years. The Climate Convention negotiations required six sessions of two weeks
each in less than sixteen months. Despite this very full and expensive schedule of negotiations,
the Climate Convention negotiations were only one of more than a half dozen global or regional
environmental agreement negotiations occurring more or less at the same time.”

  

Without an effective forum with an action orientation, rulemaking and norm development have been inadequate and
left to a chosen few, leading to prolonged discussions, lowest
common-denominator outcomes, and poor results.
There is, moreover, no structured system of dispute settlement.
Most environmental agreements have no procedures for resolving dis
putes among parties. A few agreements, notably the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea and the Montreal Protocol, have dispute settle
ment mechanisms, but these provisions have gone unused. Other
treaties, like the Biodiversity Convention and the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, expressly defer disputes to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). And while the ICJ has set up an
“environmental chamber,” it has never heard a case. As a result of the
weakness of the environmental institutions, the disputes they might
have addressed end up being taken to other fora, such as the World
Trade Organization. This pattern leaves those with international envi
ronmental claims with no institutional mechanism for redress (Kalas,
2001). This lack of institutional capacity has broad implications:

•

Individuals harmed by transboundary effects of state or corporate
activities have nowhere to turn;

•

The existing bodies have jurisdiction only over states. Private actors
can neither be brought before the court nor do they have standing
to request adjudication;

•

Jurisdiction is largely “by consent” and remedies are not
enforceable.

Information Gap

As the long-standing literature on international cooperation makes
clear, the availability of reliable information is critical to policy
formation (Hassan and Hutchinson, 1992; Martin, 1999; Esty, 2001,
2002). In the environmental ﬁeld, where problems are dispersed across
space and time, sound decisionmaking hinges on the availability of
information regarding (1) environmental problems, trends, and causal





  

relationships, and (2) policy options, results, and compliance with
commitments. Data collection, “indicator” development, monitoring
and veriﬁcation, and scientiﬁc assessment and analysis thus emerge as
central to sound decisionmaking.
High quality data with cross-country comparability is necessary to
support an effective approach to problem deﬁnition and assessment
(Esty, 2002). A suite of international organizations, scientiﬁc research
centers, national governments, and environmental convention
secretariats are responsible for data collection and scientiﬁc assess
ment. UNEP has established an Environment and Natural Resources
Information Network to help collate, store, manage, and disseminate
environmental information and data in developing countries and to
assess environment and development issues for decisionmaking,
policy setting, and planning. UNDP has launched a similar initiative
with its Capacity 21 program. Numerous other international organi
zations, NGOs, universities, and think tanks have information
initiatives underway. However, signiﬁcant data gaps remain. There is
little coordination among data collection efforts, and comparability
across jurisdictions is poor (WEF, 2002).
Compliance monitoring and reporting are even more unsystematic,
scattered, and informal. International environmental agreements have,
until recently, contained few substantive mechanisms for monitoring
and evaluation. Although environmental agreements usually require
parties to report their compliance to the respective treaty secretariat,
few guidelines exist as to the scope or methodology of the reports.
Moreover, the convention secretariats often lack the authority and
resources to monitor agreements through veriﬁcation of reported
information or through independent assessments. The analysis and
publication of collected data is also severely limited. With the
proliferation of agreements, countries have found it increasingly
difficult to meet their reporting obligations under the various
conventions, and nations’ self-reported data are often incomplete,
unreliable, and inconsistent (GAO, 1999). UNEP has, in fact, begun to
consider the potential of streamlining reporting requirements across
similar conventions.

  

Implementation Gap

The biggest single obstacle to environmental progress at the global
scale is the lack of an action orientation. This might be attributable to
an implementation gap. Treaty congestion has led to overload at the
national level, where the political, administrative, and economic
capacity to implement agreements resides. Many international
environmental institutions, including the numerous secretariats of
international environmental conventions, have some claim on the
administrative capacity of national states. Even industrialized states
with well-developed regulatory mechanisms and bureaucracies have
become overwhelmed (Brown Weiss, 1995; UNEP, 2001).

For developing countries, financial and technology transfer
mechanisms are critical. But the efforts to date in these
regards are modest and noticeably inadequate.
The existing ﬁnancial mechanisms are scattered across the Global
Environment Facility, UNEP, the World Bank, and separate treatybased funds such as the Montreal Protocol Finance Mechanism. This
dispersion and lack of integration reinforces the perception of a lack
of seriousness in the North about the plight of the South. The institu
tional mechanisms for technology transfer have also been less than
effective. Tying technology transfer to ofﬁcial aid and export promo
tion policies has resulted in the imposition of inappropriate
technologies on countries with little capacity to choose, assess,
operate, and maintain them.
Moreover, few international environmental agreements contain
serious enforcement provisions. In most cases, the only incentive for
compliance with treaty obligations comes from peer pressure or the
threat of public exposure. However, when performance data are
scarce, the “name and shame” strategy provides little traction. Even
when agreements do include enforcement provisions, resource or
other constraints limit their effectiveness. For example, the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries Convention has the authority to establish and allo
cate ﬁshing quotas, but allows for the exemption of any member from
any enforcement proposal through the lodging of an objection. It also





  

permits members to choose not to be bound by rules already in force.
Finally, although members are allowed to board and inspect the ves
sels of other member nations, only the nation under whose ﬂag the
vessel is operating can prosecute and sanction a vessel’s owner for vio
lations. Nations are often reluctant to penalize their own ﬂeets. In
1993, for example, out of forty-nine vessels charged with offenses, only
six were prosecuted (GAO, 1999).
A multi-pronged agenda of reﬁnements to the existing structure
and reforms of UNEP and the other elements of the current interna
tional environmental system should be developed to address these
glaring gaps in global environmental governance.

The list of problems is so long and the baggage associated
with the current regime so heavy that at some point a funda
mental restructuring rather than incremental tinkering
becomes a better path forward.
In the face of so many difﬁculties and the existing regime’s poor
track record, any presumption in favor of working with the status quo
cannot be sustained. Moreover, as the analysis above suggests, the nub
of the issue is structural. This fact makes a different starting point and
a new institutional design desirable if not essential.

rationale for global action
The need for international cooperation to address environmental
problems with transboundary or global implications is clear both in
theory and in practice. Some environmental problems (local air
pollution and waste disposal, for example) are of limited geographic
scope and can be handled at the national or local scale. An increasingly
large set of issues, however, from persistent organic pollutants to
ﬁsheries depletion to climate change, demand an effective response
among several jurisdictions and, sometimes, coordinated action
across the globe. Governments around the world are beginning to
recognize the limits of their ability to tackle transboundary
environmental problems on their own.

  

Global Public Goods

To understand the need for a new institutional design, it is helpful to
understand that the underlying conceptual framework of the environ
mental problem set central to this framework is the notion of a “pub
3
lic good.” Clean air and an intact ozone layer are classic examples of
public goods. While markets are the primary producers of private
goods, which are delivered to individual buyers, public goods confer
beneﬁts that cannot be conﬁned to a single individual or group. Once
provided, they can be enjoyed for free.
The challenge public goods pose is that, unless carefully managed,
they trigger behavior that is individually rational but collectively sub
optimal or even disastrous. Since the very nature of public goods is
that individual users cannot be excluded, some individuals may
choose to “free ride” on the efforts of others rather than contribute
resources to the provision of the good in question. It is rational for a
ﬁsherman, for example, to try to maximize his personal gain by catch
ing as many ﬁsh as possible as quickly as possible. Collectively, how
ever, such a strategy leads to overexploitation of the resource and can
result in a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). The ﬁsh stock
will be depleted, leaving the entire ﬁshing community worse off than
it would have been had it found a cooperative arrangement for con
4
trolling the rate at which the resources were extracted.
Similarly, in a world of multiple governing authorities and jurisdic
tions, optimal pollution reduction is unlikely to occur without some
structure to promote collaboration. Fundamentally, public goods –
including global public goods – will be underproduced without
mechanisms to promote cooperation (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern,
1999). The problem that public goods (especially global public goods)
pose, therefore, is one of organizing cooperation to overcome the ten
dency toward what is called in game theory a “lose-lose” equilibri
um.The situation must be converted from one in which decisions are
made independently based on narrow self-interest to one in which
actors overcome the “collective action” problem and adopt cooperative
solutions (Ostrom, 1990).
3

Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999) define global public goods as “goods whose benefits reach
across borders, generations, and population groups.” Among these are equity and justice, mar
ket efficiency, environment and cultural heritage, health, knowledge and information, and peace
and security.

4

As Hardin put it in his seminal piece in 1968,“Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush,
each pursuing his own best interest in a society which believes in the freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”





  

Super Externalities

In the environmental arena, the problem of collective action is espe
cially acute where shared resources or pollution harms spill across
national boundaries, creating “super externalities” (Dua and Esty,
1997). At the national level, a regulatory agency is usually given author
ity to direct (and coerce if need be) the behavior of private actors so as
to ensure cooperation. In the absence of an overarching sovereign at
the global level, the incentives to free ride are even stronger (Young,
1999).
Take the example of the ﬁshing community again. Even if local ﬁsh
ermen could reach an agreement to regulate catch, the tragedy of the
commons will persevere unless there is oversight and control over for
eign commercial ﬂeets. Crucial ﬁsheries have indeed collapsed world
wide as heavily subsidized ﬂeets sweep across thousands of kilometers
scooping up ﬁsh. In the face of such competition, local ﬁshermen
behave “rationally” by rushing to catch more ﬁsh more quickly. But in
doing so, they generate a “lose-lose” outcome in which everyone is
worse off than they might have been had they cooperated. In the
words of a Mexican ﬁsherman, “The philosophy is: get it now, grab it
– if I don't, the next guy will” (Weiner, 2002).
Global collective action is further hampered by the fact that
impacts of “externalities” are often hard to grasp. They are often
spread out, both spatially and temporally. In the case of climate
change, for example, the abatement and adaptation costs can be
transferred not only across space – to other countries – but also over
time – to future generations. Cooperation is also difﬁcult to obtain
when the impact is unidirectional, i.e., when activities in one country
cause damage only in another jurisdiction. Upstream users of a shared
river, for instance, have little incentive to limit their extraction of water
or curb pollution, as the costs they impose will largely be borne by
others downstream. As Whalley and Zissimos demonstrate in this
volume, internalization of global environmental externalities through
bargains involving ﬁnancial resources or policy changes will be critical
to solving collective action problems and improving environmental
quality worldwide.

  

Global Environmental Governance Functions

The nature of current and future environmental problems – spanning
jurisdictions and generations – requires new governance mechanisms
that alter incentives in favor of environmentally sound choices. We see
three major sets of functions as critical to addressing the global
collective action problem: (1) provision of adequate information on
the problems at hand and on whose behavior is contributing to the
problem; (2) creation of a forum for sustained interaction, bargaining,
and rulemaking; and (3) establishment of concrete mechanisms for
implementation of the deals and rules upon which agreement has
5
been reached. A series of functions falls within each of these
categories (Figure 1).
Data collection, indicator development, monitoring and veriﬁca
tion, and scientiﬁc assessment and analysis emerge as central func
tions in the information domain. A policy space for continued inter
action instills a sense of reciprocity, facilitates adoption of common
rules and norms, and assists the “internalization of externalities,” tack
ling potentially contagious phenomena at the source, before they spill
across borders. Within the forum function, we thus place issue linkage
and bargaining, a mechanism for rulemaking, environmental advoca
cy within the global regime, a mechanism for inclusive participation,
and a dispute settlement framework. Sound and reliable ﬁnancing
mechanisms coupled with appropriate technology transfer would
ensure that targets are met. A database of best practices and imple
mentation strategies would further facilitate the implementation of
commitments.

a global environmental mechanism
In our view, a Global Environmental Mechanism (GEM) could effec
tively respond to both the common elements of national problems
and the special demands of transboundary issues and global public
goods. Conceptually, a GEM ﬁlls the need for a mechanism to promote
environmental collective action at the international scale. Practically,
it offers the chance to build a coherent and integrated environmental

5

See also Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1993) for a similar analysis and an assessment of the causes
of institutional effectiveness – what they term “the three Cs” – concern, contractual environ
ment, and capacity.
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policymaking and management framework that addresses the chal
lenges of a shared global ecosystem.
We see three core capacities as essential to a Global Environmental
Mechanism:

•

Provision of adequate information and analysis to characterize
problems, track trends, and identify interests;

•

Creation of a policy “space” for environmental negotiation and
bargaining;

•

Expansion of capacities – both global and national – for address
ing issues of concern and signiﬁcance.

We envision a “network-based” GEM that builds on the functioning
elements of existing institutions and creates new structures where
gaps exist in the current regime. We see a GEM growing organically as
consensus develops around issues and needs. A GEM might contain
the following elements:

•

A Data Collection Mechanism, ensuring the availability of reliable
data of high quality and comparability, developing indicators and
benchmarks, and publishing State of the Global Environment reports;

•

A Compliance Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism, providing a
repository for information on compliance with agreements and
established norms, and a continuous and transparent reporting effort;

•

A Scientiﬁc Assessment and Knowledge Networking Mechanism,
drawing on basic research on environmental processes and trends,
long-term forecasting, and early warnings of environmental risks;

•

A Bargaining and Trade-offs Mechanism, facilitating the internal
ization of externalities through exchanges of commitments on
various environmental issues (forest cover, biodiversity protec
tion, species management, etc.) in return for cash or policy change
(market access);

•

A Rulemaking Mechanism for the global commons, establishing
policy guidelines and international norms on protection of shared
natural resources such the atmosphere and oceans;

•

A Civil Society Participation Mechanism, providing a business
and NGO forum for direct participation in problem identiﬁcation
and policy analysis;





  

•

A Financing Mechanism, for global-scale issues mobilizing both
public and private resources to provide structured ﬁnancial assis
tance to developing countries and transition economies;

•

A Technology Transfer Mechanism, promoting the adoption of
best options suited to national conditions and encouraging inno
vative local solutions;

•

A Dispute Settlement Mechanism, with agreed procedures and
rules to promote conflict resolution between environmental
agreements and vis-à-vis other global governance regimes in an
equitable manner;

•

An Implementation Strategies Mechanism, ensuring coordination
with institutions with primary implementation responsibility
(such as national governments, UNDP, World Bank, business, civil
society organizations) and providing a database of best practices.

Through these capacities, the GEM would contribute to the closing
of the three institutional gaps we describe – the jurisdictional gap, the
information gap, and the implementation gap. For real progress to be
achieved, an extraordinary mix of political idealism and pragmatism
will be required. If global politics require, the GEM could start mod
estly and grow over time, progressively gaining new responsibilities
and enlarging its mandate as its value is demonstrated.
Because scientiﬁc activities represent the dimension of the policy
realm where economies of scale and other efﬁciency gains can most
quickly be realized from increased cooperation, a Global Information
Clearinghouse could become the ﬁrst concrete step toward the estab
lishment of a GEM. The coordination of existing institutional mecha
nisms for data collection, scientiﬁc assessment, and analysis might
attract broad-based support. A Global Technology Clearinghouse
focusing on information sharing and best practices dissemination
might also be launched as an early GEM element. With its competence
established in these areas, the GEM mandate might then be expanded
to include monitoring, rulemaking, and the development of a Global
Bargaining Forum. Subsequently, the GEM might acquire a dispute set
tlement mechanism.

  

Global Environmental Information Clearinghouse

An institutional mechanism is needed to channel relevant scientiﬁc
and technical expertise to the appropriate policy arena. Better envi
ronmental data and information make it easier to identify issues, spot
trends, evaluate risks, set priorities, establish policy options, test
solutions, and target technology development (Esty, 2002). A global
information clearinghouse for relevant, valid, and reliable data on
environmental issues and trends could shift assumptions, preferences,
and policies. In the case of acid rain in Europe, for example,
knowledge of domestic acidification damage triggered emission
reductions in several countries (Levy, 1993). Simply put, data can make
the invisible visible, the intangible tangible, and the complex
manageable.
The availability of information on how others are doing in reduc
ing pollution and improving resource productivity tends to stimulate
competition and innovation. Comparative performance analysis across
6
countries – similar to the national PROPER scheme in Indonesia –
could provide much greater transparency, reward leaders, and expose
laggards (Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda, 2000). Just as knowledge
that a competitor in the marketplace has higher proﬁts drives execu
tives to redouble their efforts, evidence that others are outperforming
one’s country on environmental criteria can sharpen the focus on
opportunities for improved performance. The attention that the
World Economic Forum’s Environmental Sustainability Index has
generated demonstrates this potential (Seelye, 2002; Yeager, 2002).
While data gathering should primarily be the function of local or
national organizations, a central repository for such information and
a mechanism for making the information publicly available would
represent a signiﬁcant discipline on slack performance (Chayes and
Chayes, 1995). An information clearinghouse will, in reality, not cen
tralize science policy functions but create a “centralized source for
coordinating information ﬂow between the institutions responsible
for performing the different science policy functions” (UN University,
2002).

6

PROPER (Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation, and Rating) is Indonesia’s innovative pro
gram for reducing pollution by rating and publicly disclosing the environmental performance of
industrial facilities.





  

Global Environmental Technology Clearinghouse

Most multilateral environmental agreements contain provisions related
to technology transfer as part of the incentive packages for developing
countries to meet their obligations under the conventions. The Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the Montreal Protocol on the
Ozone Layer, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its related Kyoto
Protocol all cite technology transfer as a critical method for achieving
concrete environmental improvements. Agenda 21 also underscores
7
the importance of technology transfer to sustainable development.
However, the process of selecting and operating environmentally
sound technologies is not as simple and straightforward a process as is
sometimes believed. Selecting a technology that is suitable for local
needs, adapting it to local conditions, and maintaining it require sub
stantial skills and information. Yet, the recipients of technology trans
fers have limited access to information and limited technical capacity,
underscoring the need for an information clearinghouse on various
abatement technologies (Worrell et al., 2001).
An environmental technology clearinghouse could serve as the
repository and disseminator of information on available technologies,
their sources, their environmental risks, and the broad terms under
which they may be acquired. It could also encompass information on
best practices around the world, promoting continuous learning. The
clearinghouse would thus be critical to the expansion of technological
and innovation capabilities in recipient countries. It could address the
need “to work out a collaborative model between the North and the
South that can cater to both the soft and the hard aspects of
technology transfer, be driven by local needs, adapted to the
developing country operational environment and sustained through
facilitated private sector participation” (Aslam, 2001). In order to be
effective, the clearinghouse would also need to provide referrals to
other services, including sources of advice, training, and technology
8
assessment.

7

See Agenda 21, Chapter 34, “Transfer of Environmentally-Sound Technology, Cooperation, and
Capacity-Building,” available at http://www.igc.org/habitat/agenda21/a21-34.htm

8

For a proposal for the creation of international information networks and technology clearing
houses, see Agenda 21, Chapter 34 at http://www.igc.org/habitat/agenda21/a21-34.htm

  

Global Bargaining Forum

A global bargaining forum could act as a catalyst between countries or
private entities to negotiate the transfer of resources in exchange for
commitments to agreed-upon policies and behavior. Thus, a govern
ment in one country might negotiate a deal to preserve a particular
natural resource – part of a rainforest, a set of species, etc. – in another
country in return for a sum of money or other policy beneﬁts, as
Whalley and Zissimos explain in this volume.
Market access, for example, is an issue of paramount economic
importance for developing countries, and has been used as a condition
for many concessions on issues of interest to the North. Brazil has
made a market access agreement in agriculture a precondition for its
involvement in a new trade negotiations round. India has made
commitments on intellectual property rights in exchange for
expanded market access in agriculture and textiles (Runge, 2001). A
global bargaining forum would allow such deals to be negotiated, and
ensure that incentives are altered in ways that include commitments to
higher environmental quality. Such a forum would also help to
stimulate a ﬂow of new resources to developing countries, which often
bear the costs of producing many global public goods. The forum
would also need to comprise a set of mechanisms for veriﬁcation,
ﬁnancial transfers, and contract enforcement.
A permanent negotiation forum, moreover, would substantially
reduce the costs of diplomatic activity around global issues. Rather
than holding a series of international meetings at different locations
around the world, a “campus” for international environmental activi
ty could be devised where relevant scientiﬁc information is presented
and negotiations conducted (Spencer, 2001). This process of continu
ous interaction, mutual education, and creative trade-offs would
encourage increased coherence of rules, revelation of preferences and
assumptions, and innovative solutions to cross-cutting issues.

Networked Governance

In proposing a loosely structured GEM, we emphasize the need for
form to follow function. We envision a light institutional
superstructure, which would provide coordination through a staff
comparable in size and expertise to the WTO Secretariat in Geneva
that manages the international trading regime. The secretariat would





  

help to promote cooperation and achieve synergies across the
disparate multilateral environmental agreements and other inter
national institutions with environmental roles. It would also act as a
mediator and buffer between the environment and the Bretton Woods
institutions with their economic focus.

The Global Environmental Mechanism would thus not add a
new layer of international bureaucracy nor create a world
government. Quite to the contrary, movement toward a GEM
should entail consolidation of the existing panoply of inter
national environmental institutions and a shift toward a
more modern, “virtual” organizational structure.
At the center of our proposal for a GEM lies a global public policy
network that draws in issue-speciﬁc expertise from around the world.
Global networks represent an innovative organizational mechanism
for responding to an ever more complex international policy environ
ment, taking advantage of Information Age communications and
technologies to build new opportunities for cooperation (see Streck,
this volume). Engaging an established set of private and public organ
izations with environmental expertise, these networks operate as a
ﬂexible system for advancing international environmental agenda-set
ting, analysis, negotiation, policy formulation, implementation, and
institutional learning.
Two beneﬁts from networked governance are most notable – min
imized complexity and hierarchy, and fast boot-up and delivery times
(Rischard, 2001). While capitalizing on existing institutions and har
nessing the power of governments and civil society alike, networks
offer a faster, agile, problem-tailored process, inclusiveness on a merit
basis, access to state of the art knowledge, and simultaneous proximi
ty to both the local and the global scale.

conclusion
Global environmental policymaking in the last decade has focused
mainly on principles and declarations rather than on mechanisms that

  

alter incentives and produce change. The global environmental man
agement system is clearly falling short of the world community’s needs
and expectations. It is time to re-engineer the regime, aiming for a
new, forward-looking, sleeker, and more efﬁcient architecture that will
better promote the environment while also serving governmental,
public, and business needs.
The logic of a Global Environmental Mechanism is straightfor
ward: a globalizing world requires better and more modern ways to
manage ecological interdependence. A vibrant and focused Global
Environmental Mechanism would contribute to improved collective
action in response to global-scale challenges by:

•

Closing the jurisdictional gap through the provision of an author
itative environmental voice in the international arena and a recog
nized forum where national ofﬁcials and other stakeholders can
work cooperatively to address global issues;

•

Closing the information gap by bringing relevant data and analy
sis to the appropriate policy arena, elucidating problems, and
framing solutions;

•

Closing the implementation gap by matching interests and com
mitments in a global bargaining forum and providing functional,
coordinated ﬁnancing and technology mechanisms. With a global
public network at its core, a GEM would contribute to improved
legitimacy through greater participation, representation, and fair
ness in the policy process.

The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development presents an
opportunity to make real progress.

We suggest launching a Global Information Clearinghouse
and a Global Technology Clearinghouse as immediate con
crete steps forward and initiating a Commission of eminent
people to examine options for more fundamental structural
reform.





  

More broadly, a commitment to revitalize the international envi
ronmental regime should be cast as part of a wider “global bargain.”
Speciﬁcally, the launch of a GEM needs to be paired with a major new
poverty alleviation initiative, perhaps driven by a rechartered World
Bank and UNDP.
In conclusion, we turn to the words of former New Zealand Prime
Minister Geoffrey Palmer, who, before the 1992 Rio Earth Summit,
observed:
[T]he methods and techniques now available to fashion new
instruments of international law to cope with global environ
mental problems cannot meet the challenge. The emerging
issues are so big and so all-embracing that current ways of
doing things will not solve these problems. The institutional
mechanisms within the United Nations system are not capable
of handling the issues. The time has come for ‘something more
innovative, for a conceptual leap forward in institutional
terms.’ (Palmer, 1992)
These words continue to ring true today and underscore the
urgency of the task before us.
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Climate Change:
National Interests
Or a Global Regime?
Christiana Figueres and Maria H. Ivanova
summary
This chapter addresses the ultimate global environmental governance
challenge: climate change. It explores four key questions: 1) Who is
responsible for climate change? 2) Who is affected by its consequences?
3) Who should act in response? and 4) What is to be done?
Climate change is profoundly different from most other environmen
tal problems humanity has faced. The atmosphere’s planetary scale and
scope make it a “global public good,” prone to overexploitation and
underregulation. The multiplicity of causes of climate change, the uncer
tainty of timing and effects, and substantial economic costs make global
agreement difficult to attain and maintain. Along with a challenge to
material wellbeing, however, the climate change problem poses an ethi
cal dilemma stemming from the large physical, social, and even temporal
distances between emitters and victims of climate change.
Climate change requires a global response, encompassing the North
and the South, local and global communities, and the public and private
sectors. Ranging from global negotiations to individual choices, a diver
sity of actors with different resource endowments, and diverging values
and aspirations, need to be involved.
Success will depend on the substance and equity of national commit
ments and on the process developed for promoting global-scale cooper
ation. Four conditions need to be emphasized in building a global climate
regime: 1) adequate information, 2) issue linkage and bargaining, 3) tech
nological potential, and 4) a shift in values.





  

climate change and global governance
All social structures humanity has ever built have required some form
of management. As societies evolved from tribes to kingdoms and
from kingdoms to nation-states, they were governed both at an
increasingly larger scale, and with increasing levels of complexity.
Tribes were managed as relatively simple top-down structures, where
the center of inﬂuence was the tribe itself, and the circumference of
interdependence was the geographically surrounding tribes. Nationstates developed more complex systems of governance, and pushed
the circumference of interdependence beyond neighboring states. In
the era of globalization, however, governance issues have moved to a
global level in response to a growing recognition of planetary interde
pendence.
Climate change is one of the ﬁrst truly global environmental chal
lenges. Several key features distinguish it from other environmental
problems:

•

The atmosphere is a classic example of a global public good –
greenhouse gas emissions in one country affect the entire planet;
conversely, emission controls in any country beneﬁt all, encourag
ing “free riding” on the efforts of others;

•

The impact of climate change is not likely to be evenly distributed
among regions and countries. Developing countries tend to be
more vulnerable and, at the same time, less able to respond and to
adapt;

•

A multitude of human activities result in greenhouse gas
emissions, so that efforts at reducing emissions are needed at
many levels – from global to national to local to individual;

•

Uncertainties as to the timing, scope, and impacts of climate
change reinforce reluctance to alter economic behavior.

The scale of climate change requires global collective action, yet the
costs and complexity make many countries hesitant to participate. A
functioning climate change regime has thus been difﬁcult to con
struct. This chapter examines the tension between national interests
and the creation of a global climate regime by asking four questions:

  

•
•
•
•

Who is responsible?
Who is affected?
Who should act?
What is to be done?

Were the answers to the ﬁrst three questions one and the same,
devising solutions to the problem of climate change would be a rela
tively simple task – the countries responsible for climate change
would tackle the issue themselves, because it would be in their own
interest to do so. The fact that the answers vary takes us into a per
plexing ethical arena where many of the countries most affected are
least able to act, and many of those most able to act are least willing.
We will emerge from this quandary to the degree that countries are
able to shift from narrowly deﬁned national interests to an internal
ized notion of global interdependence. Such a shift will need to
encompass both a technological revolution and an ethical evolution
supported by a new approach to problem solving at the global scale.

Who Is Responsible?

Major components of our biosphere (including the air, the oceans, the
range of animal and plant species, and the climate system itself) have
been altered by the intensity of human exploitation of the earth’s
1
resources in the twentieth century. Responsibility is lodged in the
North as well as in the South and must be understood in terms of two
major global trends that lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions
and reduced “sinks” for carbon dioxide – population growth and
increasing consumption (especially of fossil fuels). Population growth
is a problem mainly in developing countries while increasing con
sumption is a problem mostly in the industrialized world.
Global population has doubled since 1960, reaching 6.1 billion by
2001 (UNFPA, 2001). Increasing population entails increasing pressure
on the land. Arable land per capita has been rapidly dwindling since
the 1950s. The average then was 1.2 acres per capita. The average today
is less than half that. In developing countries, pressure on the land has
been “eased” by clearing forests and converting them to (poorly
1

For information and data on changes in climate and other consequences of global warming,
see IPCC (2001a) and UNEP (2002).





  

performing) agricultural land. Deforestation, however, contributes
signiﬁcantly to carbon dioxide emissions (UNEP, 2002).

Twenty-three percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are
due to deforestation, and most of this comes from developing
countries. In Latin America alone, well over two thirds of total
emissions are due to deforestation. There is clear climate
change responsibility here.
The second macro trend is increasing consumption. The rate of
environmental degradation is affected not simply by population
growth but by the pressure people exert on natural systems through
consumption, especially of non-renewable resources, most notably
coal, oil, and natural gas. While world population has doubled over
the past ﬁfty years, total energy consumption has increased ﬁvefold in
the same period of time (Energy Information Administration, 2002).
We have relied mainly on fossil fuels for that energy generation, and
the growth in consumption has brought on parallel increases in green
house gas emissions. Carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations in the
atmosphere have increased from 280 parts per million (ppm), before
the industrial revolution to 370 ppm today, reaching a level that has
not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years, and in all likelihood,
not during the past twenty million years (IPCC, 2001a).
The United States alone accounts for as much as twenty-one per
cent of total world emissions while being home to only four percent of
the world’s population. In contrast, 136 developing countries are col
lectively responsible for twenty-four percent of global emissions
(Marland, Boden, and Andres, 2000). This situation, however, will
shift in or about the year 2020, when population growth and increased
energy consumption in developing countries will contribute half the
total world emissions. It is therefore imperative that both developed
and developing countries make a substantial commitment to action
and that the requisite governance structures are created to facilitate
agreement, to allow bargaining and trade-offs, and to assist in the
implementation of the necessary measures.

  

Who Is Affected?

It has been universally accepted that countries have “common but
2
differentiated responsibilities” with regard to environmental degrad
ation. Sophisticated climate models and scenarios point out that
countries have also common but differentiated vulnerabilities. The
comparative susceptibility to adverse climate impacts lies also along a
North-South axis, but in an inverse relation to historical
responsibility. Recent studies of the likely impact of climate change on
regional agricultural production predict positive impacts for the
United States, Japan, and parts of Europe (Mendelsohn and Nordhaus,
3
1996; Mendelsohn, 2001; Reuters, 2002) and considerable negative
consequences to sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent
4
(IPCC, 2001b; Fischer et al., 2001). Some of the most signiﬁcant
potential effects for the developing world include:

•

Exacerbated desertiﬁcation in Africa due to reductions in average
rainfall, runoff, and soil moisture;

•

Signiﬁcant increases in the geographic incidence of insect-borne
diseases, such as malaria and dengue, particularly in the tropics
and subtropics, due to rising temperatures;

•

Increased risk of hunger and famine for many of the world’s poor
est people as a result of a change in the volume and distribution of
water;

2

Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit states that “In view of
the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that
they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures
their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial
resources they command.” The full text of the Rio Declaration is available at:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm

3

Even within the United States, where some studies forecast positive impacts, there is likely to
be significant regional differentiation. Southern states are likely to experience substantial
negative consequences from higher temperatures, including decreased agricultural produc
tivity, increased unemployment, and increased energy use for cooling that would far outstrip
the savings from heating (Mendelsohn, 2001).

4

A warmer climate is also likely to adversely affect far Northern latitudes where permafrost
would melt, leading to the collapse of the topsoil and the loss of large forested areas. This
would be particularly devastating for Russia, where large parts of the country (rich in natural
resources) are covered in permafrost. The global impacts would also be significant as Siberian
forests are currently an important natural sink for excess carbon.





  

•

Undermined food security, human health, and infrastructure, and
constrained development due to increases in droughts, ﬂoods, and
other extreme events;

•

Food production losses of as much as twenty-ﬁve percent in forty
of the world’s poorest nations, including India, Bangladesh, Brazil,
and many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These countries have a
current combined population of about 2 billion, of which some
450 million are already undernourished;

•

Displacement of tens of millions of people in the low-lying coastal
areas of Asia due to rising sea levels and increasingly intense trop
ical cyclones.

These adverse impacts will be most severely felt in the poorest coun
tries where vulnerability is greater due to geographic and climatic con
ditions, and where the ability to respond is very limited. Successful
adaptation depends on technological advances, institutional capacity,
knowledge and education, and availability of ﬁnancing.

Overall, developing countries have less favorable economic
circumstances, weaker institutions, more limited access to
capital, and more restricted information exchange. The
nations most vulnerable to global change are often the ones
least prepared to respond or to adapt to it.

Who Should Act?

The divergence between the countries most responsible for, and the
countries most affected by, climate change creates a profound ethical
dilemma. Developed countries have the capacity to act, yet some of
them (notably the United States) are unwilling to do so without the
assurance of substantial emission reductions on the part of develop
ing nations. Facing pressing domestic concerns, however, countries in
the South resent the imposition of economic costs for the ameliora
tion of what they perceive to be a Northern-caused environmental
problem.

  

Currently, the United States emits twenty metric tons of CO2 per
capita annually, while per capita CO2 emissions in India are 1.05 met
ric tons. (World Bank, 2002). One is reminded of the famous cartoon
of the tall white man who drives up in his gas-guzzling SUV and asks
the bushman to put out his campﬁre in order to reduce global emis
sions. It is not surprising that Indian negotiators contend that their
people should not be limited to a few “survival emissions” while
industrial countries are not even willing to accept modest cutbacks in
their “luxury emissions.”
Finger pointing about past responsibility for or future contribu
tions to the problem will not help countries reach a solution.
Constructing a global climate regime without the United States may
be possible, but it is certainly not optimal. The Kyoto Protocol target
of a 5.2 percent reduction in CO2 emissions from 1990 levels by indus
trialized countries cannot be met without the United States. But even
if it could be reached, the estimated sixty to seventy percent decrease
required to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
(Mapes, 2001; Gelbspan, 2001) demands the participation of all.

One-sided measures will not be sufficient. Industrialized
countries cannot, by themselves, reduce global carbon
emissions to levels likely to fall within relatively harmless
concentrations; indeed, even a total ban of fossil fuels by all
industrialized nations would not be sufficient if developing
countries continue to increase their emissions (Jacoby, Prinn,
and Schmalensee, 1998).
Many developing countries have shown a willingness and
capability to voluntarily participate in global climate protection. The
most recent ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol comes from Brazil,
which – with a unanimous vote from its Senate on June 18, 2002 –
joined seventy-ﬁve other countries in committing to a global climate
5
regime. Several developing countries are making signiﬁcant efforts
5 Developing countries, however, are not required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under
the Kyoto Protocol. They can participate in the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto agreement,
such as emissions trading and the Clean Development Mechanism.





  

to reduce emissions, primarily for economic reasons. China, Brazil,
India, and Mexico have cut fossil fuel subsidies, reducing
6
consumption by twenty-ﬁve million tons of carbon. South Korea,
China, Mexico, and Thailand have adopted efﬁciency standards as well
as tax incentives for energy efﬁciency. China’s efforts at restricting
carbon emissions are especially impressive. It has reduced carbon
emissions substantially, even while its economy has grown steadily,
7
with the help of subsidy phase-outs for coal, market pricing for fuel,
and energy conservation initiatives. The World Bank estimates that
the un framework convention on climate change
and the kyoto protocol
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), which was opened for signature during the 1992 United
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio,
was designed as a first attempt to deal with the threat of global
climate change. The main objective of the Convention is to stabilize
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at levels that would
prevent dangerous consequences for the climate system (UNFCCC,
1992: Note 1, Article 2). Although the existence of the Convention
attests to an international consensus that serious steps must be
taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Convention does not
set any specific targets, leaving that step to subsequent protocols.
The Kyoto Protocol differentiates Annex B countries, mainly
industrialized countries and countries with economies in transition,
from non-Annex B countries, the developing nations. The Kyoto
agreement provides legally binding emissions targets for Annex B
countries, which will be required, by 2012, to reduce their combined
emissions of greenhouse gases to below the levels measured in 1990.
Different countries have different targets, which range from an eight
percent decrease from the base level for the European Union to a ten
percent increase for Iceland (UNFCCC, 1992: Annex B).
6 Between 1990-91 and 1995-96, total fossil fuel subsidies in fourteen developing countries that
account for twenty-five percent of global carbon emissions from industrial sources declined
forty-five percent, from $60 billion to about $33 billion. Reduced subsidies are desirable
because they lead to higher fuel prices and reduced taxes of growth in carbon emissions (Reid
and Goldemberg, 1997).
7 China has reduced its coal use by forty percent since 1996 (BP, 2001: 33).

  

further efﬁciency gains in China have the potential of yielding savings
of 1,000 to 1,700 million tons of coal equivalents per year by 2020 – an
amount greater than China's total energy consumption in 1990
(Johnson et al., 1996).
So far, developed countries have done little to reduce their emis
sions. The commitment of the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change has gone largely unfulﬁlled. Inaction
8
is justified by the presumption of prohibitive economic costs.
However, a growing body of data and results from progressive corpo
rate and local government practices tell a different, more encouraging
story (Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins, 1999). While national govern
ments have been reluctant to respond to the challenge, innovative
solutions have sprung up at the company and local levels across the
world.
Aware that – with or without the Kyoto Protocol – the future trend
is toward less carbon intensive economies, multinational corporations
are putting in place efﬁcient energy systems to reduce emissions. BP,
for example, has established a voluntary plan with the target of reduc
ing emissions of greenhouse gases by ten percent from a 1990 baseline
by the year 2010 (Browne, 2002). A consortium of corporations led by
Shell Hydrogen and DaimlerChrysler reached an agreement in 1999
with the government of Iceland to make that country the world’s ﬁrst
hydrogen-powered economy. Shell expects to develop its hydrogen
capacity and DaimlerChrysler expects to have the ﬁrst fuel cell-pow
ered automobile on the market. Shell plans to open its ﬁrst chain of
hydrogen stations in Iceland (Brown, 2001).
In developing countries, where access to a central power utility and
an electricity grid is limited, local entrepreneurs are investing in solar
cell generating facilities and selling power to village households. By the
end of 2000, one million households were receiving their electricity
from solar cells. About 700,000 of those households were in villages in
developing countries.
Similarly, local governments have responded to new information
about environmental realities. In the United States, many state gov
ernments and local communities have embarked on new energy ini
8 An intensive advertising campaign in the United States by a coal-led industrial lobby with the
environmentally friendly name of “Global Climate Coalition” has contributed significantly to
the perception by the press and politicians that any climate-related mitigation measures
would be prohibitively costly. The United States has large sources of cheap coal and a transi
tion to less carbon-intensive fuels would adversely affect the powerful coal mining industry.





  

tiatives encompassing energy efﬁciency and emission reductions pro
grams as well as a shift toward new generation capacities. Advances in
wind turbine technology have lowered the cost of wind power dra
matically and wind farms have sprung up in Colorado, Iowa,
Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming. Lester Brown
calls the U.S. Great Plains “the Saudi Arabia of wind power” as the
steady breezes in this region have the potential to generate enough
electricity to meet a signiﬁcant portion of U.S. needs. In Europe, wind
power covers ﬁfteen percent of the electricity demand of Denmark,
nineteen percent of Schleswig-Holstein, the northernmost state of
Germany, and twenty-two percent of Spain’s industrial state of
Navarra. China could double its current generation capacity by wind
alone (Brown, 2001).
Corporate and governmental action will be fundamental to ensur
ing greenhouse reduction. However, unlike other environmental
problems where blame is easily assigned to industrial pollution or gov
ernmental failure, individual decisions are a critical factor in global
climate change. In Bangkok, Thailand, the city government decided
that at 9:00 pm on a given weekday evening, all major television sta
tions would show a big dial with the city’s use of electricity at the time.
Once the dial appeared on the screen, viewers were requested to turn
off unnecessary lights and appliances. As people watched, the dial
showed a reduction of 735 megawatts, enough to close two coal-ﬁred
power plants (Brown, 2001). This experiment served as a reminder of
the power of individual decisions to make a collective difference.
At the individual level, seemingly insignificant investment
decisions of shareholders could also exercise enormous pressure. The
9
Dow Jones Sustainability Index tracks the performance of leading
companies worldwide and addresses increasing investor interest in
companies committed to innovative technology, industrial leadership,
and social wellbeing. There is mounting evidence that the manage
ment of these particular factors is directly related to superior ﬁnancial
performance (EPA, 2000).
Global climate change requires a response encompassing the North
and the South, local communities, and the global community of
nations. Ranging from global negotiations to individual choices, a
diverse set of actors with different resource endowments and diverg
ing values and aspirations would need to be involved. Concerns for
9 For information on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, see http://www.sustainability-index.com

  

equity and justice, however, are central to effective responses to glob
al climate change (Paterson, 2001; Wiegandt, 2001). Differences in the
perceptions of developed and developing countries as to what is fair
and equitable have presented enormous difﬁculties in constructing
governance mechanisms for addressing climate change. Developing
countries emphasize the need for a historical view of responsibility as
well as present-day distributive justice. An historical perspective
entails not only the widely accepted “polluter pays” principle but also
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility.” However,
absent a supranational body vested with the requisite judicial author
ity, the application of these concepts is, at best, difﬁcult. Distributive
justice entails a fair distribution of costs or beneﬁts. Some commen
tators argue that this translates into equal per capita emissions
(Grubb, 1990; Agarwal and Narain, 1990; Bertram, 1992). Given the
political infeasibility of this approach, its defenders have emphasized
the critical importance of ﬁnancial resources and technology transfers
to assist developing countries in minimizing their impact while allow
10
ing economic growth.
Developed countries have formally acknowledged the need for
fairness, but they have shown little interest in operationalizing this
commitment to equity on a basis that satisﬁes the South. The absence
of governance structures that allow for matching interests, facilitating
bargains, and overseeing the completion of contracts hampers effec
tive responses to many global issues. In the case of climate change, an
equitable agreement could come about if the genuine interests of all
parties involved are duly considered and accounted for. This would
entail the creation of a more agile and multi-layered institutional
structure.

What Is To Be Done?

Climate is an extraordinarily complex system with many delicately
interrelated components. We lack knowledge about thresholds that
might trigger climatic changes for which we are unprepared.
Estimates of global carrying capacity for CO2 emissions range from
500 billion tons to two trillion tons (Schelling, 2002). Climate change
modeling continually grows more sophisticated, but the complexity of
10 Grubb (1990: 287) estimates that necessary North-South transfers would amount to $100 bil
lion per year.





  

the systems modeled and current limitations in technology leave pre
dictions of future changes in the realm of the hypothetical. And yet, in
the face of uncertainty that is likely to continue into the future, policy
decisions must be made regarding possible ways to advance human
development while diminishing its impact on nature. As illustrated by
the analysis thus far, action is necessary at the local and the global lev
els, by private and public actors, in the North and in the South. To this
end, an interest-based approach is critical. Interests are shaped by
changes in information on vulnerability or abatement costs. Drawing
on the analysis of Esty and Ivanova in this volume, we see functioning
governance mechanisms for information and technology as critical
and a forum for issue linkage and bargaining as imperative for a suc
cessful climate change regime that incorporates yet transcends nation
al interests.
Information Provision

Given the distance, scope, and relatively hard-to-see nature of the
problem, and the scientiﬁc ambiguity and magnitude of the costs
involved, climate change decisions are predicated upon a complex
array of data on emissions, likely impacts of human activities on the
environment, and costs and benefits of abatement strategies.
Measurement and indicators can make obscure phenomena such as
greenhouse gas emissions seem more tangible. The “electricity meter
on TV” in Bangkok provides a vivid example of this effect.
Data and information can expose uncertainties, reveal risks, and
demonstrate alternatives (Esty, 2002). As new information emerges,
the utility calculus of countries can shift, leading to an altered percep
tion of interests and more optimal strategies. For example, if countries
receive new evidence that their ecological vulnerability is higher or
that abatement costs are lower than previously estimated, their
propensity to support stronger international commitments may
increase (Sprinz and Weiß, 2001).
The climate regime has developed considerable data and informa
tion capacity, drawing on research institutes around the world. It has
built a sophisticated network of experts through the assessment
process of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
demonstrating the value of collaborative research and analysis across
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a variety of disciplines. The climate data and information initiative is
an important building block for a more comprehensive environmen
tal information initiative at the global level.

Comparative cross-country data and benchmarking on energy
efficiency indicators could be developed to reveal true eco
nomic potential, identify best practices, and increase aware
ness and peer pressure. Greater information availability could
also promote a more effective issue linkage and bargaining
strategy and more efficient and equitable technology transfer.
Issue Linkage and Bargaining

Recognizing the importance of institutional incentives and ﬂexible
arrangements, the Kyoto Protocol features new mechanisms that seek
to facilitate greater participation and alter incentives, including Joint
Implementation, emissions trading, and the Clean Development
Mechanism. These mechanisms provide ﬂexibility in achieving emis
sion reduction targets through the potential for contracts between
countries with high and low abatement costs. As Whalley and
Zissimos emphasize in this volume, a bargaining forum that allows
linkage among various issues could further develop these mechanisms
and provide for matching of interests and “give and take” on a series
of issues of global impact and signiﬁcance.
One way to breach the North-South gap might be to establish a
place where environmental bargains could be struck. Many developing
countries, for example, still manufacture and use chemicals known as
persistent organic pollutants. These substances include pesticides such
as DDT, deldrin, and endrin, industrial chemicals such as PCBs, and
unintentional byproducts of industrial and combustion processes
such as dioxins and furans. Persistent organic pollutants pose a serious
threat to human and ecosystem health and their effects may span the
globe, since they travel great distances, persist in the environment, and
bioaccumulate through the food chain. A global forum for negotiation
and bargaining across issues might provide a breakthrough in global

11 The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1988 to assess scientific, technical, and socioeco
nomic information about human-induced climate change.





  

governance. The United States, for example, could agree to reduce
CO2 emissions in exchange for a phase-out of persistent organic pol
lutants, more stringent controls for preventing inﬂux of non-native
species, forest preservation, or other issues of concern to the United
States and its citizens. Developing countries would hold powerful bar
gaining chips in the form of natural resources of global signiﬁcance.
Biodiversity, tropical forests, coral reefs, and pristine ecosystems could
be preserved in exchange for market access, debt relief, or immediate
12
ﬁnancial transfers.

An issue linkage strategy might provide for a more egalitari
an approach than current governance structures.
Emission reductions could be linked with minimizing the costs to
the North of meeting reduction targets, and would also facilitate NorthSouth ﬁnancial and technological transfers based on genuine interestbased contracts rather than altruistic promises. Moreover, a bargaining
approach, with a light institutional structure to oversee contract com
pletion, could ensure efﬁciency in implementing obligations.

Technological Potential for a New Growth Imperative

The economic paradigm of the last hundred years of rapid growth was
based on the presumption that the environment should be under
stood as a subset of the economy rather than the economy being a
subset of the ecosystem on which it depends. Further, the supply of
natural resources was assumed to be inﬁnite and the capacity to
absorb waste unlimited. Environmental services such as the ability of
plants to convert carbon dioxide to oxygen, of wetlands to cleanse
water, or of forests to stabilize aquifers are not assigned any economic
13
value despite their importance to continued economic growth. It was
not until it became obvious that economic development and popula
12 For a full analysis of the rationale for and the functioning of a global bargaining body, see
Whalley and Zissimos, this volume.
13 Many of the ecosystem services that life on Earth depends upon have no substitute at any
price. This was demonstrated memorably in 1991-93 when the scientists operating the $200
million Biosphere 2 experiment in Arizona discovered that it was unable to maintain life-sup
porting oxygen levels for the eight people living inside. The Earth performs this task daily at
no charge for 6 billion people (Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins, 1999).

  

tion growth were affecting the carrying capacities of natural systems
that an alternative was put forward – the vision of sustainable devel
opment.
A shift from the traditional fossil fuel-based economy to carbonfree energy systems would be the cornerstone of an environmentally
sustainable economy. Indeed, as Seth Dunn of Worldwatch Institute
points out, an information-age economy cannot conceivably be pow
ered by a primitive, industrial-age energy system (cited in Brown,
2001). Technological breakthroughs can already be identified.
Advanced new technologies such as hydrogen fuel cells, ﬁlm-thin solar
cells applicable to facades and windows, and wind turbines with long
term energy storage capacity are being developed and could dramati
cally alter energy needs. The transition from fossil fuels to an energy
economy based on wind, solar, and hydrogen power is taking hold (see
Table 1). Moreover, energy restructuring is not only feasible, it could
14
be economically proﬁtable.
Table 1

Trends in Energy Use, by Source, 1990-2000

Energy Source
Wind power
Solar cells
Geothermal power
Hydroelectric power
Natural gas
Oil
Nuclear power
Coal

Annual Growth Rate (percent)
1990–2000
2000
25
20
4
2
2
1
0.8
-1

32
43
N/A
N/A
2
1
0.8
-4

Source: Brown, Lester. 2001. Eco-Economy: Building an Economy for the Earth. New
York: W. W. Norton, available from http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/Eco_
contents.htm

14 The United States, for example, could cut its annual energy bills by $300 billion by using exist
ing, more energy efficient technologies (Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins, 1999: 243).





  

Technological progress is likely to play a key role in a transition
toward sustainability. Technological innovation represents a double
opportunity, offering prospects for improvement in both developed
and developing countries. In the North, new technologies could be
gradually introduced as capital stocks turn over. In the South, new,
more energy efﬁcient technologies would allow countries to bypass
the carbon intensive growth typical of the North, and advance direct
ly into cleaner energy matrices. However, new technologies often rep
resent incremental costs and take time to develop and disseminate.
Financing mechanisms for technology transfer from the North to the
South would therefore be critical to meeting the rapidly growing ener
gy needs of developing countries, while also facilitating their partici
pation in global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

New Ethical Imperative

The pace of progress will be determined by the most important shift
that the international community still needs to make – a shift in val
ues. As Speth argues in the opening chapter of this volume, we now
ﬁnd ourselves in a radically different ethical position, one that
demands “active management of the planet.” We need to extend our
value system over space, relinquish our self-centered attitudes, and
think beyond the conﬁnes of our immediate surroundings. We need
to give up our village behavior as we realize that our wellbeing has
become intricately tied to the wellbeing of others. We need to also
extend our value system over time and overcome our propensity for
short-term thinking. Global environmental challenges require long
term commitment and investment. The effects of today’s environ
mental degradation are likely to be experienced most intensely by
future generations. At the end of our lives, we must return to our chil
dren the planet we have ultimately borrowed from them.

conclusion
Climate change presents the ultimate challenge to global environmen
tal governance. The inherently global nature of the problem mandates
a truly global response. The atmosphere is indivisible and greenhouse
gas concentrations have a global effect. However, the multiplicity of

  

causes, uncertainty of timing and effects, and signiﬁcant economic
costs are strong deterrents of collective action. Moreover, vulnerabili
ty to climate change varies across regions, with the greatest negative
impacts likely to be concentrated in the tropics and sub-tropics. While
historical responsibility for climate change is undoubtedly lodged
with the North, development trajectories are shifting this burden to
the South. Climate change thus brings forth deep-seated North-South
divisions that demand resolution. Historical fairness would have the
North pay a large share of the initial climate change bill, but the exist
ing international institutional arrangements have no authority to
impose such a tab. Distributive justice entails an ability to pay
approach, but even this version of fairness seems politically infeasible.
An innovative governance architecture is necessary to facilitate a
leap from narrowly deﬁned national interests to a global regime.
Accurate, comprehensive, and reliable information can reveal prefer
ences, confer negotiating power, and alter interests. Bargaining across
issues holds the promise of reaching otherwise impossible agreements
and directly addressing preferences for resource transfer or policy
changes. A system of international mechanisms to promote changes in
behavior across sectors and jurisdictions in an efﬁcient and equitable
manner will be critical to the success of a climate change regime.
Despite all the debate, the confrontations, and the frustration, we
have begun to move in the right direction. The issue now is the pace at
which we are moving. The longer we wait before taking serious action,
the more difﬁcult and costly it will be to mitigate global warming.
Global governance, whether for climate change or for any of the myri
ad issues affecting the world as a whole, can only be built on the recog
nition of planetary interdependence. Anything short of that will keep
us paralyzed while the planet’s challenges grow far beyond our reach.
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The Road Ahead:
Conclusions and Action Agenda
Daniel C. Esty and Maria H. Ivanova

We live in a time of contrasts. Ours is an era of fast-paced change and
yet persistent problems. More people are wealthier than ever before in
history – and yet billions remain desperately poor. News travels in an
instant across the planet – and yet old beliefs, values, and prejudices
only slowly change. New actors from multinational corporations to
non-governmental organizations are playing an increasingly central
role on the global stage – and yet, nation-states continue to be the
dominant mode of political organization. Transformative technolo
gies, such as the internet, bind us together ever more tightly – and yet
old divides remain deep, and new ones seem to be emerging. On one
level, the lines between “us” and “them” appear to be more sharply
etched than ever. But on other levels, past distinctions have blurred.
What is clear is that success in achieving old goals – such as providing
opportunities for lives of peace and prosperity, liberty and happiness
– will require fresh thinking, reﬁned strategies, and new mechanisms
for cooperation.
Recent events have clearly revealed the interdependence of the
nations and peoples of the world. Security issues have been in focus
but interdependence extends beyond these concerns. Economic inte
gration has demonstrated that some global-scale forces are beyond the
capacity of national governments to regulate and control. Simul
taneously, we are becoming ever more aware of our ecological inter
dependence. From shared natural resources such as ﬁsheries and bio
logical diversity to the potential for transboundary pollution
spillovers across the land, over water, and through the air, we now
understand that the traditional notion of national territorial sover
eignty cannot protect us from global-scale environmental threats.
This volume seeks to address the environmental dimension of
interdependence. It highlights a set of issues that make the present dif
ferent from the past and promise to make the future dramatically
more dissimilar. The environmental challenges and other problems of





  

sustainability we now face are not all new, but the scope and scale of
the threat they pose are unprecedented.
The need to coordinate pollution control and natural resource
management policies – across the diversity of countries and peoples,
political perspectives and traditions, levels of wealth and develop
ment, beliefs and priorities – may seem awkward. But, however
uncomfortable, there really is no choice. Ecological interdependence is
now an inescapable fact. Moreover, the rapid pace of economic inte
gration has led to interlinked world markets and economies, demand
ing synchronization of national policies on a number of issues. One
dimension of this coordination concerns the environment.
Given the global-scale issues and linkages highlighted in this vol
ume, it is imperative that we manage our ecological interdependence
and related economic relationships thoughtfully, explicitly, and effec
tively. Four basic “governance” options can be distinguished:

•
•
•
•

Do nothing;
Reﬁne the status quo governance structure;
Launch a new Global Environmental Organization;
Develop a new governance approach: a Global Environmental
Mechanism.

Do Nothing

If the harms that a global environmental regime would address were
not serious, there would be a logic to a “do nothing” approach. As
economists (Demsetz, 1967; Libecap, 1989), lawyers (Krier, 1974; Rose,
1991), political scientists (Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 1993) and environ
mental analysts (Esty and Mendelsohn, 1998) have demonstrated,
unless the beneﬁts of action justify the costs, the investment in coor
dination and governance cannot be justiﬁed. Organizing a response to
a problem demands resources. “Collective action” at the global scale is
especially complicated and expensive. Thus, simply put, if the costs of
organizing for action are greater than the beneﬁts anticipated, doing
nothing makes sense.
Cost-beneﬁt calculations represent an essential starting point in
deciding whether to have a global environmental regime and what sort

  

of governance structure to create. But undergirding this analysis must
be good data on the environmental problem set and the costs and ben
eﬁts of taking action. All too often, however, economic costs have been
easier to measure and beneﬁts difﬁcult to quantify, leading to “justi
ﬁed” inaction. We thus need reﬁned economic models that more fully
account for the ecological services on which the economy – and
humanity’s existence – depend (see Hales and Prescott-Allen, and
Figueres and Ivanova, this volume, calling for a more rigorous
approach to environmental valuation). Carefully gathered, rigorously
scrutinized, and thoroughly peer-reviewed information on the types
of threats to which we are exposed, the risks they pose, the degree of
harm threatened, and the value of the damage that might be inﬂicted
must therefore underpin any governance debate.
As demonstrated by Speth and others throughout this volume, and
elsewhere in the literature (Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 1993; Hempel,
1996; Vogler, 2000; Vig and Kraft, 2000), the evidence suggests both
that investment in global scale environmental protection makes sense
and that the current approach is not delivering good results. The ques
tion is not whether to design a structure of global environmental gov
ernance, but how. Therefore, we turn to a set of reform options.

Refine the Status Quo

A number of commentators (Juma, 2000; von Moltke, 2001a; Najam,
2002, forthcoming) believe that the most feasible way to improve
global environmental results is to revitalize the existing regime cen
tered on the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). They argue that
what is missing is political will and claim that we have never tried to
make the current system work. Thus, their reform package focuses on
giving UNEP a sharper mandate, bolstering its funding, and develop
ing better coordination across UN bodies.
On a practical level, those who favor a reﬁned status quo generally
fear that any broader gauge reform effort will fall ﬂat politically. They
emphasize the difﬁculty of carrying out fundamental changes within
the UN system and point to the likely bureaucratic obstruction and
ﬁerce turf battles that would be triggered by any program of wholesale
restructuring. Others say that energies put into revolutionizing the
global environmental regime are misplaced. The priority, they suggest,
should be strengthening national level environmental capacity.





  

Some proponents of a reﬁne-the-status-quo strategy also argue
that proposals to consolidate global-scale environmental responsibili
ties might diminish the effectiveness of the system. They note that the
range of problems that must be addressed is diverse, making a decen
tralized structure of multiple international organizations and individ
ual treaty secretariats a virtue. Other reformers have argued for a
“clustering” of the various pieces of the existing environmental regime
so as to improve policy coherence, tighten potential cross-issue link
ages, and avoid the duplication of effort that comes from full decen
tralization (von Moltke, 2001b; UNEP, 2001a, 2001b).

Launch a Global Environmental Organization

Proposals for major structural reform derive from the conclusion that
the existing global-scale environmental architecture is deeply dysfunc
tional and structurally ﬂawed, making a fresh start easier than reform
along the margins. A number of leading politicians (Ruggiero, 1998;
Chirac, 2001; Gorbachev, 2001; Panitchpakdi, 2001), academics
(Runge, 1994, 2001; Esty, 1994a, 1994b; Biermann, 2000; Schellnhuber
et al., 2000; Whalley and Zissimos, 2001) and others (Charnovitz,
2002; Zedillo Commission, 2001) have come to this conclusion.
Beyond the difﬁculties of trying to ﬁx a failed structure, those arguing
for a new approach often note that the existing regime was designed
for a pre-globalization era, before the full spectrum of worldwide
environmental problems was understood and the depth of current
economic integration was achieved.
The substantive case for a major overhaul of the environmental
regime builds on a number of arguments: (1) the “public goods” logic,
which suggests that collective action must be organized at the scale of
the problem to be addressed (Olson, 1971), combined with the
recognition that some problems arise at a worldwide scale, making
national level responses inadequate; (2) the potential to overcome the
fragmentation of the current structure, to obtain synergies in
addressing problems, and to take advantage of opportunities for better
issue prioritization, budget rationalization, and bureaucratic
coordination; (3) the beneﬁt of having a body that could serve as a
counterpoint and a counterweight to the World Trade Organization,
the World Bank, and the other international economic institutions,
thus ensuring that environmental sensitivities are systematically built

  

into the international economic regime; and (4) the practical value of
having an authoritative international body with a ﬁrst-rate staff, a
reputation for analytic rigor, and the capacity to take on tasks such as
dispute resolution.

Develop a New Governance Approach: A Global Environmental
Mechanism

Another option for strengthening global environmental governance
focuses on creating a structure that can deliver the functions needed at
the global level. Such an approach acknowledges the diversity and
dynamism of environmental problems and recognizes the need for
specialized responses. Proponents of a Global Environmental
Mechanism (GEM) argue that no bureaucratic structure can build an
internal organization with the requisite knowledge and expertise to
address the wide-ranging, dynamic, and interconnected problems we
now face (GEM PAG, 2002; Esty and Ivanova, this volume). The issues
demanding immediate attention arise on various geographic scales,
requiring a multi-tier response structure (Esty, 1999). They demand
capacities in multiple areas, including ecological sciences, public
health, risk assessment, cost-beneﬁt analysis, performance measure
ment, and policy evaluation. What is necessary is not only a multi-tier
but also a multi-dimensional governance structure (Esty, 2003, forth
coming). Today’s global environmental governance challenge thus
requires a more virtual structure with a multi-institutional founda
tion capable of drawing in a wide array of underlying disciplines
through governments, the private sector, NGOs, and global public pol
icy networks.
As we argue in this volume, a Global Environmental Mechanism
could emerge in various ways, driven by functional needs. Its core
capacities might include: (1) provision of adequate information and
analysis to characterize problems, track trends, and identify interests;
(2) creation of a “policy space” for environmental negotiation and bar
gaining; and (3) sustained build up of capacity for addressing issues of
agreed-upon concern and significance. A Global Environmental
Mechanism could build upon the expertise of existing institutions and
create new mechanisms where key functions were deemed to be non
existent or inadequate. Initial elements might comprise a global infor
mation clearinghouse with mechanisms for data collection, assess





  

ment, monitoring, and analysis; a global technology clearinghouse
with mechanisms for technology transfer and identiﬁcation and dis
semination of best practices; and a bargaining forum, along the lines
proposed by Whalley and Zissimos in this volume, to facilitate deals
that improve environmental quality and reconcile the interests of dif
ferent parties.
While it would take time to weave the dense fabric of relationships
across actors and institutions that is required for successful global
environmental governance, the concept of a Global Environmental
Mechanism would allow for the progressive growth of the regime. It
could begin with “the art of the possible” and gradually assemble the
elements of an effective institutional structure as issues and mecha
nisms are identiﬁed and developed, building on a core set of functions
such as information provision and a mechanism for dissemination of
policy and technology strategies. A Global Environmental Mechanism
could expand into more ambitious domains such as bargaining, tradeoffs, norm development, and dispute settlement as (and only if) the
value of those activities is demonstrated. A Global Environmental
Mechanism offers a new model of governance that is light, more vir
tual and networked, and potentially more entrepreneurial and efﬁ
cient.

toward effective action
In deciding what route to take, careful thinking is needed about what
is required from the international environmental regime. The chapters
in this volume identify a number of critical roles and functions in a
global environmental governance system:

•
•
•
•
•

Problem identiﬁcation and deﬁnition;
Analysis and option evaluation;
Policy discussion and coordination;
Financing and support for action;
Outreach and legitimacy.

  

Problem Identification and Definition

Understanding the range of pollution control and natural resource
management issues the world community faces requires good data
and information. As Hales and Prescott-Allen demonstrate in their
chapter, the foundations for effective decisionmaking in the interna
tional environmental and sustainable development realm do not exist.
With a better picture of the problem set and issue trends, the logic of
collective action at the global scale would be clearer and the speciﬁc
institutional needs might come into sharper focus. Such clarity would
help to deﬁne the challenge, furnish us with a compass and a
roadmap, and make it easier to identify the best path forward.

Analysis and Option Evaluation

Progress depends on more than data. Once a problem is identiﬁed, it
must be studied so that the risks it poses are understood and the costs
and beneﬁts of action or inaction can be calculated. Given the range
of issues that must be addressed and the variety of circumstances
under which these issues arise, those responding to international envi
ronmental challenges need access to signiﬁcant analytic capacity.
Without a global-scale policymaking apparatus, however, critical
transboundary issues will likely be neglected (Dua and Esty, 1997).
And as Karlsson argues in this volume, the high degree of uncertain
ty that exists in the environmental domain and the diversity of under
lying values and assumptions means that the analytic process needs to
draw on a wide range of perspectives.
Managing interdependence in the context of great diversity seems
to call for an “open architecture” of decisionmaking that encourages
data, information, risk assessments, cost-benefit analysis, policy
options, and evaluations to be brought forward not just by govern
ments, but by the business community, environmental groups, and
others in civil society who can enrich the foundation on which deci
sions are made. In their chapter, Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu highlight
some of the beneﬁts of a more open and inclusive governance process.
Streck’s analysis in this volume explains, moreover, how global public
policy networks can forge effective working arrangements across sec
tors and could be part of the answer to the complexity of internation
al environmental problems and the diversity of perspectives that need
to be considered.





  

Policy Discussion and Coordination

Successful intervention to address environmental challenges requires
more than analysis; a course of policy action must be agreed upon and
executed. Getting all of the relevant parties on board an action plan is
never easy. Coordinating effective policies in the international sphere
is especially difﬁcult. There is, of course, no global legislature. Thus,
one of the critical functions that a global environmental regime must
serve is as a forum for dialogue. As Koh and Robinson stress in their
analysis in this volume, the current consensus-driven approach to
internalize problem solving has resulted in multiple political agree
ments, but has failed in implementation. What is needed is a mecha
nism for generating on-the-ground progress. Whalley and Zissimos,
in their chapter, suggest a novel option: a “policy space” for sustained
environmental interaction, negotiation, and bargaining. Such a forum
might engage not only governments in trying to forge multi-country
“deals” to address particular issues, but could also draw in the business
community and other potential parties.

Financing and Support for Action

Real progress cannot be achieved without resources – and to date the
commitments made in this regard have generally been regarded as
inadequate. Another aspect of the global environmental regime that
therefore demands attention is funding. The financial support
required for action could come from a variety of sources: (1) increased
government funding and development assistance; (2) a redirection of
existing funding, perhaps through a “rechartering” of the World Bank
and the UN Development Programme (UNDP); (3) increased eco
nomic growth and better channeling of private capital ﬂows (includ
ing foreign direct investment (FDI) and national private sector invest
ments); and (4) new commitments of resources from foundations,
enlightened citizens, and social entrepreneurs. Given the magnitude of
the challenge it seems likely that all of these strategies will need to be
pursued. In this volume, Koch-Weser offers an innovative strategy for
jump-starting this process through a Johannesburg Commission on
Sustainable Development Finance.

  

Outreach and Legitimacy

A further challenge in the global governance arena emerges from the
need for legitimacy. At the national level, governments are usually
elected and thus derive authority and legitimacy from their “popular
sovereignty.” International decisionmaking inevitably involves ofﬁ
cials whose claim to power does not derive directly from having won
elections. Because they are somewhat removed from the majority
vote-based popular sovereignty, international organizations must
make special efforts to ensure their legitimacy (Esty, 2002). They must
build bridges to publics around the world, and explain their decision
processes, drawing in views and guidance from the citizens of the
world community on whose behalf they are meant to act. NGOs can
play a useful role in this give-and-take. As Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu
explain in their chapter, international organizations must also
demonstrate their effectiveness and thus the value of their role as
coordinators of worldwide action.
International bodies in general, and any global environmental
regime in particular, must also be perceived as fair and equitable.
Fairness encompasses both procedural and substantive elements.
Procedural fairness requires access to decisionmaking on an equitable
basis, with both a horizontal dimension – across governments and
bridging the North-South divide – and a vertical dimension – pro
viding individuals and groups as well as governments a chance to be
heard. As Figueres and Ivanova suggest in this volume, substantive
fairness demands that the polluter pays principle be enforced and the
“ability to pay” be recognized in setting the course of international
action and in deciding how the costs of intervention will be borne.

the johannesburg opportunity
As we hope this volume has demonstrated, there are many paths to
progress in global environmental governance. The creation of a func
tioning and effective environmental regime will require years of work
and reﬁnement. But windows of opportunity to deﬁne the agenda and
take major steps do not come around all that often. One exists in 2002:
the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.





  

We urge the countries participating in the Johannesburg process to
seize the opportunity and demonstrate a commitment to action with
four concrete initiatives, addressing:

•
•
•
•

Global environmental data and information;
Financing for sustainable development;
Technology promotion;
Exploration of options for strengthening global environmental
governance.

Global Environmental Data and Information

The weak foundations for global-scale environmental decisionmaking
could be shored up with a modest commitment of resources to a new
coordinated program of global environmental data gathering and
information sharing. Building on existing efforts, such an initiative
might focus on ensuring that a core set of baseline environmental
indicators (covering air, water, and land) were tracked in every coun
try in the world on a methodologically consistent and rigorous basis
that would permit cross-country comparisons. Furthermore, individ
ual countries or regional groupings might supplement the global data
set with additional metrics addressing local priorities.
Information systems could reveal new policy options and lead to
better decisionmaking, improved performance, and greater efﬁciency
through reduced uncertainty, enhanced comparative analysis, and
greater ability to deﬁne points of policy leverage. Data that are com
parable across countries also facilitate benchmarking and the identiﬁ
cation of best practices, creating both a spur to lagging jurisdictions
and a guide for all. A more “measured” approach to environmental
problem solving would not only enhance analysis and decisionmak
ing, it would make it easier to evaluate policy and program perform
ance, track on-the-ground progress in addressing pollution control
and natural resource management challenges, and identify successful
(and unsuccessful) efforts and approaches.

  

Financing for Sustainable Development

Any commitment to enhanced global environmental efforts must
come in the context of a “global bargain” that commits the world
community to a more aggressive program of poverty alleviation. The
Johannesburg process creates an opportunity for such a dual commit
ment with a major initiative to promote economic progress across the
developing world. Such an initiative might include several elements:
(1) an expanded emphasis on phasing out trade barriers and broader
commitments toward progress in the Doha Development Round; (2)
a rechartering of the World Bank and UNDP to redouble their efforts
to promote development in the poorest countries and to ﬁnance glob
al public goods, including environmental programs; and (3) a new
mechanism (or, at least, the launching of a process to create a new
mechanism) to promote ﬁnancing for sustainable development har
nessing government, business, foundation, and individual resources.

Technology Promotion

“Technology transfer” has become a buzzword. But too little has been
done to translate the concept into action. A step forward could be
taken by launching a technology initiative that would seek to make use
of Information Age breakthroughs to resolve international environ
mental challenges. Beginning perhaps as a technology clearinghouse,
such a facility might ultimately provide a mechanism for North-South
cooperation and for creating incentives for the private sector to devel
op technologies in response to needs in both developing and devel
oped countries. Engaging leading information technology companies
in this initiative would be useful – and could be seen as part of a strat
egy to bridge the “digital divide.”

Exploration of Options for Strengthening Global Environmental
Governance

To give momentum to the process of exploring options for
strengthened global environmental governance within the context of
the Johannesburg process, a Commission could be launched to
identify and evaluate the world community’s needs in the
international environmental realm and various ways of addressing
these needs. Comprised of eminent persons from the North and the





  

South, including a number of environmental ministers as well as
distinguished business leaders, academics, and non-governmental
organization ofﬁcials, the Commission could be given a mandate to
report back within eighteen months with an evaluation of the options
and a recommended blueprint for action.

the road ahead
We have entered a new era of public policy, deﬁned by a growing num
ber of concerns that straddle national borders and transcend national
interests. Global environmental challenges represent an issue set on
which collective action is critical and through which experience could
be gained on how best to build broader mechanisms for international
cooperation. Narrow, unstructured government-to-government
approaches are no longer sufﬁcient. The global problems we current
ly face will yield only to a carefully targeted, sustained, and coordinat
ed effort involving novel coalitions of actors and innovative institu
tional arrangements.
As Speth emphasizes in the opening chapter of this volume, the
goals and principles of global environmental governance have been
elaborated over the past two decades, and “it is clearly time to launch
a second phase moving us from talk to action.” With this volume, we
hope to contribute to the unfolding debate on concrete options and
opportunities for strengthening global environmental governance.
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